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Moral Psychology (moral + psychology)
Selected AbstractsDOES ETHICAL THEORY HAVE A PLACE IN POST-KOHLBERGIAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY?EDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 2 2010Bruce Maxwell Philosophers tend to assume that theoretical frameworks in psychology suffer from conceptual confusion and that any influence that philosophy might have on psychology should be positive. Going against this grain, Dan Lapsley and Darcia Narváez attribute the Kohlbergian paradigm's current state of marginalization within psychology to Lawrence Kohlberg's use of ethical theory in his model of cognitive moral development. Post-Kohlbergian conceptions of moral psychology, they advance, should be wary of theoretical constructs derived from folk morality, refuse philosophical starting points, and seek integration with literatures in psychology, not philosophy. In this essay, Bruce Maxwell considers and rejects Lapsley and Narváez's diagnosis. The Kohlbergian paradigm's restricted conception of the moral domain is the result of a selective reading of one tendency in ethical theorizing (Kantianism). The idea that moral psychology may find shelter from normative criticism by avoiding ethics-derived models overlooks the deeper continuity between "ethical theory" and "psychological theory." The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.1 [source] Moral Psychology and ExpressivismEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2004Robert Dunn First page of article [source] DOES ETHICAL THEORY HAVE A PLACE IN POST-KOHLBERGIAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY?EDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 2 2010Bruce Maxwell Philosophers tend to assume that theoretical frameworks in psychology suffer from conceptual confusion and that any influence that philosophy might have on psychology should be positive. Going against this grain, Dan Lapsley and Darcia Narváez attribute the Kohlbergian paradigm's current state of marginalization within psychology to Lawrence Kohlberg's use of ethical theory in his model of cognitive moral development. Post-Kohlbergian conceptions of moral psychology, they advance, should be wary of theoretical constructs derived from folk morality, refuse philosophical starting points, and seek integration with literatures in psychology, not philosophy. In this essay, Bruce Maxwell considers and rejects Lapsley and Narváez's diagnosis. The Kohlbergian paradigm's restricted conception of the moral domain is the result of a selective reading of one tendency in ethical theorizing (Kantianism). The idea that moral psychology may find shelter from normative criticism by avoiding ethics-derived models overlooks the deeper continuity between "ethical theory" and "psychological theory." The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.1 [source] Spenser's Magic, or Instrumental Aesthetics in the 1590 Faerie QueeneENGLISH LITERARY RENAISSANCE, Issue 2 2006Genevieve Guenther This essay historically contextualizes and analyzes the literary aesthetic Spenser develops in the 1590 Faerie Queene to the end of fashioning his reader in virtuous discipline. Spenser is influenced by Sidney's claim that the metaphysical ideas of virtue conveyed in beautiful poetic images inspire the reader to emulation, but I argue that his epistemology is also affected by the Protestant critique of Neoplatonism and by early modern moral psychology, both of which hold that demons can place deceiving images directly into the subject's imagination. In light of this perceived danger, Spenser develops an "instrumental aesthetics of wonder," whereby the reader is inspired at once to love the beauty of ideas of virtue and to doubt the provenance of their images in his mind's eye. The aesthetics of wonder are instrumental to the end of fashioning the reader, because the reader's wonder over his own imagination enacts the inward-looking self-monitoring that characterizes Spenser's disciplined subject. And the episodes representing demonic magic in the 1590 Faerie Queene most produce this instrumental aesthetic effect, for Spenser represents magic with verse so artfully ambiguous that it becomes impossible for the reader to decide whether the pictures in his mind's eye are poetic or demonic, or both. [source] Spinoza on the Problem of AkrasiaEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2010Eugene Marshall Though each is intuitive in a certain way, they both fail as explanations of the most interesting cases of akrasia. Spinoza's own thoughts on bondage and the affects follow, from which a Spinozist explanation of akrasia is constructed. This account is based in Spinoza's mechanistic psychology of cognitive affects. Because Spinoza's account explains action asissuing from modes of mind that are both cognitive and affective, it captures the intuitions that motivate the two traditional views while avoiding the pitfalls that result from their one-sided approaches. This project will allow us a fuller understanding of Spinozist moral psychology. In addition to this historical value, the Spinozist theory may offer a satisfactory explanation of certain hard cases of akrasia while avoiding the problems be set by other theories. For this reason, the Spinozist account could also be seen as a useful contribution to our philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of akrasia. [source] The Moral Psychology of Conflicts of Interest: Insights from Affective NeuroscienceJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2007PAUL THAGARD abstract This paper is an investigation of the moral psychology of decisions that involve a conflict of interest. It draws on the burgeoning field of affective neuroscience, which is the study of the neurobiology of emotional systems in the brain. I show that a recent neurocomputational model of how the brain integrates cognitive and affective information in decision-making can help to answer some important descriptive and normative questions about the moral psychology of conflicts of interest. These questions include: Why are decisions that involve conflicts of interest so common? Why are people so often unaware that they are acting immorally as the result of conflicts of interest? What is the relation of conflicts of interest to other kinds of irrationality, especially self-deception and weakness of will? What psychological, social, and logical steps can be taken to reduce the occurrence of immoral decisions resulting from conflicts of interest? I discuss five strategies for dealing with conflicts of interest: avoidance, optimal reasoning patterns, disclosure, social oversight, and understanding of neuropsychological processes. [source] Pleasure and Illusion in PlatoPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006Jessica MOSS Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic, not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason. [source] Descartes's Passions of the SoulPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2006Lisa Shapiro While Descartes's Passions of the Soul has been taken to hold a place in the history to human physiology, until recently philosophers have neglected the work. In this research summary, I set Descartes's last published work in context and then sketch out its philosophical significance. From it, we gain further insight into Descartes's solution to the Mind,Body Problem , that is, to the problem of the ontological status of the mind,body union in a human being, to the nature of body,mind causation, and to the way body-caused thoughts represent the world. In addition, the work contains Descartes's developed ethics, in his account of virtue and of the passion of générosité in particular. Through his taxonomy of the passions and the account of their regulation, we also learn more about his moral psychology. [source] | ||||||||||