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Moral Justification (moral + justification)
Selected AbstractsPeer and cyber aggression in secondary school students: the role of moral disengagement, hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectanciesAGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 2 2010Chrisa D. Pornari Abstract This study investigated the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, applied by people to rationalize and justify harmful acts, and engagement in traditional peer and cyber aggression among school children. We examined the contribution of moral disengagement (MD), hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectancies, and we further explored the individual contribution of each MD mechanism. Our aim was to identify shared and unique cognitive factors of the two forms of aggression. Three hundred and thirty-nine secondary school children completed self-report measures that assessed MD, hostile attribution bias, outcome expectancies, and their roles and involvement in traditional and cyber aggression. We found that the MD total score positively related to both forms of peer-directed aggression. Furthermore, traditional peer aggression positively related to children's moral justification, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility and outcome expectancies, and negatively associated with hostile attribution bias. Moral justification also related positively to cyber aggression. Cyber aggression and cyber victimization were associated with high levels of traditional peer aggression and victimization, respectively. The results suggest that MD is a common feature of both traditional and cyber peer aggression, but it seems that traditional forms of aggression demand a higher level of rationalization or justification. Moreover, the data suggest that the expectation of positive outcomes from harmful behavior facilitates engagement in traditional peer aggression. The differential contribution of specific cognitive mechanisms indicates the need for future research to elaborate on the current findings, in order to advance theory and inform existing and future school interventions tackling aggression and bullying. Aggr. Behav. 36:81,94, 2010. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Moral justification for Tarasoff -type warnings and breach of confidentiality: a clinician's perspectiveBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 3 2001Thomas G. Gutheil M.D. After brief review of the background and context of the Tarasoff case and its impact on clinicians, the author examines the "Tarasoff warning," proposed in the 1974 Tarasoff opinion, from a moral position, with brief discussion of its clinical and risk management dimensions. Moral issues considered include confidentiality itself, agency, fiduciary duty, a shift in the victim paradigm, the emergency context, a novel risk, and a proposed approach. The dilemma presented by the original Tarasoff fact situation is re-examined. The author stresses the need for individualized responses to the risks posed by patients. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The modern furies: projection and superego subversion in the moral justification of violenceINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES, Issue 1 2007James Poulton Abstract The moral rationalization of violence and prejudice has long been viewed by psychoanalysis as resulting from a subversion of superego functioning. Yet, the specific mechanisms by which such subversions occur have remained obscure. In this paper, the intrapsychic and intersubjective dynamics of rationalizations of violence are explored as they arise in the dyadic interactions of a married couple in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Those dynamics are then extrapolated to larger group processes (e.g. sects, races, nations, etc.), with the aim of developing a more complete understanding of the cycles of hatred and violence that can occur between them. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Resources and the Rule of Rescue1JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2007MARK SHEEHAN abstract The central issue that I consider in this paper is the use of the so-called ,Rule of Rescue' in the context of resource allocation. This ,Rule' has played an important role in resource allocation decisions in various parts of the world. It was invoked in Ontario to overturn a decision not to fund treatment for Gaucher's Disease and it has also been used to justify resource decisions in Israel concerning the same condition. In the paper I consider the nature of the Rule of Rescue and its moral justification. The latter involves consideration of the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral obligations. If the Rule of Rescue is to be justified, it is plausible to think that it will be in the context of agent-relative obligations. Two problems with this suggestion are considered: the role of identifiability in the Rule of Rescue and the extent to which policy makers in a health care system can be taken to have such obligations. It is argued that in both cases these problems can be overcome and hence that there is a prima facie obligation to follow the Rule of Rescue. [source] Mechanisms of moral disengagement and their differential use by right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in support of warAGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 4 2010Lydia Eckstein Jackson Abstract Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are associated with the approval of war as a political intervention [McFarland, 2005]. We examined whether the effects of RWA and SDO on war support are mediated by moral-disengagement mechanisms [i.e., responsibility reduction, moral justification, minimizing consequences, and dehumanizing,blaming victims; Bandura, 1999] and whether the ideologies use the mechanisms differently. Our data were consistent with the possibility that minimizing consequences (Study 1) and moral justification (Study 2) mediate the effects of RWA and SDO on approval of war. Both ideologies were positively associated with all moral-disengagement mechanism though more strongly so for RWA. Comparisons within ideologies suggest that RWA was most strongly associated with moral justification and SDO was most strongly associated with dehumanizing,blaming victims. We discuss implications and limitations. Aggr. Behav. 36:238,250, 2010. © 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Peer and cyber aggression in secondary school students: the role of moral disengagement, hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectanciesAGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 2 2010Chrisa D. Pornari Abstract This study investigated the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, applied by people to rationalize and justify harmful acts, and engagement in traditional peer and cyber aggression among school children. We examined the contribution of moral disengagement (MD), hostile attribution bias, and outcome expectancies, and we further explored the individual contribution of each MD mechanism. Our aim was to identify shared and unique cognitive factors of the two forms of aggression. Three hundred and thirty-nine secondary school children completed self-report measures that assessed MD, hostile attribution bias, outcome expectancies, and their roles and involvement in traditional and cyber aggression. We found that the MD total score positively related to both forms of peer-directed aggression. Furthermore, traditional peer aggression positively related to children's moral justification, euphemistic language, displacement of responsibility and outcome expectancies, and negatively associated with hostile attribution bias. Moral justification also related positively to cyber aggression. Cyber aggression and cyber victimization were associated with high levels of traditional peer aggression and victimization, respectively. The results suggest that MD is a common feature of both traditional and cyber peer aggression, but it seems that traditional forms of aggression demand a higher level of rationalization or justification. Moreover, the data suggest that the expectation of positive outcomes from harmful behavior facilitates engagement in traditional peer aggression. The differential contribution of specific cognitive mechanisms indicates the need for future research to elaborate on the current findings, in order to advance theory and inform existing and future school interventions tackling aggression and bullying. Aggr. Behav. 36:81,94, 2010. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] ARE MORAL PHILOSOPHERS MORAL EXPERTS?BIOETHICS, Issue 4 2010BERNWARD GESANG ABSTRACT In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain , within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory , that moral philosophers are ,semi-experts'. [source] Guidance and Justification in Particularistic EthicsBIOETHICS, Issue 4 2000Ulrik Kihlbom This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed by scholars such as Helga Kuhse, a particularistic version of virtue ethics properly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and a satisfactory account for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance, health care practice. In the first part of the paper, three criteria for comparing normative theories with respect to action-guiding power are outlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version of virtue ethics actually can provide more guidance than the universalistic theories favoured by Kuhse and others. In the second part of the paper it is claimed that universalist normative theories have serious problems accounting for the role that moral principles are supposed to play in the justification, of moral opinions, whereas the present version of virtue ethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification without invoking moral principles or eschewing objectivity. [source] Economic behaviour and the norms of capitalismINTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, Issue 185 2005Pierre Demeulenaere The idea of moralising the capitalist economy presupposes an idea of morality or justice. If we confine ourselves intuitively to the principle of freedom or non-domination , often connected with a defence of market institutions as well as broader moral justifications , two questions must be asked. Firstly, can profit-oriented economic behaviour secure principles of non-domination? The answer is no, for there is a structural interest in cheating in a prisoner's dilemma situation. Additional normative considerations must be introduced in order to ensure that market norms are respected. The second question is, then, whether moral regard for the principle of non-domination can in itself justify free-trade institutions. Here again the answer is no, inasmuch as various typical features of social existence prevent us from thinking that respect for the pure norms of free trade can be consonant with direct application of this non-domination principle. In fact, actual social existence introduces other norms reflecting other social objectives that may also be derived from a non-domination principle. [source] | |||||||||||||