Moral Considerations (moral + consideration)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Law and regulation of retained organs: the ethical issues

LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2002
John Harris
Organ retention has been with us for millennia. Walk into virtually any cathedral and many a church in Europe and you will nd an array of retained organs or tissue, allegedly originally the property of assorted saints, or even of God, and almost certainly collected without proper informed consent and retained in less than secure conditions. In our own time the complexities of organ collection, retention and use have proliferated.1 The events at Alder Hey Children's Hospital and the debates about the ethics of biobanking all over the world have dramatically highlighted the complexity, the difsiculty and the moral importance of these issues.2 Some of these issues have to do with the question of who can give permission for or consent to such removal and retention. Other issues involve consideration of whose rights or interests are engaged when cadaver organs and tissue are removed and retained, just what in particular is the nature, extent and force of those rights or interests, and how they are to be balanced against other moral considerations. These questions are the subject of this paper. We will not, however, here be concerned with the issues of genetic privacy, the security of genetic information. [source]


On Trying to Save the Simple View

MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 5 2006
THOMAS NADELHOFFER
Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the ordinary concept of intentional action is concerned, an agent need not intend to x in order to x intentionally. [source]


From Pacifism to War Resistance

PEACE & CHANGE, Issue 2 2001
Iain Atack
Pacifism is often interpreted as an absolute moral position that claims it is always wrong to go to war. As such, it is often rejected on the grounds that it excludes or overlooks other moral considerations, such as an obligation to resist aggression or defend fundamental human rights. Vocational pacifism, restricted to those who choose nonviolence as a way of life, is one version of pacifism that might overcome some of the objections connected to its moral absolutism. Contingent pacifism, on the other hand, acknowledges the complexities of moral reasoning connected to decisions concerning the use of armed force while retaining pacifist objections to war and preparations for war. Even contingent pacifism is limited by its individualism or voluntarism as a moral position, however. War resistance contributes its analysis of the political or structural factors responsible for war or preparations for war while retaining pacifism's moral impetus for action. [source]


Theological Pragmatism: A Critical Evaluation

THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 2 2000
Mikael Stenmark
Theological pragmatists like Daly, Kaufman, McFague and Reuther claim that the God we should believe in and the kind of images we should use to express our religious faith should be evaluated primarily on the basis of the consequences they have for the maintenance of certain political or moral values. These views are presented and critically evaluated. One difficulty is that their pragmatism seems to clash with our intuition and experience that there is no automatic fit between our moral aspirations and political visions, on the one hand, and how the world is actually structured, on the other. Their strong emphasis on political and moral considerations is, therefore, questionable and only plausible under certain specific circumstances. [source]


Salamanca and the city: culture credits, nature credits, and the modern moral economy of indigenous Bolivia

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, Issue 2 2006
Kathleen B. Lowrey
This article draws on fieldwork carried out in a Guaraní-speaking community in the Bolivian Chaco , Isoso , between 1997 and 2000. At the time, some Isoseño people were employed in urban-headquartered projects that revolved around Isoso's environment, culture, or identity and that were funded multilaterally by grants, loans, or other foreign aid. The article describes a set of fantastic discourses circulating in rural Isoso that seem to compare a magical place called Salamanca to the city where some Isoseño people now work. The article argues that these Salamanca discourses are an Isoseño-specific way of talking about a general set of unprecedented processes. It takes up the fact that undertakings of the kind in which the Isoseño are involved create new calibrations among radically different systems for moral/qualitative and material/ quantitative evaluation which can most ,economically' be expressed in terms of credit and debt. Finally, it considers why it is that for all their strange magic, Isoseño ,Salamanca and the city' discourses put an extremely recognizable suite of moral considerations at their centre. [source]