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Moral Beliefs (moral + belief)
Selected AbstractsEXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDETHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 235 2009Krister Bykvist Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ,ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that ,purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. [source] Politics for Better or Worse: Political Nonconformity, the Gambling Dilemma and the North of England Newspaper Company, 1903,1914HISTORY, Issue 286 2002Paul Gliddon Edwardian Britain saw a revival of political activity by nonconformists, who campaigned fervently for the Liberal Party. This resurgence included the purchase of newspapers by nonconformists in the Liberal cause. Many of these nonconformists held strong moral beliefs, and scholars have suggested that there was a tension between such ideals and political practicalities, a tension that caused nonconformists to become disillusioned with political activity and to withdraw from it. However, since such arguments tend to be generalized, this article analyses one example of nonconformists' difficulties, namely those experienced by Liberals who acquired several newspapers in Darlington in 1903. These Liberal nonconformists tried in vain to run The Northern Echo, a paper of note (or notoriety, depending on one's politics), without the betting content they so deplored. This article argues that the episode does demonstrate a tension between high ideals and political practicalities, though the nonconformist response here was a pragmatic and even a mixed one that ensured the survival of a strong Liberal press in north-east England for the next fifty years. It also suggests that, although there was a significant demand for betting content among newspaper audiences, none the less that demand was of a lesser extent than historians have so far supposed. [source] Feedlot veterinarians' moral and instrumental beliefs regarding antimicrobial use in feedlot cattleJOURNAL OF COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2009W. M. Alex McIntosh Abstract This cross-sectional survey research study examined the role moral beliefs play in predicting behavioural beliefs and attitudes and the role that subjective norms play in predicting moral beliefs. Using a self-administered questionnaire, one hundred and three feedlot veterinarians completed measures of behavioural beliefs, referent others, perceived constraints and moral beliefs regarding recommendations to use antimicrobials in four situations (i.e. acutely sick cattle, chronically sick cattle, at-risk cattle and high-risk cattle). Regression analysis and F -tests indicate moral beliefs as contributing significant increases in R2 to models predicting behavioural beliefs regarding antimicrobial use in each situation. In addition, subjective norms contribute a significant increase in R2 in models predicting moral beliefs in each of the four situations. The results indicate the effects of moral beliefs on behavioural beliefs are somewhat contingent on the condition; that is the level of risk associated with treating cattle with antimicrobials, the level of risk of not doing so, and the effectiveness of the antimicrobial in situations such as acute illness or being at-risk of illness. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Authoritative Knowledge and Single Women's Unintentional Pregnancies, Abortions, Adoption, and Single Motherhood: Social Stigma and Structural ViolenceMEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2003Marcia A. Ellison This article explores the sources of authoritative knowledge that shaped single, white, middle-class women's unintentional pregnancies and childbearing decisions throughout five reproductive eras. Women who terminated a pregnancy were most influenced by their own personal needs and circumstances, birth mothers' decisions were based on external sources of knowledge, such as their mothers, social workers, and social pressures. In contrast, single mothers based their decision on instincts and their religious or moral beliefs. Reproductive policies further constrained and significantly shaped women's experiences. The social stigma associated with these forms of stratified maternity suggests that categorizing pregnant women by their marital status, or births as out-of-wedlock, reproduces the structural violence implicit to normative models of female sexuality and maternity. This mixed-method study included focus groups to determine the kinds of knowledge women considered authoritative, a mailed survey to quantify these identified sources, and one-on-one interviews to explore outcomes in depth, [authoritative knowledge, social stigma, abortion, birth mothers, single mothers, unintentional pregnancies] [source] What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2007ROBERT HOPKINS Is it legitimate to acquire one's moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct. [source] EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDETHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 235 2009Krister Bykvist Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ,ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that ,purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. [source] |