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Moral Philosophy (moral + philosophy)
Selected AbstractsDouble Vision: Moral Philosophy and Shakespearean Drama by zamir, tzachiJOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM, Issue 2 2008STEPHANIE PATRIDGE No abstract is available for this article. [source] Religious Ethics, History, and the Rise of Modern Moral Philosophy: Focus IntroductionJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 2 2000Jennifer A. Herdt In this introduction to a cluster of three articles on eighteenth-century ethics written by Mark Larrimore, John Bowlin, and Mark Cladis, the author maintains that although the broad narrative tracing the emergence of a religiously neutral or naturalistic moral language in the eighteenth century is a familiar one, many central questions concerning this development remain unanswered and require further historical study. Against those who contend that historical study is antecedent to, but not part of, the proper substance of religious ethics, the author argues that historical and normative studies are interdependent, each helping to define the questions central to the other. The introduction concludes with an overview of the three articles and suggests ways in which religious ethicists can, in the future, make a distinctive contribution to the history of ethics. [source] Does the Study of Literature Belong Within Moral Philosophy?PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 4 2000Reflections in the Light of Ryle's Thought First page of article [source] Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kan's Moral PhilosophyPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative content of our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by a seemingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent on the contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing from them differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, Korsgaard takes Kantian autonomy to mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in universalizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accommodated within a Kantian framework. After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person's practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to "constructivism" and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people's actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it. [source] Melancholy and the Care of the Soul: Religion, Moral Philosophy and Madness in Early Modern England.THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 6 2008By Jeremy Schmidt No abstract is available for this article. [source] Dangerous and severe personality disorder: an ethical concept?NURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2005Sally Glen phd ma rn Abstract Most clinicians and mental health practitioners are reluctant to work with people with dangerous and severe personality disorders because they believe there is nothing that mental health services can offer. Dangerous and severe personality disorder also signals a diagnosis which is problematic morally. Moral philosophy has not found an adequate way of dealing with personality disorders. This paper explores the question: What makes a person morally responsible for his actions and what is a legitimate mitigating factor? How do psychiatric nurses working with this client group understand the awful things some clients do? What concepts do they need, if they are to know how to explain and how to react? It is suggested that dangerous and severe personality disorder is best regarded as a moral category, framed in terms of goodness, badness, obligation and other ethical concepts. It seems plausible that in important ways the dangerous and severe personality disordered client does not understand morality or understands it differently. The peculiar position of the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual in our system of moral responsibility stems from his apparent inability to see the importance of the interests of others. It might be more helpful to regard personality disordered clients as we do children: partially but not fully reasonable for their actions. We might regard the dangerous and severe personality disordered client responsible for those actions which he most clearly understands, such as causing others physical pain, but not for those with which he is only superficially engaged, such as causing emotional pain. The paper concludes by suggesting that the dangerous and severe personality disordered individual does not fit easily into any conventional moral category, be it criminal, patient, animal or child, and thus an assessment of his moral accountability must take into consideration his special circumstances. [source] John Dewey's "Wholly Original Philosophy" and Its Significance for MuseumsCURATOR THE MUSEUM JOURNAL, Issue 2 2006George E. Hein He attempted to construct a philosophical system that incorporated life as it is lived, not in some ideal form. He rejected all dualisms, such as those between thought and action, fine and applied arts, or stimulus and response. An analysis of "experience" (defined as almost synonymous with "culture") is central to Dewey's writing and leads him to emphasize process, continuity, and development, rather than static, absolute concepts. This paper examines the significance of Dewey's educational views for museum exhibitions and education programs, and his complex definitions of relevant concepts, with special emphasis on his interpretation of "experience." Dewey's faith in democracy and his moral philosophy require that the value of any educational activity depends on its social consequences as well as its intellectual content, a proposition that is discussed and applied to museums. This argument suggests that exhibitions and programs can strengthen democracy by promoting skills that improve visitors' ability to become critical thinkers and by directly addressing controversial issues, taking the side of social justice and democracy. [source] On the justification for civil commitmentACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA, Issue 399 2000G. Høyer This paper explores some of the controversies in the debate regarding the justification of civil commitment. The sometimes conflicting values reflected in the mental health legislation, human rights principles, moral philosophy and psychiatric professional standards are discussed. In spite of the often substantial use of civil commitment in many countries, there are almost no scientifically sound studies addressing the outcome of coercive treatment. The paper establishes that the traditional arguments in favour of civil commitment, like lack of insight and competence as well as the effectiveness of civil commitment, are poorly founded. The paper concludes that there seems to be a general agreement that civil commitment of patients who are dangerous to themselves or others should be the responsibility of the mental health care system, while civil commitment for treatment purposes is more controversial and hard to justify. [source] Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of MoralityHYPATIA, Issue 4 2004Charles WrightArticle first published online: 16 DEC 200 Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay "Playfulness,,World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception" reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy. [source] The ethical nature of critical research in information systemsINFORMATION SYSTEMS JOURNAL, Issue 2 2008Bernd Carsten Stahl Abstract., Critical research in information systems is based on and inspired by ethics and morality. In order to support this proposition, this paper will suggest a way of classifying critical research that differs from definitions common IS research. According to the current definition, research is critical when it is motivated by the intention to change social realities and promote emancipation. Based on this critical intention, critical research is furthermore characterized by critical topics, critical theories, and critical methodologies. Using these criteria of critical research, the paper argues that critical research is ethical in nature. To support this view, the paper introduces the concepts of ethics and morality by analysing two traditions of moral philosophy, here called the ,German tradition' and the ,French tradition'. Using three examples of current critical research in information systems, the paper will show that ethics and morality strongly influence critical intention, topics and theories. Having thus established the ethical nature of critical research, the paper concludes by discussing the weaknesses of critical research from the point of view of ethics and morality. [source] William Law and The Fable of the BeesJOURNAL FOR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES, Issue 3 2009ANDREW STARKIE Abstract Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees (1723), an influential work of moral and economic theory, was decried as a libertine publication. The response of William Law to Mandeville, Remarks on the Fable of the Bees (1724), attacked the work on both the rational and the rhetorical level. Despite his reputation as a pious High-Churchman, Law was as adept as his opponent at employing the fashionable rhetoric of wit and irony. He appealed to Newtonian and Lockean ideas, and made alliance with Low-Church and Whig moralists in articulating a realist moral philosophy in opposition to Mandeville's libertinism. [source] Mind Reading, Deception and the Evolution of Kantian Moral AgentsJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2004ALEJANDRO ROSAS Classical evolutionary explanations of social behavior classify behaviors from their effects, not from their underlying mechanisms. Here lies a potential objection against the view that morality can be explained by such models, e.g. Trivers'reciprocal altruism. However, evolutionary theory reveals a growing interest in the evolution of psychological mechanisms and factors them in as selective forces. This opens up perspectives for evolutionary approaches to problems that have traditionally worried moral philosophers. Once the ability to mind-read is factored-in among the relevant variables in the evolution of moral abilities and counted among the selection pressures that have plausibly shaped our nature as moral agents, an evolutionary approach can contribute, so I will argue, to the solution of a long-standing debate in moral philosophy and psychology concerning the basic motivation for moral behavior. [source] Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009KATE A. MORAN There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related ,fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy. [source] Capability as Opportunity: How Amartya Sen Revises Equal OpportunityJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 1 2002Harlan Beckley Although the concept of equal opportunity has received scant attention from theological ethics, it attracts widespread approval in the U.S. popular culture and has been examined extensively by contemporary moral philosophy. Amartya Sen's conception of capabilities as "freedom" or "real opportunity" corrects deficiencies in both popular and philosophical conceptions of equal opportunity that ignore interpersonal variations in mental, physical, and psychological abilities beyond agents' control. Recent theologically informed conceptions of love and common grace affirm and revise Sen's conception of equal capability as equal opportunity. The resulting understanding of equal opportunity is quite different from some uses of this concept and could be an important criterion for a just society. [source] MORAL PARTICULARISM AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICEMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4-5 2008BRENDAN LARVOR Abstract: Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons. [source] ENVY'S NARRATIVE SCRIPTS: CYPRIAN, BASIL, AND THE MONASTIC SAGES ON THE ANATOMY AND CURE OF THE INVIDIOUS EMOTIONSMODERN THEOLOGY, Issue 1 2009PAUL M. BLOWERS Incorporating Martha Nussbaum's work on the "intelligence" of human emotions in Greco-Roman moral philosophy, Robert Kaster's analysis of the "narrative scripts" of rivalrous emotions in antiquity, and René Girard's insights into the role of "mimetic desire" in human envy, this article explores the strategies of two major early Christian bishops, Cyprian and Basil of Caesarea, to "read" and to cure the variant scripts of envy and related invidious passions in concrete ecclesial contexts. The article also examines certain monastic theologians in late antiquity who aspired to preempt invidious passions by encouraging salutary scripts of competition in virtue that realized equality of honor in their respective communities. [source] The Moral Philosophy of Raimond Gaita and Some Questions of Method in the Philosophy of ReligionNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 1030 2009Mark Wynn Abstract Raimond Gaita's moral philosophy is distinguished by, among other things, its attention to the role of embodied, enacted witness in disclosing certain moral values, and its understanding of the emotions as forms of thought. In this paper, I consider how Gaita's insights on these matters may be applied to certain questions in the philosophy of religion, paying particular attention to the nature of religious experience and ,the problem of evil'. I suggest that Gaita's discussion of how we come to recognise moral values or ,meanings' can be extended to the question of how we might recognise religious meanings. On this view, religious experience may take the form of an appreciation of the meaning borne by a material context (rather than, for example, some supra-sensory encounter with a supernatural agent), and our sense of the goodness or otherwise of the world may be answerable to the authoritative example of particular lives. [source] Scepticism about the virtue ethics approach to nursing ethicsNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2010D.Phil, Stephen Holland MA (Oxon) Abstract Nursing ethics centres on how nurses ought to respond to the moral situations that arise in their professional contexts. Nursing ethicists invoke normative approaches from moral philosophy. Specifically, it is increasingly common for nursing ethicists to apply virtue ethics to moral problems encountered by nurses. The point of this article is to argue for scepticism about this approach. First, the research question is motivated by showing that requirements on nurses such as to be kind, do not suffice to establish virtue ethics in nursing because normative rivals (such as utilitarians) can say as much; and the teleology distinctive of virtue ethics does not transpose to a professional context, such as nursing. Next, scepticism is argued for by responding to various attempts to secure a role for virtue ethics in nursing. The upshot is that virtue ethics is best left where it belongs , in personal moral life, not professional ethics , and nursing ethics is best done by taking other approaches. [source] Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kan's Moral PhilosophyPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative content of our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by a seemingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent on the contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing from them differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, Korsgaard takes Kantian autonomy to mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in universalizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accommodated within a Kantian framework. After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person's practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to "constructivism" and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people's actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it. [source] Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant's Second CritiquePHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 5 2006Patrick Kain This article surveys recent work on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, with a particular focus on his doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates, assessing the implications of such work for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations raised by Kant's first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I survey recent work on the Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and argue that it does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. In section 3, I argue that recent work on Kant's doctrine of the practical postulates does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. [source] The Angelic Doctor and the Stagirite: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary ,Aristotelian' EthicsPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1 2001M. W. F. Stone To what extent, if any, is the moral thought of Thomas Aquinas ,Aristotelian'? This question is not simply of historical interest, since it directs our attention to those areas of contemporary English-speaking moral philosophy where Thomas is discussed. In some quarters there is a tendency to classify Thomas as a thinker in the ,Aristotelian tradition', and his debt to Aristotle is thought to be apparent in his remarks on moral reasoning and virtue. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in discussions of Thomas by supporters of modern virtue ethics. In this paper, I will argue that the relationship of Thomas's ethics to Aristotle is much more complicated than these discussions assume. Despite the strong and interesting affinities that exist between the practical philosophies of Thomas and Aristotle, the sum total of their common features can never disguise nor dilute the profound differences that separate them. The paper will conclude with some suggestions as to how an appreciation of these differences can enable us to cast Thomas's remarks on virtue in a different light. [source] I,The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of DistanceARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2010Miranda Fricker Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism,the ,relativism of distance'. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain ,fantasy'). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate,moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. [source] The Mass Media as Discursive Network: Building on the Implications of Libertarian and Communitarian Claims for News Media Ethics TheoryCOMMUNICATION THEORY, Issue 3 2005Patrick Lee Plaisance Media theorists have created competing normative ethical frameworks based on libertarian and communitarian philosophies, but because each approach essentially promotes different moral principles, they do not merely offer competing alternatives that essentially serve the same purpose, as some scholars have presumed. This analysis suggests that the two dominant theoretical approaches of libertarianism and communitarianism require further clarification and elaboration. The article seeks to clarify why the libertarian approach is insufficient as a basis for a news media ethic. Instead, it suggests a modified communitarian approach that advances media ethics theory by resisting a moralizing ethic, foregrounding the epistemic nature of moral philosophy as it relates to the communicative enterprise, and reconceptualizing the public sphere being served by the mass media as a population predicated on moral agency. [source] | ||||||||||||||||