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Moral Judgments (moral + judgment)
Selected Abstracts"I Followed the Rules, and They All Loved You More": Moral Judgment and Attitudes toward Fictional Characters in FilmMIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2010CARL PLANTINGA First page of article [source] The Pervasive Impact of Moral JudgmentMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 5 2009DEAN PETTIT A series of recent studies have shown that people's moral judgments can affect their intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally. Prior attempts to explain this effect can be divided into two broad families. Some researchers suggest that the effect is due to some peculiar feature of the concept of intentional action in particular, while others suggest that the effect is a reflection of a more general tendency whereby moral judgments exert a pervasive influence on folk psychology. The present paper argues in favor of the latter hypothesis by showing that the very same effect that has been observed for intentionally also arises for deciding, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. [source] Moral Judgments and Works of Art: The Case of Narrative LiteratureJOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM, Issue 1 2004Mary Devereaux First page of article [source] Moral judgment in high-functioning pervasive developmental disordersPSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES, Issue 4 2007TOSHINOBU TAKEDA md Abstract Individuals with pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) are characterized by deficits in socialization. To date, moral judgment, which may have a considerable influence on socialization, has not been fully investigated in high-functioning PDD (HFPDD), particularly from a viewpoint of practical adjustment with peers. Human External Action and its internal Reasoning Type (HEART), a standardized test for evaluating moral judgment in school children developed in Japan, was used to compare various aspects of moral judgment between 23 students with HFPDD (6,14 years old) and 23 students with typical development matched for age, intelligence, and socioeconomic status. Students with HFPDD scored significantly lower on Internal Moral Reasoning than control students. As for the level of Internal Moral Reasoning, while both groups reached a conventional (third) level in almost all items, fewer students with HFPDD achieved an autonomous (fourth) level and more students with HFPDD remained at a heteronomous (second) level than did control students. In the HFPDD group there were significant positive correlations between some items of Internal Moral Reasoning and verbal ability-related items of Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III. A comparatively lower score in students with HFPDD may relate to difficulty in socialization. [source] Perceived intentionality intensifies blameworthiness of negative behaviors: Blame-praise asymmetry in intensification effect1JAPANESE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2007YOHSUKE OHTSUBO Abstract:, The intensification effect in moral judgment refers to the fact that a behavior elicits more extreme blame or praise when it is intentionally (rather than unintentionally) performed. Two vignette experiments tested the hypothesis that intensification is stronger for blameworthy behaviors than for praiseworthy behaviors. In Study 1, 40 Japanese participants read 10 brief descriptions of negative or positive behaviors. Participants who attributed intentionality to negative (or positive) behaviors rated those behaviors as more blameworthy (or praiseworthy) than those who did not. Study 2 (N = 94) presented 20 descriptions of behaviors that differed according to a 2 × 2 (valence of behavior: positive vs. negative; intentionality: present vs. absent) between-participants design. Explicit indication of intentionality elevated blameworthiness of negative behaviors but not praiseworthiness of positive behaviors. [source] Heuristic Methods for Computer EthicsMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2002Walter Maner The domain of "procedural ethics" is the set of reflective and deliberative methods that maximize the reliability of moral judgment. While no general algorithmic method exists that will guarantee the validity of ethical deliberation, non-algorithmic "heuristic" methods can guide and inform the process, making it significantly more robust and dependable. This essay examines various representative heuristic procedures commonly recommended for use in applied ethics, maps them into a uniform set of twelve stages, identifies common faults, then shows how the resulting stage-by-stage decision-making model could be adapted for general use and for use in computer ethics. [source] Obligation as Self-Determination: A Critique of Hegel and KorsgaardPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2003Mark Shelton I examine the differences between their accounts in order to show that their efforts suffer from a common inadequacy, namely, overlooking that there are two distinct ways we can value things as self-determining agents. I maintain that accounting for the actual stringency of moral judgment depends on explaining the superiority of one of these ways of valuing over the other. [source] Mars and Venus at Twilight: A Critical Investigation of Moralism, Age Effects, and Sex DifferencesPOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2003Daniel Aldrich Analysts have long sought to understand whether women and men have different ethical orientations. Some researchers have argued that women and men consistently make fundamentally different ethical judgments, especially of corruption; others have found no such disparities. This study considered whether an individual's age may also play a role in determining his or her moral judgment. A statistical investigation of interactive effects between gender and age in a nationally representative data set from Japan shows that this interaction functions better as a predictor of moralism than do education or gender alone. Older individuals of both sexes were found to have similar strict moral perceptions; as women and men age, their ethical judgments converge. [source] Moral judgment in high-functioning pervasive developmental disordersPSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES, Issue 4 2007TOSHINOBU TAKEDA md Abstract Individuals with pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) are characterized by deficits in socialization. To date, moral judgment, which may have a considerable influence on socialization, has not been fully investigated in high-functioning PDD (HFPDD), particularly from a viewpoint of practical adjustment with peers. Human External Action and its internal Reasoning Type (HEART), a standardized test for evaluating moral judgment in school children developed in Japan, was used to compare various aspects of moral judgment between 23 students with HFPDD (6,14 years old) and 23 students with typical development matched for age, intelligence, and socioeconomic status. Students with HFPDD scored significantly lower on Internal Moral Reasoning than control students. As for the level of Internal Moral Reasoning, while both groups reached a conventional (third) level in almost all items, fewer students with HFPDD achieved an autonomous (fourth) level and more students with HFPDD remained at a heteronomous (second) level than did control students. In the HFPDD group there were significant positive correlations between some items of Internal Moral Reasoning and verbal ability-related items of Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III. A comparatively lower score in students with HFPDD may relate to difficulty in socialization. [source] A Contractualist Defense of Democratic AuthorityRATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2005DAVID LEFKOWITZ My first argument is a straightforward application of contractualist reasoning, and mirrors T. M. Scanlon's defense of a principle of fairness for the distribution of benefits produced by a cooperative scheme. My second argument develops and defends the intuition that treating others morally requires respecting their exercise of moral judgment, or a sense of justice. I conclude by addressing the problem of disagreement over the design of the democratic decision procedure itself, and rebutting Jeremy Waldron's claim that democratic authority is incompatible with judicial review. [source] Historians and Moral EvaluationsHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2004RICHARD T. VANN In dem Gebiet der Geschichte liegt die ganze moralische Welt. ,Schiller ABSTRACT The reappearance of the question of moral judgments by historians makes a reappraisal of the issues timely. Almost all that has been written on the subject addresses only the propriety of moral judgments (or morally charged language) in the written texts historians produce. However, historians have to make moral choices when selecting a subject upon which to write; and they make a tacit moral commitment to write and teach honestly. Historians usually dislike making explicit moral evaluations, and have little or no training in how to do so. They can argue it's not their job; they are only finders of fact. Historians holding a determinist view of actions do not think it appropriate to blame people for doing what they couldn't help doing; for those believing there is an overall pattern to history, individual morality is beside the point. Finally, since earlier cultures had values different from ours, it seems unjust to hold them to contemporary standards. This essay modifies or rejects these arguments. Some historians have manifested ambivalence, acknowledging it is difficult or impossible to avoid making moral evaluations (and sometimes appropriate to make them). Ordinary-language philosophers, noting that historiography has no specialized vocabulary, see it as saturated by the values inherent in everyday speech and thought. I argue that the historicist argument about the inevitably time-bound limitation of all values is exaggerated. Historians who believe in the religious grounding of values (like Lord Acton) obviously disagree with it; but even on a secular level, morals are often confused with mores. If historians inevitably make moral evaluations, they should examine what philosophical ethicists,virtue ethicists, deontologists, and consequentialists,have said about how to make them; and even if they find no satisfactory grounding for their own moral attitudes, it is a brute fact that they have them. I end with an argument for "strong evaluations",neither treating them as a troublesome residue in historiography nor, having despaired of finding a solid philosophical ground for moral evaluations, concluding that they are merely matters of taste. I believe historians should embrace the role of moral commentators, but that they should be aware that their evaluations are, like all historical judgments, subject to the criticisms of their colleagues and readers. Historians run little risk of being censorious and self-righteous; the far greater danger is acquiescing in or contributing to moral confusion and timidity. [source] Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just PeaceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 4 2006ROBERT E. WILLIAMS JR. What happens following a war is important to the moral judgments we make concerning warfare, just as the intentions going in and the means used are. There has, however, been inadequate attention paid to considerations of jus post bellum in the just war tradition. This essay seeks to contribute to recent efforts to develop jus post bellum principles by first noting some of the ways that jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations serve to constrain what can legitimately be done after war. We argue, however, that the constraints grounded in traditional just war theory do not offer sufficient guidance for judging postwar behavior and that principles grounded in the concept of human rights are needed to complete our understanding of what constitutes a just war. A just peace exists when the human rights of those involved in the war, on both sides, are more secure than they were before the war. [source] Children's moral judgments of commission and omission based on their understanding of second-order mental states1JAPANESE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007HAJIMU HAYASHI Abstract: Children's moral judgments about acts of commission and omission with negative outcomes were studied based on their understanding of mental states. Children (N = 142) in the first, third, and fifth grades made judgments about four tasks composed of two levels of mental states (first-order or second-order) and two types of acts (commission or omission). The results showed that the 7-year-olds responded considering only first-order mental states, but the 9- and 11-year-olds also used second-order mental states in their judgments. Whether the acts were commission or omission did not make a difference. These results indicate that children can make moral judgments regarding acts of commission and omission based on an understanding of second-order mental states by approximately the age of 9 years. [source] Contrasting Role Morality and Professional Morality: Implications for PracticeJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2003Kevin Gibson Investigating role morality is important, since the mentality of role morality may allow agents to believe they can abdicate moral responsibility when acting in a role. This is particularly significant in the literature dealing with professional morality where professionals, because of their special status, may find themselves at odds with their best moral judgments. Here I tell four stories and draw out some distinctions. I conclude that role morality is a genuine and useful distinction. However, I suggest that the purported distinction between role morality and professional morality is over-determined. Therefore, alleged conflicts between the demands of role and profession (such as the different pressures on Pinto designers as employees and as engineers) are not conflicts between different kinds of demands, but rather conflicts arising from divergent roles that most workers will encounter regularly. Another analytical perspective is to look at moral choices at work in terms of power and the ability to bring about change. Finally, I draw the implication that we should stress moral awareness at a fairly abstract level for all employees and reinforce the moral primacy of individual choice. [source] When a man hits a woman: moral evaluations and reporting violence to the policeAGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 6 2009Richard B. Felson Abstract We use experimental data from a nationally representative sample to examine whether gender and the victim's relationship to the offender affect attitudes about the seriousness of the offense and whether the offense should be reported to the police. We find that respondents are particularly likely to condemn men's assaults on women, and to favor reporting them. The pattern appears to reflect both greater moral condemnation of men's assaults on women and the belief that the victims of these assaults are in greater danger. In general, moral judgments and attitudes toward reporting do not depend on the gender, age, level of education, or political ideology of the respondent. Condemnation of men's violence against women, and support for police intervention when it occurs, are apparently widespread across different segments of the population. Aggr. Behav. 35:477,488, 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] A METAETHICAL OPTION FOR THEISTSJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 1 2006Kyle Swan ABSTRACT John Hare has proposed "prescriptive realism" in an attempt to stake out a middle-ground position in the twentieth century Anglo-American debates concerning metaethics between substantive moral realists and antirealist-expressivists. The account is supposed to preserve both the normativity and objectivity of moral judgments. Hare defends a version of divine command theory. The proposal succeeds in establishing the middle-ground position Hare intended. However, I argue that prescriptive realism can be strengthened in an interesting way. [source] The Pervasive Impact of Moral JudgmentMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 5 2009DEAN PETTIT A series of recent studies have shown that people's moral judgments can affect their intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally. Prior attempts to explain this effect can be divided into two broad families. Some researchers suggest that the effect is due to some peculiar feature of the concept of intentional action in particular, while others suggest that the effect is a reflection of a more general tendency whereby moral judgments exert a pervasive influence on folk psychology. The present paper argues in favor of the latter hypothesis by showing that the very same effect that has been observed for intentionally also arises for deciding, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. [source] Emotivism and Deflationary TruthPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2002Kyle S. Swan The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non,cognitivists theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non,cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self,defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. It relies upon a problematic understanding of both emotivism and the deflationary theory of truth. [source] Moral Cognitivism and CharacterPHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 3 2005Craig Taylor It may seem to follow from Peter Winch's claim in ,The Universalizability of Moral Judgements' that a certain class of first-person moral judgments are not universalizable that such judgments cannot be given a cognitivist interpretation. But Winch's argument does not involve the denial of moral cognitivism and in this paper I show how such judgements may be cognitively determined yet not universalizable. Drawing on an example from James Joyce's The Dead, I suggest that in the kind of situation Winch envisages where we properly return a different moral judgement to another agent it may be that we accept their judgement is right for them because we recognise that it is determined by values that, simply because of the particular people we are, we could never know or understand in just the same way. [source] Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral NonnaturalismPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2008Stephen Finlay Authors' Introduction Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts therefore arise out of, and often assume competence with, a variety of different literatures. It can be taught thematically, but this sample syllabus offers a dialectical approach, focused on metaphysical debate over moral realism, which spans the century of debate launched and framed by G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. The territory and literature are, however, vast. So, this syllabus is highly selective. A thorough metaethics course might also include more topical examination of moral supervenience, moral motivation, moral epistemology, and the rational authority of morality. Authors Recommend: Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). This is one of the few clear, accessible, and comprehensive surveys of the subject, written by someone sympathetic with moral naturalism. David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Brink rehabilitates naturalism about moral facts by employing a causal semantics and natural kinds model of moral thought and discourse. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's book frames the debate as driven by a tension between the objectivity of morality and its practical role, offering a solution in terms of a response-dependent account of practical rationality. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism & Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996). Harman argues against the objectivity of moral value, while Thomson defends it. Each then responds to the other. Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Jackson argues that reductive conceptual analysis is possible in ethics, offering a unique naturalistic account of moral properties and facts. Mark Timmons, Morality without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Timmons distinguishes moral cognitivism from moral realism, interpreting moral judgments as beliefs that have cognitive content but do not describe moral reality. He also provides a particularly illuminating discussion of nonanalytic naturalism. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001). A Neo-Aristotelian perspective: moral facts are natural facts about the proper functioning of human beings. Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). In this recent defense of a Moorean, nonnaturalist position, Shafer-Landau engages rival positions in a remarkably thorough manner. Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Cuneo argues for a robust version of moral realism, developing a parity argument based on the similarities between epistemic and moral facts. Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Schroeder defends a reductive form of naturalism in the tradition of Hume, identifying moral and normative facts with natural facts about agents' desires. Online Materials: PEA Soup: http://peasoup.typepad.com A blog devoted to philosophy, ethics, and academia. Its contributors include many active and prominent metaethicists, who regularly post about the moral realism and naturalism debates. Metaethics Bibliography: http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm Maintained by James Lenman, professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield, this online resource provides a selective list of published research in metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu See especially the entries under ,metaethics'. Sample Syllabus: Topics for Lecture & Discussion Note: unless indicated otherwise, all the readings are found in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell, 2007). (FE) Week 1: Realism I (Classic Nonnaturalism) G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 2nd ed. (FE ch. 35). W. K. Frankena, ,The Naturalistic Fallacy,'Mind 48 (1939): 464,77. S. Finlay, ,Four Faces of Moral Realism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 820,49 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00100.x]. Week 2: Antirealism I (Classic Expressivism) A. J. Ayer, ,Critique of Ethics and Theology' (1952) (FE ch. 3). C. Stevenson, ,The Nature of Ethical Disagreement' (1963) (FE ch. 28). Week 3: Antirealism II (Error Theory) J. L. Mackie, ,The Subjectivity of Values' (1977) (FE ch. 1). R. Joyce, Excerpt from The Myth of Morality (2001) (FE ch. 2). Week 4: Realism II (Nonanalytic Naturalism) R. Boyd, ,How to be a Moral Realist' (1988) (FE ch. 13). P. Railton, ,Moral Realism' (1986) (FE ch. 14). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth' (1991) (FE ch. 38). Week 5: Antirealism III (Contemporary Expressivism) A. Gibbard, ,The Reasons of a Living Being' (2002) (FE ch. 6). S. Blackburn, ,How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist' (1993) (FE ch. 4). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,Nondescriptivist Cognitivism' (2000) (FE ch. 5). W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ,Expressivism and Embedding' (2000) (FE ch. 37). Week 6: Realism III (Sensibility Theory) J. McDowell, ,Values and Secondary Qualities' (1985) (FE ch. 11). D. Wiggins, ,A Sensible Subjectivism' (1991) (FE ch. 12). Week 7: Realism IV (Subjectivism) & Antirealism IV (Constructivism) R. Firth, ,Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer' (1952) (FE ch. 9). G. Harman, ,Moral Relativism Defended' (1975) (FE ch. 7). C. Korsgaard, ,The Authority of Reflection' (1996) (FE ch. 8). Week 8: Realism V (Contemporary Nonnaturalism) R. Shafer-Landau, ,Ethics as Philosophy' (2006) (FE ch. 16). T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 1. T, Cuneo, ,Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 850,79 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00102.x]. [source] ARE MORAL PHILOSOPHERS MORAL EXPERTS?BIOETHICS, Issue 4 2010BERNWARD GESANG ABSTRACT In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain , within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory , that moral philosophers are ,semi-experts'. [source] | |||||||||||||