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Moral Law (moral + law)
Selected AbstractsForgiveness, the Moral Law and Education: A Reply to Patricia WhiteJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2002L. Philip Barnes Patricia White has recently attempted to construct an ethically valid notion of forgiveness that will serve educational purposes and contribute to the moral development of pupils in schools. She distinguishes between a strict view that requires repentance before forgiveness, which she rejects, and a relaxed view that does not require repentance, which she endorses. In this reply I defend the strict view of forgiveness against her criticism and challenge the ethical propriety of the relaxed view. I shall argue that her support for the relaxed view both runs counter to our deepest moral intuitions and serves to undermine the moral law and moral endeavour. [source] Research and Moral Law: Ethics and the Social Science Research RelationPOLAR: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REVIEW, Issue 2 2007Amy Swiffen This paper explores the ethics of social science research by taking the Canadian context as a case study of the increasing formalization of ethics review procedures in North America. Based on a biomedical model of harm prevention, all university research involving humans in Canada, regardless of discipline, must pass through an ethics board review. I read the official ethics policy document governing review procedures for human research in Canada and use two examples of criticism of such policy as entry points to identify and explore a limit in understandings of social research ethics. This limit is reached when ethics policy is criticized on the basis of the incompatibility of a general rule applied to a particular research situation. Using concepts from the ethical philosophies of Kant and Lacan, I move beyond the question of the application of general rules to particular research situations and push research ethics into different territory, where neither general rules nor the notion of particularity can be relied on to ground ethical action. In this other terrain, radical responsibility and unguaranteed decision are the only signposts. [source] On Testing the ,Moral Law'MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 2 2009PAULO SOUSA This article challenges their interpretation of the data. It does so by explicating some methodological problems in the Turiel tradition that Kelly et al. themselves in a way inherit and by drawing on new evidence coming from a partial replication of their research. [source] Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009KATE A. MORAN There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related ,fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy. [source] Forgiveness, the Moral Law and Education: A Reply to Patricia WhiteJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2002L. Philip Barnes Patricia White has recently attempted to construct an ethically valid notion of forgiveness that will serve educational purposes and contribute to the moral development of pupils in schools. She distinguishes between a strict view that requires repentance before forgiveness, which she rejects, and a relaxed view that does not require repentance, which she endorses. In this reply I defend the strict view of forgiveness against her criticism and challenge the ethical propriety of the relaxed view. I shall argue that her support for the relaxed view both runs counter to our deepest moral intuitions and serves to undermine the moral law and moral endeavour. [source] ETHICS AND OBSERVATION: DEWEY, THOREAU, AND HARMANMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 5 2007ANDREW WARD Abstract: In 1929, John Dewey said that "the problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of human life." Using this as its theme, this article begins with an examination of Gilbert Harman's reasons for denying the existence of moral facts. It then presents an alternative account of the relationship between science and ethics, making use of the writings of Dewey and Henry David Thoreau. For both Dewey and Thoreau, the dichotomy between a scientific approach to the world and an ethical approach to the world is a false one. The article explores the reasons for believing that the dichotomy is a false one, agreeing with Thoreau that there "is no exclusively moral law,there is no exclusively physical law." [source] Kantian Marriage and Beyond: Why It Is Worth Thinking about Kant on MarriageHYPATIA, Issue 2 2010LINA PAPADAKI Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place "without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws." Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary thinkers: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoxical, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. Finally, the paper advances the discussion beyond marriage. Drawing on Kant's conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context. [source] | ||||||||||