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Moral Perceptions (moral + perception)
Selected AbstractsMORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTIONRATIO, Issue 3 2010Justin P. McBrayer One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception , we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties.1 [source] I,Moral Perception and Moral KnowledgeARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2010Robert Audi This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge. [source] How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic EnforcementJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2009Yuval Feldman This paper examines how different legal instruments affect people's moral intuitions and willingness to engage in social enforcement in the field of environmental law. These instruments vary in terms of their governance technique, the process through which they were enacted, and their allocation of enforcement responsibilities. Their effect on citizens' moral evaluation and emotional reaction to corporate polluting behaviour are examined, based on an experimental survey of a representative sample of 1400 individuals in Israel. Our findings demonstrate that their design influences people's level of moral and emotional resentment when faced by environmentally problematic behaviour, as well as their motivation to engage in private enforcement. The design of the regulatory instrument could thus generate biases in social reactions to polluting behaviour, irrespective of its actual ecological adverse effect. We analyse the moral and psychological mechanisms which underlie these effects and explore their various policy implications. [source] Towards a strong virtue ethics for nursing practiceNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2006Alan E. Armstrong rn(g) ba(hons) ma phd Abstract, Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including anxiety, fear, powerlessness, and vulnerability. There is much debate on the ,therapeutic' or ,helping' nurse,patient relationship. However, despite the current agenda regarding patient-centred care, the literature concerning the development of good interpersonal responses and the view that a satisfactory nursing ethics should focus on persons and character traits rather than actions, nursing ethics is dominated by the traditional obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontology. I critically examine these theories and the role of duty-based notions in both general ethics and nursing practice. Because of well-established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based moral theories are incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. I examine the work of Hursthouse on virtue ethics' action guidance and the v-rules. I argue that the moral virtues and a strong (action-guiding) version of virtue ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-based approach to nursing. The latter is characterized by three features: (1) exercising the moral virtues such as compassion; (2) using judgement; and (3) using moral wisdom, understood to include at least moral perception, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination. Merits and problems of the virtue-based approach are examined. I relate the work of MacIntyre to nursing and I conceive nursing as a practice: nurses who exercise the virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the practice of nursing and thus prevent the marginalization of the virtues. The strong practice-based version of virtue ethics proposed is context-dependent, particularist, and relational. Several areas for future philosophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to develop this account yet further. [source] MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTIONRATIO, Issue 3 2010Justin P. McBrayer One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception , we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties.1 [source] I,Moral Perception and Moral KnowledgeARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2010Robert Audi This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge. [source] Strategic Moral Diplomacy: Mandela, Qaddafi, and the Lockerbie NegotiationsFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2005Lyn Boyd-Judson Understanding and mitigating the consequences of clashing moral perceptions should be a primary goal of diplomacy and foreign policy analysis. Personal interviews and primary documents about the Lockerbie negotiations are used to illustrate the dangerous collision of different moral claims in the international arena, the mistakes made by the United States and United Kingdom in handling this aspect of the negotiations, and South African President Nelson Mandela's use of strategic moral diplomacy to resolve the stalemate between Libya, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Mandela's strategy in these negotiations is an example of how an intelligent and pragmatic moral position, rather than the conventional image of an enemy as evil, can produce the desired strategic results,in this case, Colonel Qaddafi's handover of the two Libyan citizens accused of the Lockerbie bombing. [source] The Behavioral Foundations of Trade Secrets: Tangibility, Authorship, and LegalityJOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2006Yuval Feldman This article examines whether the nature of information protected by trade secret law affects departing employees' normative judgments of obedience to trade secret law. This examination assesses two main dimensions: tangibility (whether the employee downloaded the confidential information) and authorship (whether the employee developed the confidential information by himself or herself). The data was collected from a nonrandom multi-sourced sample of 260 high-tech employees in Silicon Valley. Tangibility affected almost all the factors that were measured (such as the perceived consensus and participants' own intention to share information), while authorship affected only participants' moral perceptions. Further analysis revealed that the expected social approval of a new employer was the most important mediator of the effect of tangibility on the intention to share trade secrets. [source] Ethics Beyond Moral TheoryPHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 3 2009Timothy Chappell I develop an anti-theory view of ethics. Moral theory (Kantian, utilitarian, virtue ethical, etc.) is the dominant approach to ethics among academic philosophers. But moral theory's hunt for a single Master Factor (utility, universalisability, virtue . . .) is implausibly systematising and reductionist. Perhaps scientism drives the approach? But good science always insists on respect for the data, even messy data: I criticise Singer's remarks on infanticide as a clear instance of moral theory failing to respect the data of moral perceptions and moral intuitions. Moral theory also fails to provide a coherent basis for real-world motivation, justification, explanation, and prediction of good and bad, right and wrong. Consider for instance the marginal place of love in moral theory, compared with its central place in people's actual ethical outlooks and decision making. Hence, moral theory typically fails to ground any adequate ethical outlook. I propose that it is the notion of an ethical outlook that philosophical ethicists should pursue, not the unfruitful and distorting notion of a moral theory. [source] Mars and Venus at Twilight: A Critical Investigation of Moralism, Age Effects, and Sex DifferencesPOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2003Daniel Aldrich Analysts have long sought to understand whether women and men have different ethical orientations. Some researchers have argued that women and men consistently make fundamentally different ethical judgments, especially of corruption; others have found no such disparities. This study considered whether an individual's age may also play a role in determining his or her moral judgment. A statistical investigation of interactive effects between gender and age in a nationally representative data set from Japan shows that this interaction functions better as a predictor of moralism than do education or gender alone. Older individuals of both sexes were found to have similar strict moral perceptions; as women and men age, their ethical judgments converge. [source] | |||||||||||||