Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Moral Concept (moral + concept)
Selected Abstracts,Care': Moral concept or merely an organisational suffix?JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY RESEARCH, Issue 7 2008J. Clapton Abstract Background Over recent decades, a couple of interesting trends have occurred in regard to human services practices in Australia. First, there has been a significant shift from practices that previously have intentionally responded to emerging and continuing human need within communities to practices that are now managed within a context of managerialism and influenced by market forces. Second, in such a changing context, increasingly, organisations have added the suffix ,care' to their organisational name. One is therefore left to consider why this latter change has occurred, and how is care being considered, particularly in organisations supporting people with intellectual disability (ID). Method A conceptual-theoretical analysis is undertaken to explore the characteristics of human services that embrace managerialism. The moral constructions of personhood in regard to people with ID within this service context are investigated; and the implications of how care is practised are considered. Results An immoral-amoral binary of personhood within an underpinning neo-liberal context is identified and analysed. Further analysis reveals a more insidious independent,dependent binary for people with an ID linked to a dominating Ethic of Normalcy. This latter binary suggests that care seemingly becomes neither ethically relevant nor legitimate for people with ID in managerialist service contexts. Conclusions Ethical transformation in regard to care is needed for contemporary human services practice for people with ID. The underpinning Ethic of Normalcy is challenged for an Ethic of Engagement; whereby a deep understanding of care as a moral concept needs to be at the core of practice, rather than merely attached in an organisational name. [source] RIGHT ACT, VIRTUOUS MOTIVEMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2010THOMAS HURKA Abstract: The concepts of virtue and right action are closely connected, in that we expect people with virtuous motives to at least often act rightly. Two well-known views explain this connection by defining one of the concepts in terms of the other. Instrumentalists about virtue identify virtuous motives as those that lead to right acts; virtue-ethicists identify right acts as those that are or would be done from virtuous motives. This essay outlines a rival explanation, based on the "higher-level" account of virtue defended in the author's Virtue, Vice, and Value. On this account rightness and virtue go together because each is defined by a (different) relation to some other, more basic moral concept. Their frequent coincidence is therefore like a correlation between A and B based not on either's causing the other but on their being joint effects of a single common cause. [source] Tom Morawetz's "Robust Enterprise": Jurisprudence after WittgensteinPHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 2 2006Thomas D. Eisele I examine one theme within Tom Morawetz's complex jurisprudential work (stemming from Wittgenstein): the concept of a practice. After considering this theme in some detail, I then sketch a different jurisprudential approach that still proceeds within the inspiration of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Here, I summarise Stanley Cavell's elaborate recounting of Wittgenstein's twin concepts, "criteria" and "grammar." In a third and final section, I employ this alternative method to provide a brief example of how a Wittgensteinian approach might be made towards explicating and understanding Holmes' classic claim regarding the need in jurisprudence to separate legal and moral concepts. [source] | ||||||||||