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Moral Cognition (moral + cognition)
Selected AbstractsEducating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010Kristján Kristjánsson Abstract In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a ,moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as ,identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education. [source] Social cognition and moral cognition in bullying: what's wrong?AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR, Issue 6 2006Gianluca Gini Abstract Two different models have been proposed that describe the bully alternatively as a child lacking in social skills [Crick and Dodge, 1994], or as a cold manipulative individual, who leads gangs to achieve personal goals [Sutton et al., 1999a]. The present study examined the performance of 204 8,11-year-olds in a set of stories that assessed understanding of cognitions and emotions, in relation to their Participant Role in bullying. Moreover, children's understanding of moral emotions and proneness to moral disengagement was assessed. Victims showed some difficulties in the social cognition task, whereas bullies did not. Aggressive children, instead, were found to be more ready to show moral disengagement mechanisms, whereas defenders showed higher levels of moral sensibility. Results are discussed in relation to the two models, and the need for further research into empathy and moral cognition of children involved in bullying episodes is highlighted. Aggr. Behav. 32:528,539, 2006. © 2006 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Moral Nativism: A Sceptical ResponseMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 3 2010KIM STERELNY In the last few years, nativist, modular views of moral cognition have been influential. This paper shares the view that normative cognition develops robustly, and is probably an adaptation. But it develops an alternative view of the developmental basis of moral cognition, based on the idea that adults scaffold moral development by organising the learning environment of the next generation. In addition, I argue that the modular nativist picture has no plausible account of the role of explicit moral judgement, and that no persuasive version of the ,poverty of the stimulus' applies to moral cognition. [source] The role of mental state understanding in the development of moral cognition and moral actionNEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT, Issue 103 2004Jodie A. Baird The authors explore children's use of intention information in evaluating the moral quality of others' actions. They also address links among mental state understanding, motives-based moral reasoning, and children's own moral behavior. [source] THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN RETRACTED Conscience in Renaissance moral thought: a concept in transition?RENAISSANCE STUDIES, Issue 4 2009M. W. F. Stone This paper focuses on a neglected aspect of the history of the discussion of conscience in late fifteenth-century Europe. It seeks to explain how Adrian of Utrecht (1459,1523), a prominent scholastic theologian at Louvain, pondered the more subjective dimensions of conscience, and how his arguments can be appraised from the perspective of a wide-ranging discussion of the nature and function of moral cognition and judgement that took place in humanist and philosophical circles. Adrian's work is especially interesting for reason that he has important things to say about ,moral integrity', and ,convictions of the heart', ideas that bring into focus how highly personalized aspects of moral reflection impinge upon the activities of conscience. Having outlined Adrian's concerns, his description of the machinations of our moral conscience will then be set in context by comparing his account to that of a leading philosopher of his age, Marsilio Ficino (1433,1499). In addition to this, the thoughts of the celebrated ,Christian humanists' John Colet (1467,1519) and Desiderius Erasmus (1466/9,1536) will also be enlisted so that a richer picture of Renaissance ideas of conscience can emerge. [source] Aggressive behaviour and social problem-solving strategies: a review of the findings of a seven-year follow-up from childhood to late adolescenceCRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR AND MENTAL HEALTH, Issue 4 2001Liisa Keltikangas-Järvinen PhD Professor Objectives In a seven-year follow-up study, the author and colleagues examined the development of social skills from childhood to late adolescence, with a particular focus on aggressive behaviour. This paper presents a review of the most important findings of the project. Results and conclusions Social strategies explained aggressive behaviour, and changes of strategies predicted changes of behaviour. Aggressive behaviour was, however, very stable, and spontaneous change from an aggressive child to a sociable adolescent was not observed. This emphasizes an importance of early prevention of aggression. Disagreement between the children's and their parents' problem-solving strategies was apparent, suggesting that interventions to reduce a child's aggression should be augmented by educating the parents about their children's behaviour. The role of peers was important because the child's concept of his or her strategies was dependent on his or her social acceptance, and this should be taken into account in interventions. Finally, as approval or disapproval of aggression is related to behaviour, moral cognitions should be included in the interventions. Copyright © 2001 Whurr Publishers Ltd. [source] |