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Moral Problems (moral + problem)
Selected AbstractsThe Tasks of Embodied Love: Moral Problems in Caring for Children with DisabilitiesHYPATIA, Issue 3 2002ROGER S. GOTTLIEB Neither secular moral theory nor religious ethics have had much place for persons in need of constant physical help and cognitive support, nor for those who provide care for them. Writing as the father of a fourteen-year-old daughter with multiple disabilities, I will explore some of moral issues that arise here, both from the point of view of the disabled child and from that of the child's caretaker(s). [source] Moral Problems in Medicine: A Practical CoursebookJOURNAL OF CLINICAL NURSING, Issue 5 2000Moral Problems in Medicine: A Practical Coursebook by Michael Palmer. [source] The "Nanny" Question in FeminismHYPATIA, Issue 2 2002Joan C. Tronto Are social movements responsible for their unfinished agendas? Feminist successes in opening the professions to women paved the way for the emergence of the upper middle-class two-career household. These households sometimes hire domestic servants to accomplish their child care work. If, as I shall argue, this practice is unjust and furthers social inequality, then it poses a moral problem for any feminist commitment to social justice. [source] Mortality and World HungerMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2001Rüdiger Bittner Why does world hunger hold an inferior place on the contemporary moral agenda? Proposed answer: because it is a political, not a moral problem. It is not a moral problem, because morality needs two conditions fulfilled: that those be in some way close to the agent unto whom that agent is doing something that is to be morally assessed; and that the relevant good or bad states or events can be clearly credited to some particular agent or agents. Neither condition is fulfilled in the case of world hunger. This explains morality's failure to come to grips with it. Yet, while lacking morality's endorsement, the abolition of world hunger may still be a political goal. [source] Productions of social solidarity and of social compulsion,PSYCHOTHERAPY AND POLITICS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 2 2006Janine Puget Abstract I begin from the assumption that the social groups within which people acquire subjective attributes belong to two different orders. Those of the first order follow the model of organized, closed structures that define fixed places. Examples are social institutions, the state, and the oedipal structure. The groups of the second order are ad hoc groups whose life and consistency depend on the emergence of a problem that must be solved and, therefore, on a doing together. I call these groups communities. This approach to the matter of globalization responds to a way of thinking linkage organization that privileges different ontologies and a characteristic topology for each of them. We should ask ourselves whether solidarity requires an ontological definition; whether it constitutes an ethical problem (commitment), a moral problem (behaviour or obligation), an action/doing based on a previous knowledge of one of the parties, a practice created in connection with an emerging problem, a psychic mechanism, and so on. To answer these manifold questions, I travel a path , one among many possible paths , that involves understanding solidarity as a resource and a practice referred to psychic suffering, especially in present-day Argentina. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons. Ltd. [source] Ethical aspects of technical safetyHUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS IN MANUFACTURING & SERVICE INDUSTRIES, Issue 3 2003Carl Friedrich Gethmann Uncertainty and inequality are the most important phenomena that lead to the situation in which the modern technical age, in contrast to the premodern technical phase, gives rise to specifically moral problems which in the premodern era played only a marginal role or no role at all. So modern, technically constituted societies must learn to develop from the initial perception of dangers to a rational risk assessment. To justify this ethical obligation, the first section discusses the relation between danger and risk. The problem of weighing risks is analyzed in the second section; in this context the concept of pragmatic consistency is introduced. In the third section, the term safety is explicated as a comparative concept by means of the principle of pragmatic consistency. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Hum Factors Man 13: 243,252, 2003. [source] Behavioural Genetics: Why Eugenic Selection is Preferable to EnhancementJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2006JULIAN SAVULESCU abstract Criminal behaviour is but one behavioural tendency for which a genetic influence has been suggested. Whilst this research certainly raises difficult ethical questions and is subject to scientific criticism, one recent research project suggests that for some families, criminal tendency might be predicted by genetics. In this paper, supposing this research is valid, we consider whether intervening in the criminal tendency of future children is ethically justifiable. We argue that, if avoidance of harm is a paramount consideration, such an intervention is acceptable when genetic selection is employed instead of genetic enhancement. Moreover, other moral problems in avoiding having children with a tendency to criminal behaviour, such as the prospect of social discrimination, can also be overcome. [source] Stereotypes and Moral Oversight in Conflict Resolution: What Are We Teaching?JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2002J. Harvey I examine some common trends in ,conflict management skills', particularly those focused on practical results, and argue that they involve some moral problems, like the reliance on offensive stereotypes, the censorship of moral language, the promotion of distorted relationships, and sometimes the suppression of basic rights and obligations that constitute non,consequentialist moral constraints on human interactions (including dispute resolution). Since these approaches now appear in educational institutions, they are sending dangerous messages to those least able to critically assess them, messages that denigrate the language, reflection, and interactions on which the moral life depends, thus undermining the possibility of moral education in the most fundamental sense of the phrase. [source] Scepticism about the virtue ethics approach to nursing ethicsNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2010D.Phil, Stephen Holland MA (Oxon) Abstract Nursing ethics centres on how nurses ought to respond to the moral situations that arise in their professional contexts. Nursing ethicists invoke normative approaches from moral philosophy. Specifically, it is increasingly common for nursing ethicists to apply virtue ethics to moral problems encountered by nurses. The point of this article is to argue for scepticism about this approach. First, the research question is motivated by showing that requirements on nurses such as to be kind, do not suffice to establish virtue ethics in nursing because normative rivals (such as utilitarians) can say as much; and the teleology distinctive of virtue ethics does not transpose to a professional context, such as nursing. Next, scepticism is argued for by responding to various attempts to secure a role for virtue ethics in nursing. The upshot is that virtue ethics is best left where it belongs , in personal moral life, not professional ethics , and nursing ethics is best done by taking other approaches. [source] Three versions of an ethics of careNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2009Steven D. Edwards PhD M.Phil BA(hons) Abstract The ethics of care still appeals to many in spite of penetrating criticisms of it which have been presented over the past 15 years or so. This paper tries to offer an explanation for this, and then to critically engage with three versions of an ethics of care. The explanation consists firstly in the close affinities between nursing and care. The three versions identified below are by Gilligan (1982), a second by Tronto (1993), and a third by Gastmans (2006), see also Little (1998). Each version is described and then subjected to criticism. It is concluded that where the ethics of care is presented in a distinctive way, it is at its least plausible; where it is stated in more plausible forms, it is not sufficiently distinct from nor superior to at least one other common approach to nursing ethics, namely the much-maligned ,four principles' approach. What is added by this paper to what is already known: as the article tries to explain, in spite of its being subjected to sustained criticism the ethics of care retains its appeal to many scholars. The paper tries to explain why, partly by distinguishing three different versions of an ethics of care. It is also shown that all three versions are beset with problems the least serious of which is distinctiveness from other approaches to moral problems in health care. [source] ON THE MORALITY OF GUINEA-PIG RECRUITMENTBIOETHICS, Issue 6 2010MIKHAIL VALDMAN ABSTRACT Can it be wrong to conduct medical research on human subjects even with their informed consent and even when the transaction between the subjects and researchers is expected to be mutually beneficial? This question is especially pressing today in light of the rise of a semi-professional class of ,guinea pigs', human research subjects that sell researchers a right of access to their bodies in exchange for money. Can these exchanges be morally problematic even when they are consensual and mutually beneficial? I argue that there are two general kinds of concern one can have about such transactions , concerns about the nature of what is sold and concerns about the conditions in which the selling occurs. The former involves worries about degradation and the possible wrongness of selling a right of access to one's body. These worries, I argue, are not very serious. The latter involves worries about coercion, exploitation, and undue influence , about how, by virtue of their ignorance, impulsiveness, or desperation, guinea pigs can be taken advantage of by medical researchers. These worries are quite serious but I argue that, at least in cases where the exchange between guinea pigs and researchers is consensual and mutually beneficial, they do not raise insurmountable moral problems. [source] Credit accessibility and corporate social responsibility in financial institutions: the case of microfinanceBUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 4 2009Francesc Prior What are financial institutions' social responsibilities in developing countries? On the one hand, these institutions share the generic responsibilities of all human organizations and business enterprises. However, their specific social responsibility is the performance of the social function of financial intermediaries, which, in the case of emerging countries, consists mainly of contributing to economic growth and solving the problem of poverty. This paper describes a number of technical-economic and moral problems that take us to a consideration of the performance of banking operations in microfinancing, with special reference to Latin America. The paper also provides a series of recommendations that, in addition to contributing to solving the development and poverty problems in emerging countries, help define financial institutions' social responsibility in such countries. [source] Contesting the New York Community: From Liminality to the "New Normal" in the Wake of September 11CITY & COMMUNITY, Issue 3 2004Courtney B. Abrams This article explores the processes involved in the construction and contestation of community in New York City following the disaster of September 11, 2001. By employing insights from the literatures on disaster and cultural meaning making, we examine how New Yorkers created and negotiated the meanings of the cultural, symbolic, and moral problems that followed the attacks. Though this postdisaster period has come to be heralded as one that witnessed a spontaneous and uniform rise in patriotism, helping behaviors, and memorial practices, we demonstrate that New Yorkers actively contested and negotiated these terrains. We argue that the tension inherent in this contestation was rooted in uncertainty about identity, interaction, and the boundaries of community in the wake of the attacks, and that its negotiation resulted in a structure of feeling that was fraught with lingering inconsistencies. This was ultimately taken for granted and incorporated into the cultural framework of the "new normal," marking the collapse of the acute liminality of the New York community's postdisaster experience. [source] | |||||||||||||