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Moral Commitments (moral + commitment)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	100%

Selected Abstracts

Historians and Moral Evaluations

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2004
RICHARD T. VANN
In dem Gebiet der Geschichte liegt die ganze moralische Welt. ,Schiller ABSTRACT The reappearance of the question of moral judgments by historians makes a reappraisal of the issues timely. Almost all that has been written on the subject addresses only the propriety of moral judgments (or morally charged language) in the written texts historians produce. However, historians have to make moral choices when selecting a subject upon which to write; and they make a tacit moral commitment to write and teach honestly. Historians usually dislike making explicit moral evaluations, and have little or no training in how to do so. They can argue it's not their job; they are only finders of fact. Historians holding a determinist view of actions do not think it appropriate to blame people for doing what they couldn't help doing; for those believing there is an overall pattern to history, individual morality is beside the point. Finally, since earlier cultures had values different from ours, it seems unjust to hold them to contemporary standards. This essay modifies or rejects these arguments. Some historians have manifested ambivalence, acknowledging it is difficult or impossible to avoid making moral evaluations (and sometimes appropriate to make them). Ordinary-language philosophers, noting that historiography has no specialized vocabulary, see it as saturated by the values inherent in everyday speech and thought. I argue that the historicist argument about the inevitably time-bound limitation of all values is exaggerated. Historians who believe in the religious grounding of values (like Lord Acton) obviously disagree with it; but even on a secular level, morals are often confused with mores. If historians inevitably make moral evaluations, they should examine what philosophical ethicists,virtue ethicists, deontologists, and consequentialists,have said about how to make them; and even if they find no satisfactory grounding for their own moral attitudes, it is a brute fact that they have them. I end with an argument for "strong evaluations",neither treating them as a troublesome residue in historiography nor, having despaired of finding a solid philosophical ground for moral evaluations, concluding that they are merely matters of taste. I believe historians should embrace the role of moral commentators, but that they should be aware that their evaluations are, like all historical judgments, subject to the criticisms of their colleagues and readers. Historians run little risk of being censorious and self-righteous; the far greater danger is acquiescing in or contributing to moral confusion and timidity. [source]

PALLIATIVE CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH AND JUSTICE: SETTING PRIORITIES IN RESOURCE POOR COUNTRIES

DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS, Issue 3 2009
CRAIG BLINDERMAN
ABSTRACT Many countries have not considered palliative care a public health problem. With limited resources, disease-oriented therapies and prevention measures take priority. In this paper, I intend to describe the moral framework for considering palliative care as a public health priority in resource-poor countries. A distributive theory of justice for health care should consider integrative palliative care as morally required as it contributes to improving normal functioning and preserving opportunities for the individual. For patients requiring terminal care, we are guided less by principles of justice and more by the duty to relieve suffering and society's commitment to protecting the professional's obligation to uphold principles of beneficence, compassion and non-abandonment. A fair deliberation process is necessary to allow these strong moral commitments to serve as reasons when setting priorities in resource poor countries. [source]

Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2007
JOSHUA WILLIAM BUSBY
Do states and decision-makers ever act for moral reasons? And if they do, is it only when it is convenient or relatively costless for them to do so? A number of advocacy movements,on developing country debt relief, climate change, landmines, and other issues,emerged in the 1990s to ask decision-makers to make foreign policy decisions on that basis. The primary advocates were motivated not by their own material interests but broader notions of right and wrong. What contributes to the domestic acceptance of these moral commitments? Why do some advocacy efforts succeed where others fail? Through a case study of the Jubilee 2000 campaign for developing country debt relief, this article offers an account of persuasion based on strategic framing by advocates to get the attention of decision-makers. Such strategic but not narrowly self-interested activity allows weak actors to leverage existing value and/or ideational traditions to build broader political coalitions. This article, through case studies of debt relief in the United States and Japan, also links the emerging literature on strategic framing to the domestic institutional context and the ways veto players or "policy gatekeepers" evaluate trade-offs between costs and values. [source]

Equality: From Marxism to Liberalism (and Back Again)

POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2003
Christine Sypnowich
G. A. Cohen casts doubt on the extent to which Marxism can contribute to a theory of equality. This essay affirms Cohen's critique. The historical materialist approach to social change, the privileged role ascribed to the proletariat, and Marx's assumption that scarcity can be abolished: these three themes account for the impatience of classical Marxists with moral commitments and normative argument, an impatience which now seems utopian. Marx was wrong about how social change comes about, and that error made it very difficult for the goal of equality to be formulated, let alone realised. ,The egalitarian turn' in liberalism suggests that it is liberal political theory, not Marxism, which can inform debates about equality. The insistence on neutrality about the good in much left-liberal argument, however, has forestalled consideration of the kinds of lives to which human beings should aspire, something that must be considered if we are enable individuals to live well, as Marx understood with his critique of alienation. This paper argues that questions of human flourishing are essential to questions of equality, and that Marx's perfectionist vision of the equal society ought to be retrieved. [source]