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Moral Status (moral + status)
Selected AbstractsTotipotency and the Moral Status of Embryos: New Problems for an Old ArgumentJOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2004William J. FitzPatrick First page of article [source] Divisibility and the Moral Status of EmbryosBIOETHICS, Issue 5-6 2001Christian Munthe The phenomenon of twinning in early fetal development has become a popular source for doubt regarding the ascription of moral status to early embryos. In this paper, the possible moral basis for such a line of reasoning is critically analysed with sceptical results. Three different versions of the argument from twinning are considered, all of which are found to rest on confusions between the actual division of embryos involved in twinning and the property of early embryos to be divisible, to be based on highly questionable ethical assumptions, or to imply inconsistent claims regarding the moral importance of potentiality and/or the moral status of embryos. This is taken to expose a number of related inconsistencies in the moral basis of pro-life positions. In particular, ascribing moral significance to the property of being (in)divisible is found to be incompatible with the claim that human individuals possess unique values which could underpin an absolute moral ban on murder. [source] SELECTIVE ABORTION IN BRAZIL: THE ANENCEPHALY CASEDEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS, Issue 2 2007DEBORA DINIZ ABSTRACT This paper discusses the Brazilian Supreme Court ruling on the case of anencephaly. In Brazil, abortion is a crime against the life of a fetus, and selective abortion of non-viable fetuses is prohibited. Following a paradigmatic case discussed by the Brazilian Supreme Court in 2004, the use of abortion was authorized in the case of a fetus with anencephaly. The objective of this paper is to analyze the ethical arguments of the case, in particular the strategy of avoiding the moral status of the fetus, the cornerstone thesis of the Catholic Church. [source] Objectification leads to depersonalization: The denial of mind and moral concern to objectified othersEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2010Steve Loughnan Philosophers have argued that when people are objectified they are treated as if they lack the mental states and moral status associated with personhood. These aspects of objectification have been neglected by psychologists. This research investigates the role of depersonalization in objectification. In Study 1, objectified women were attributed less mind and were accorded lesser moral status than non-objectified women. In Study 2, we replicated this effect with male and female targets and extended it to include perceptions of competence and pain attribution. Further, we explored whether target and perceiver gender qualify depersonalization. Overall, this research indicates that when people are objectified they are denied personhood. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The ethics of evidence-based patient choiceHEALTH EXPECTATIONS, Issue 2 2001Michael Parker BEd PhD In this paper I analyse the ethical implications of the concept of ,evidence-based patient choice' in the light of criticism of the ,individualism' of patient-centred medicine. I argue that individualism in the sense used by the critics of patient centred medicine is not an inevitable consequence of an emphasis on patient choice and that a concern with the promotion of individual choices is not incompatible with ,communitarian' values. Indeed, I argue that any ethical approach to decision-making in health-care must be capable of taking seriously both the moral status of the individual (and of his or her choices) and the moral significance of the social dimensions of such choices. The best way to ensure respect for the principle of autonomy, I suggest, is to facilitate and encourage social interactions of a particular, deliberative, kind. This is also the best way to ensure that the broader public interest is taken into account in decision-making. [source] The Origination of a Human Being: A Reply to OderbergJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2009INGMAR PERSSON abstract Recently David S. Oderberg has tried to refute three arguments that have been advanced in favour of the view that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. These arguments turn on the absence of differentiation between the embryoblast and trophoblast, the possibility of monozygotic twinning, and the totipotency of the cells during the first days after fertilization. It is here contended that Oderberg fails to rebut these arguments, though it is conceded that the first two arguments are not conclusive. They do, however, make it at least as reasonable to deny this early origination as to affirm it. It should be noticed that this is all that is needed by those who have used these arguments to dispute that something with a special moral status exists right from fertilization. Nonetheless, it will be seen that the third argument could be developed to the point of giving a conclusive reason to believe that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. [source] The Human Genome Project , threat or promise?JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY RESEARCH, Issue 7 2003B. Carmichael Abstract This paper reflects on some of the arguments against screening from the perspective of a relative of individuals with Fragile X syndrome. It proposes to think about intellectual disability (ID) as including a wide range of limitations beyond that of only the mental handicap. It argues that these limitations impose conditions upon both people with disabilities and their parents, as well as upon their siblings, that in various ways amount to suffering. The claim that people with disabilities are enriching the lives of their relatives is rejected. Furthermore, it is argued that those who ascribe a high moral status to people with disabilities tend to neglect that society does not make much of an effort to offer the necessary support to materialize this status. The claim that screening negatively affects the moral status of persons with ID is rebutted on grounds of the freedom of choice. [source] Moral Emotions and Social Activism: The Case of Animal RightsJOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, Issue 3 2009Harold A. Herzog Why do some people and not others become involved in social movements? We examined the relationships between a moral emotion,disgust,and animal activism, attitudes toward animal welfare, and consumption of meat. Participants were recruited through two social networking websites and included animal activists, promoters of animal use, and participants not involved in animal-related causes. They took an online survey which included measures of sensitivity to visceral disgust, attitudes toward animal welfare, and frequency of meat eating. Animal activists were more sensitive to visceral disgust than were promoters of animal use or nonaligned participants. Disgust sensitivity was positively correlated with attitudes toward animal welfare but not with meat consumption. The relationship between animal activism and vegetarianism was complex; nearly half of animal activists ate meat, and half of the vegetarians did not consider themselves to be animal activists. We argue that conflicts over the moral status of animals reflect fundamental differences in moral intuitions. [source] Sexuality, Color, and Stigma among Northeast Brazilian WomenMEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2004L. A. REBHUN Despite its international image as a sexually free-spirited country, local attitudes toward morality of sexual behavior remain complex throughout Brazil, especially in rural areas and the conservative Northeast region. In addition, notwithstanding its official ideology of nonracism, African ancestry as judged through personal appearance (color) constitutes a significant social and economic disadvantage. Using Goffman's idea of "spoiled identity" as a starting point, I show how locals use sexual behavior as a multivocal symbol of moral status in women, and how spoiled sexual reputation interacts with other stigmatized statuses, especially color. I also consider how the acquisition of sexually stigmatized status jeopardizes women's well-being and that of their children. [Brazil, color, gender, sexuality, stigma, women] [source] KILLING EMBRYOS FOR STEM CELL RESEARCHMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 2-3 2007JEFF MCMAHAN Abstract: The main objection to human embryonic stem cell research is that it involves killing human embryos, which are essentially beings of the same sort that you and I are. This objection presupposes that we once existed as early embryos and that we had the same moral status then that we have now. This essay challenges both those presuppositions, but focuses primarily on the first. I argue first that these presuppositions are incompatible with widely accepted beliefs about both assisted conception and monozygotic twinning. I then argue that we never existed as embryos. If this last claim is right, killing an embryo does not kill someone like you or me but merely prevents one of us from existing. [source] Gadow's contribution to our philosophical interpretation of nursingNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2003Anne H. Bishop RN MSN EdD Abstract Sally Gadow influenced our work when we first began exploring the meaning of nursing philosophically. In this article, we discuss two major themes of Gadow's work that have influenced us: existential advocacy and treating the body objectively without reducing the patient to the moral status of an object. Our treatment of these issues is appreciative but not uncritical. We argue that existential advocacy makes an important contribution to the meaning of nursing but that it cannot be its essential meaning. We contend that Gadow, by making self-direction the essence of care, tends to diminish the intersubjective nature of care. Then we show how Gadow recovers the intersubjective nature of care by disclosing how nurses and patients both become subjects in personal relationships, even when tending to the body objectively. We show how hermeneutic phenomenology, which we favour, can contribute to Gadow's existential phenomenology by using examples from nursing practice to disclose the meaning of nursing. Gadow's major contribution to our work has been in the ways her work has evoked creative thought from us concerning the meaning of nursing. [source] Stem Cell Research as Innovation: Expanding the Ethical and Policy ConversationTHE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS, Issue 2 2010Rebecca Dresser Research using human embryonic stem cells raises an array of complex ethical issues, including, but by no means limited to, the moral status of developing human life. Unfortunately much of the public discussion fails to take into account this complexity. Advocacy for liberal and conservative positions on human embryonic stem cell research can be simplistic and misleading. Ethical concepts such as truth-telling, scientific integrity, and social justice should be part of the debate over federal support for human embryonic stem cell research. Moreover, the debate should be conducted in accord with principles of deliberative democracy, including respect for people holding competing views. [source] ELECTIVE TWIN REDUCTIONS: EVIDENCE AND ETHICSBIOETHICS, Issue 6 2010LEAH MCCLIMANS ABSTRACT Twelve years ago the British media got wind of a London gynecologist who performed an elective reduction on a twin pregnancy reducing it to a singleton. Perhaps not surprisingly, opinion on the moral status of twin reductions was divided. But in the last few years new evidence regarding the medical risks of twin pregnancies has emerged, suggesting that twin reductions are relevantly similar to the reductions performed on high-end multi-fetal pregnancies. This evidence has appeared to resolve the moral debate. In this paper I look at the role of clinical evidence in medical ethics. In particular I examine the role of clinical evidence in determining what counts as a significant harm or risk. First, I challenge the extent to which these empirical claims are descriptive, suggesting instead that the evidence is to some degree normative in character. Second, I question whether such empirical claims should count as evidence for what are essentially difficult ethical decisions , a role they appear to play in the case of elective reductions. I will argue that they should not, primarily because the value-laden nature of this evidence conceals much of what is ethically at stake. It is important to recognize that empirical evidence cannot be a substitute for ethical deliberation. [source] PARENTAL VIRTUE: A NEW WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THE MORALITY OF REPRODUCTIVE ACTIONSBIOETHICS, Issue 4 2007ROSALIND MCDOUGALL ABSTRACT In this paper I explore the potential of virtue ethical ideas to generate a new way of thinking about the ethical questions surrounding the creation of children. Applying ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to the parental sphere specifically, I develop a framework for the moral assessment of reproductive actions that centres on the concept of parental virtue. I suggest that the character traits of the good parent can be used as a basis for determining the moral permissibility of a particular reproductive action. I posit three parental virtues and argue that we can see the moral status of a reproductive action as determined by the relationship between such an action and (at least) these virtues. Using a case involving selection for deafness, I argue that thinking in terms of the question ,would a virtuous parent do this?' when morally assessing reproductive action is a viable and useful way of thinking about issues in reproductive ethics. [source] Divisibility and the Moral Status of EmbryosBIOETHICS, Issue 5-6 2001Christian Munthe The phenomenon of twinning in early fetal development has become a popular source for doubt regarding the ascription of moral status to early embryos. In this paper, the possible moral basis for such a line of reasoning is critically analysed with sceptical results. Three different versions of the argument from twinning are considered, all of which are found to rest on confusions between the actual division of embryos involved in twinning and the property of early embryos to be divisible, to be based on highly questionable ethical assumptions, or to imply inconsistent claims regarding the moral importance of potentiality and/or the moral status of embryos. This is taken to expose a number of related inconsistencies in the moral basis of pro-life positions. In particular, ascribing moral significance to the property of being (in)divisible is found to be incompatible with the claim that human individuals possess unique values which could underpin an absolute moral ban on murder. [source] | ||||||||||||||||