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Moral Self (moral + self)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Psychology42%

Selected Abstracts

Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010
Kristján Kristjánsson
Abstract In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a ,moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as ,identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education. [source]

Realist Versus Anti-Realist Moral Selves,and the Irrelevance of Narrativism

JOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2009
KRISTJÁN KRISTJÁNSSON
This paper has three aims. The first is to subject to critical analysis the intractable debate between realists and anti-realists about the status of the so-called (moral) self, a debate that traverses various academic disciplines and discursive fields. Realism about selves has fallen on hard times of late, and the second aim of this paper is to get it back on track. Traditional substantive conceptions of the self contain ontological baggage that many moderns will be loath to carry. This paper settles for a more moderate aim, a "softer" kind of self-realism derived from an unlikely source,Hume,and outlines the Humean moral self and its possible advantages. The third and subsidiary aim is to challenge the view that recent "narrative" conceptions of selfhood have made the old realism versus anti-realism debate redundant. "Narrativism" about selves turns out to do little more than recycle old arguments in fancy new packages. [source]

Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010
Kristján Kristjánsson
Abstract In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a ,moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as ,identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education. [source]

Realist Versus Anti-Realist Moral Selves,and the Irrelevance of Narrativism

JOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2009
KRISTJÁN KRISTJÁNSSON
This paper has three aims. The first is to subject to critical analysis the intractable debate between realists and anti-realists about the status of the so-called (moral) self, a debate that traverses various academic disciplines and discursive fields. Realism about selves has fallen on hard times of late, and the second aim of this paper is to get it back on track. Traditional substantive conceptions of the self contain ontological baggage that many moderns will be loath to carry. This paper settles for a more moderate aim, a "softer" kind of self-realism derived from an unlikely source,Hume,and outlines the Humean moral self and its possible advantages. The third and subsidiary aim is to challenge the view that recent "narrative" conceptions of selfhood have made the old realism versus anti-realism debate redundant. "Narrativism" about selves turns out to do little more than recycle old arguments in fancy new packages. [source]

Coercive treatment for drug misuse: a dialogical juncture

JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2004
Christine Horrocks
Abstract This article adopts a ,dialogical' relational perspective to explore the recently introduced initiative of coercive treatment for drug misuse in the UK. Conversational interviews were undertaken with 11 people who had been sentenced to the Drug Treatment and Testing Order. Receiving treatment for drug misuse is often storied within a motivational account that is expectant of a ,readiness to change'; such assumptions seem theoretically problematic when change is legally imposed. Therefore, moral and ethical concerns surround the introduction of this initiative, however the interview data illustrates the potential that participation might offer for the creation of ,counterstories' where a more moral self can be enacted. Our analysis suggests that this counterstory is co-constructed thus being an outcome of both self and other. Furthermore such stories appear fragile; constantly under assault from detrimental authoritative discourses that are not only part of wider social understandings around drug misuse but also permeate the policy and practice of coercive treatment. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Being good in Ramadan: ambivalence, fragmentation, and the moral self in the lives of young Egyptians

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, Issue 2009
Samuli Schielke
So much has been written in recent years on Muslims who consciously and consistently aim to be pious, moral, and disciplined that the vast majority of Muslims who , like most of humankind , are sometimes but not always pious, at times immoral, and often undisciplined have remained in the shadow of an image of Islam as a perfectionist project of self-discipline. Taking the month of Ramadan, as a time of exceptional piety, as a starting-point, this paper tries to account for the different views and experiences that young people of Muslim faith in a northern Egyptian village articulate, the models of action and subjectivity they have access to, and the contradictory outcomes that the Islamic revivalist ideal of perfection has for some of them. Résumé Il a tellement été question, ces derničres années, de musulmans consciemment et constamment soucieux d'ętre pieux, moraux et disciplinés que la grande majorité des musulmans, qui sont parfois pieux mais pas toujours, parfois immoraux et souvent indisciplinés, comme le reste de l'humanité, est restée dans l'ombre de cette image de l'islam comme projet d'autodiscipline perfectionniste. En prenant pour point de départ le Ramadan, période de piété particuličre, l'auteur tente de rendre compte de différents points de vue exprimés par les jeunes musulmans d'un village du Nord de l'Égypte, des modčle d'action et de subjectivité qui leur sont ouverts et des résultats contradictoires que donne pour certains d'entre eux l'idéal de perfection portée par l'idée d'un renouveau islamique. [source]

Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010
Kristján Kristjánsson
Abstract In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a ,moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as ,identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education. [source]