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Moral Knowledge (moral + knowledge)
Selected AbstractsThe Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral KnowledgeJOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM, Issue 1 2002Noël Carroll [source] The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral KnowledgeTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 4 2001Todd A. Salzman In Roman Catholic moral theology there is an ongoing debate between the proportionalist or revisionist school and the traditionalist school that has developed what is referred to as the ,New Natural Law Theory' or ,Basic Goods Theory' (BGT). The stakes in this debate have been raised with Pope John Paul II's encyclical Veritatis Splendor (1993) on fundamental moral theology that condemned ,proportionalism' or ,teleologism' as an ethical theory while utilizing many of the ideas, concepts, and terminology of the BGT, thereby implicitly endorsing that ethical theory. While absolute norms and intrinsically evil acts have frequently been the focus of debate between these two schools, what is it that divides them fundamentally, on the level of ethical method? It is the role and function of reason and experience as two sources of moral knowledge, in part, that distinguish these two versions of natural law on the most basic level. While the BGT has a strict hierarchy of the sources of moral knowledge that posits the hierarchical magisterium as the definitive interpreter of reason and experience, revisionists posit a more dialogical relationship between reason, experience, and the magisterium. On certain ethical issues (e.g., artificial birth control), the experience of the faithful as well as the rational arguments developed by revisionist Catholic moral theologians challenge some of the normative claims of the magisterium. This paper investigates the methodological use of reason and experience in each theory's interpretation of natural law and how and why these two sources of moral knowledge lead to fundamentally divergent normative claims on particular ethical issues. [source] I,Moral Perception and Moral KnowledgeARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2010Robert Audi This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge. [source] Moral knowledge and responsibilities in evaluation implementation: When critical theory and responsive evaluation collideNEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION, Issue 127 2010Melissa Freeman An external evaluation documented what occurred in an inaugural summer camp to teach high school students how to preserve religious freedom by learning about and acting on the history and current state of church,state separation and other first amendment issues. Camp designers hoped to promote religious diversity values and civic engagement in youth. An analytic vignette grounded in an inductive analysis of observations, interviews, and document collection represents the competing demands of responsive and critical approaches to evaluation. Balancing obligations to promote the social well-being of society with responsibilities to clients and other stakeholders presents challenges that can be met only by identifying priorities with clients in ongoing dialogue. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc., and the American Evaluation Association. [source] Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009KATE A. MORAN There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related ,fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy. [source] MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTIONRATIO, Issue 3 2010Justin P. McBrayer One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception , we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties.1 [source] The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral KnowledgeTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 4 2001Todd A. Salzman In Roman Catholic moral theology there is an ongoing debate between the proportionalist or revisionist school and the traditionalist school that has developed what is referred to as the ,New Natural Law Theory' or ,Basic Goods Theory' (BGT). The stakes in this debate have been raised with Pope John Paul II's encyclical Veritatis Splendor (1993) on fundamental moral theology that condemned ,proportionalism' or ,teleologism' as an ethical theory while utilizing many of the ideas, concepts, and terminology of the BGT, thereby implicitly endorsing that ethical theory. While absolute norms and intrinsically evil acts have frequently been the focus of debate between these two schools, what is it that divides them fundamentally, on the level of ethical method? It is the role and function of reason and experience as two sources of moral knowledge, in part, that distinguish these two versions of natural law on the most basic level. While the BGT has a strict hierarchy of the sources of moral knowledge that posits the hierarchical magisterium as the definitive interpreter of reason and experience, revisionists posit a more dialogical relationship between reason, experience, and the magisterium. On certain ethical issues (e.g., artificial birth control), the experience of the faithful as well as the rational arguments developed by revisionist Catholic moral theologians challenge some of the normative claims of the magisterium. This paper investigates the methodological use of reason and experience in each theory's interpretation of natural law and how and why these two sources of moral knowledge lead to fundamentally divergent normative claims on particular ethical issues. [source] I,Moral Perception and Moral KnowledgeARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2010Robert Audi This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge. [source] Unwritten law in Hobbesian political thoughtBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2000Alan Cromartie In Hobbesian terminology, ,unwritten laws' are natural laws enforced within a polity, by a non-sovereign judge, without some previous public promulgation. This article discusses the idea in the light of successive Hobbesian accounts of ,law' and ,obligation'. Between De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes dropped the idea that natural law is strictly speaking law, but he continued to believe unwritten laws must form a part of any legal system. He was unable to explain how such a law could claim a legal status. His loyalty to the notion, in spite of all the trouble that it caused, is a sign of his belief that moral knowledge is readily accessible to all. [source] | |||||||||||||