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Moral Evaluations (moral + evaluation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences41%
Psychology33%
Law and Criminology16%

Selected Abstracts

A Moral Evaluation of Online Business Protest Tactics and Implications for Stakeholder Management

BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 1 2009
BEVERLY KRACHER
First page of article [source]

Historians and Moral Evaluations

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2004
RICHARD T. VANN
In dem Gebiet der Geschichte liegt die ganze moralische Welt. ,Schiller ABSTRACT The reappearance of the question of moral judgments by historians makes a reappraisal of the issues timely. Almost all that has been written on the subject addresses only the propriety of moral judgments (or morally charged language) in the written texts historians produce. However, historians have to make moral choices when selecting a subject upon which to write; and they make a tacit moral commitment to write and teach honestly. Historians usually dislike making explicit moral evaluations, and have little or no training in how to do so. They can argue it's not their job; they are only finders of fact. Historians holding a determinist view of actions do not think it appropriate to blame people for doing what they couldn't help doing; for those believing there is an overall pattern to history, individual morality is beside the point. Finally, since earlier cultures had values different from ours, it seems unjust to hold them to contemporary standards. This essay modifies or rejects these arguments. Some historians have manifested ambivalence, acknowledging it is difficult or impossible to avoid making moral evaluations (and sometimes appropriate to make them). Ordinary-language philosophers, noting that historiography has no specialized vocabulary, see it as saturated by the values inherent in everyday speech and thought. I argue that the historicist argument about the inevitably time-bound limitation of all values is exaggerated. Historians who believe in the religious grounding of values (like Lord Acton) obviously disagree with it; but even on a secular level, morals are often confused with mores. If historians inevitably make moral evaluations, they should examine what philosophical ethicists,virtue ethicists, deontologists, and consequentialists,have said about how to make them; and even if they find no satisfactory grounding for their own moral attitudes, it is a brute fact that they have them. I end with an argument for "strong evaluations",neither treating them as a troublesome residue in historiography nor, having despaired of finding a solid philosophical ground for moral evaluations, concluding that they are merely matters of taste. I believe historians should embrace the role of moral commentators, but that they should be aware that their evaluations are, like all historical judgments, subject to the criticisms of their colleagues and readers. Historians run little risk of being censorious and self-righteous; the far greater danger is acquiescing in or contributing to moral confusion and timidity. [source]

Children's Moral Evaluations of Ecological Damage: The Effect of Biocentric and Anthropocentric Intentions,

JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 8 2009
Katherine V. Kortenkamp
Moral evaluations of ecologically damaging events were studied in 5th, 8th, and 11th graders and college students (N = 246). Participants made 4 kinds of judgments about 2 scenarios: decision rightness, damage rightness, blame of the decision maker, and blame of the agents causing the damage. In both scenarios, the decision maker's intentions varied (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) as did the damage severity. Overall, participants' judgments were less harsh when the decision maker had biocentric intentions and when the damage was less severe. However, there were age differences in use of intentions to judge decision rightness. The proposition that judgments of blame of the decision maker should be a joint function of decision and damage rightness was also supported. [source]

On the Genealogy of Moral Pleasure1

GERMAN LIFE AND LETTERS, Issue 3 2009
Duncan Large
ABSTRACT This article explores the problematic relation between pleasure and morality in German thought, from the Enlightenment aesthetics of the eighteenth century through to early twentieth-century psychoanalysis. Specifically, by focusing on the status and function of pleasure in the moral analyses of Kant, the post-Kantians Schiller and Schopenhauer, then Nietzsche and finally Freud, it argues for a shift in emphasis, over this period, from the moral evaluation of pleasure to a recognition of the pleasurable value of morality. Along the way, it traces the German reception of the Discourse on the Nature of Pleasure and Pain (1773,81) by the Milanese philosopher and economist Pietro Verri. [source]

Aggressive and prosocial children's emotion attributions and moral reasoning

AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 1 2009
Tina Malti
Abstract Aggressive and prosocial children's emotion attributions and moral reasoning were investigated. Participants were 235 kindergarten children (M=6.2 years) and 136 elementary-school children (M=7.6 years) who were selected as aggressive or prosocial based on (kindergarten) teacher ratings. The children were asked to evaluate hypothetical rule violations, attribute emotions they would feel in the role of the victimizer, and justify their responses. Compared with younger prosocial children, younger aggressive children attributed fewer negative emotions and were more likely to provide sanction-oriented justifications when evaluating rule violations negatively. Furthermore, age-, gender- and context-effects in moral development occurred. The context-effects included both effects of transgression type (i.e., prosocial morality vs. fairness) on emotion attributions and moral reasoning and the effects of the context of moral evaluation and emotion attribution on moral reasoning. Findings are discussed in terms of the role of emotion attributions and moral reasoning as antecedents of children's aggressive and prosocial behavior. Aggr. Behav. 35:90,102, 2009. © 2008 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source]

How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic Enforcement

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2009
Yuval Feldman
This paper examines how different legal instruments affect people's moral intuitions and willingness to engage in social enforcement in the field of environmental law. These instruments vary in terms of their governance technique, the process through which they were enacted, and their allocation of enforcement responsibilities. Their effect on citizens' moral evaluation and emotional reaction to corporate polluting behaviour are examined, based on an experimental survey of a representative sample of 1400 individuals in Israel. Our findings demonstrate that their design influences people's level of moral and emotional resentment when faced by environmentally problematic behaviour, as well as their motivation to engage in private enforcement. The design of the regulatory instrument could thus generate biases in social reactions to polluting behaviour, irrespective of its actual ecological adverse effect. We analyse the moral and psychological mechanisms which underlie these effects and explore their various policy implications. [source]

Historians and Moral Evaluations

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2004
RICHARD T. VANN
In dem Gebiet der Geschichte liegt die ganze moralische Welt. ,Schiller ABSTRACT The reappearance of the question of moral judgments by historians makes a reappraisal of the issues timely. Almost all that has been written on the subject addresses only the propriety of moral judgments (or morally charged language) in the written texts historians produce. However, historians have to make moral choices when selecting a subject upon which to write; and they make a tacit moral commitment to write and teach honestly. Historians usually dislike making explicit moral evaluations, and have little or no training in how to do so. They can argue it's not their job; they are only finders of fact. Historians holding a determinist view of actions do not think it appropriate to blame people for doing what they couldn't help doing; for those believing there is an overall pattern to history, individual morality is beside the point. Finally, since earlier cultures had values different from ours, it seems unjust to hold them to contemporary standards. This essay modifies or rejects these arguments. Some historians have manifested ambivalence, acknowledging it is difficult or impossible to avoid making moral evaluations (and sometimes appropriate to make them). Ordinary-language philosophers, noting that historiography has no specialized vocabulary, see it as saturated by the values inherent in everyday speech and thought. I argue that the historicist argument about the inevitably time-bound limitation of all values is exaggerated. Historians who believe in the religious grounding of values (like Lord Acton) obviously disagree with it; but even on a secular level, morals are often confused with mores. If historians inevitably make moral evaluations, they should examine what philosophical ethicists,virtue ethicists, deontologists, and consequentialists,have said about how to make them; and even if they find no satisfactory grounding for their own moral attitudes, it is a brute fact that they have them. I end with an argument for "strong evaluations",neither treating them as a troublesome residue in historiography nor, having despaired of finding a solid philosophical ground for moral evaluations, concluding that they are merely matters of taste. I believe historians should embrace the role of moral commentators, but that they should be aware that their evaluations are, like all historical judgments, subject to the criticisms of their colleagues and readers. Historians run little risk of being censorious and self-righteous; the far greater danger is acquiescing in or contributing to moral confusion and timidity. [source]

When a man hits a woman: moral evaluations and reporting violence to the police

AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 6 2009
Richard B. Felson
Abstract We use experimental data from a nationally representative sample to examine whether gender and the victim's relationship to the offender affect attitudes about the seriousness of the offense and whether the offense should be reported to the police. We find that respondents are particularly likely to condemn men's assaults on women, and to favor reporting them. The pattern appears to reflect both greater moral condemnation of men's assaults on women and the belief that the victims of these assaults are in greater danger. In general, moral judgments and attitudes toward reporting do not depend on the gender, age, level of education, or political ideology of the respondent. Condemnation of men's violence against women, and support for police intervention when it occurs, are apparently widespread across different segments of the population. Aggr. Behav. 35:477,488, 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source]

Karl Olivecrona on Judicial Law-Making

RATIO JURIS, Issue 4 2009
TORBEN SPAAK
The Scandinavian Realist Karl Olivecrona did not pay much attention to questions of legal reasoning in his many works. He did, however, argue that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case. The reason, he explained, is that judges must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and that evaluations are not objective. Olivecrona's line of argument is problematic, however. The problem is that Olivecrona uses the term "evaluation" in a sense that is broad enough to cover not only evaluations, including moral evaluations, but also considerations that are not evaluations at all, and therefore his claim that judges must evaluate issues of law or fact in order to decide whether a case is false. [source]

Care and the Problem of Pity

BIOETHICS, Issue 1 2003
Fitzgerald, Patrick Boleyn
In recent years philosophers and bioethicists have given considerable attention to the concept of care. Thus we have seen important work on questions such as: whether there is a uniquely female approach to ethics, whether ethics should be partial or impartial, and whether care must be supplemented by justice. Despite this valuable and extensive work, however, some important distinctions have gone largely undiscussed. This paper tries to fill a gap left in our understanding of the concept of care itself by distinguishing between compassion and two kinds of pity. While all three are kinds of caring, we should not give them similar moral evaluations. Consequently, the distinction between compassion and different kinds of pity gives us an important insight into the question of whether we can consider care a virtue for health care professionals. [source]