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Moral Philosophers (moral + philosophers)
Selected AbstractsXII,The Argument from ResentmentPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1pt3 2007R. Jay Wallace Moral philosophers commonly deploy a strategy of hypothetical role reversal to show that morality is a source of reasons for everyone. Agents who are prepared to wrong another are invited to put themselves in their prospective victim's shoes; the agents concede that they would resent being treated in this way; and the conclusion is drawn that they themselves have reason not to wrong their prospective victims after all. The paper offers a reconstruction and defence of this argument from resentment. The argument, on the interpretation proposed, has an essentially deliberative structure; it does not attempt to extract a normative conclusion from metaethical premisses, but to elicit first-order normative convictions that are latent in the interlocutor's outlook. [source] Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of MoralityHYPATIA, Issue 4 2004Charles WrightArticle first published online: 16 DEC 200 Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay "Playfulness,,World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception" reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy. [source] Mind Reading, Deception and the Evolution of Kantian Moral AgentsJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2004ALEJANDRO ROSAS Classical evolutionary explanations of social behavior classify behaviors from their effects, not from their underlying mechanisms. Here lies a potential objection against the view that morality can be explained by such models, e.g. Trivers'reciprocal altruism. However, evolutionary theory reveals a growing interest in the evolution of psychological mechanisms and factors them in as selective forces. This opens up perspectives for evolutionary approaches to problems that have traditionally worried moral philosophers. Once the ability to mind-read is factored-in among the relevant variables in the evolution of moral abilities and counted among the selection pressures that have plausibly shaped our nature as moral agents, an evolutionary approach can contribute, so I will argue, to the solution of a long-standing debate in moral philosophy and psychology concerning the basic motivation for moral behavior. [source] ARE MORAL PHILOSOPHERS MORAL EXPERTS?BIOETHICS, Issue 4 2010BERNWARD GESANG ABSTRACT In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain , within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory , that moral philosophers are ,semi-experts'. [source] | ||||||||||