Home  About us  Contact
 

Ministerial Responsibility (ministerial + responsibility)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences54%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting45%

Selected Abstracts

Not Just Parliamentary ,Cowboys and Indians': Ministerial Responsibility and Bureaucratic Drift

GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2000
Christopher Kam
A strict interpretation of the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility requires that the minister alone bear public responsibility for her department's actions. Critics charge that it is not sensible to hold a mminister solel responsible for departmental errors when government departments are so large and complex, and senior bureaucrats so powerful in their own right; senior bureaucrats should be made directly accountable to Parliament. The paper uses a game theoretic model to show that this criticism is misguided. To the extent that politicians more effectively police the bureaucracy when they are governed by a doctrine of ministerial responsibility than when they are not, the doctrine strengthens accountability. Much of the doctrine's force comes from the threat of ministerial resignation, but the opportunities that the doctrine creates for opposition parties to embarrass the government also contribute to its efficacy. [source]

Individual Ministerial Responsibility During the Howard Years: 1996,2007

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 2 2008
Luke Raffin
Upon winning the 1996 election, John Howard became the first Australian prime minister to codify his understanding of individual ministerial responsibility by publishing A Guide on Key Elements of Ministerial Responsibility. This article examines how this ministerial code of conduct was applied to significant allegations of ministerial impropriety that occurred during the 1996,2007 Howard era, and highlights the relationship between the media, the Prime Minister's response and the ultimate outcome. It finds that Howard's early rigorous application of the Guide to allegations of conflicts of interest involved political pain and instigated its decline. Howard retreated, redefined ministerial responsibility as requiring deliberate wrongdoing and raised the threshold required for a minister's dismissal. His inability to firmly apply the Guide to instances of ministerial misconduct betrays the traditional view that ministers are responsible for their own actions. The contemporary practice is that ministers do not resign for departmental failures for which they are not personally responsible, irrespective of the gravity of that wrongdoing. [source]

Ministerial responsibility and the machinery of government

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 2 2007
Nicholas D'Ombrain
It discusses how constitutional government and the practical day-to-day functioning of a parliamentary democracy depend on ministerial responsibility as the bedrock principle for the organization and operation of the machinery of government across the range of government organizations. It concludes that ministerial responsibility remains the pivotal constitutional doctrine essential to the functioning of a parliamentary democracy; that notwithstanding the undue concentration of authority in the hands of first ministers, their machinery of government powers ought not to be reduced; and that first ministers in particular should pay closer attention to ministerial responsibility as the foundation of the machinery of government. Sommaire: Le présent article porte sur les relations entre la responsabilité ministéri-elle et l'appareil gouvernemental. Il examine comment le gouvernement constitutionnel et le fonctionnement pratique quotidien d'une démocratie parlementaire reposent sur la responsabilité ministérielle comme principe de base de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de l'appareil gouvernemental dans tous les types d'organismes gouvernementaux. L'auteur conclut que la responsabilité ministérielle demeure la doctrine constitutionnelle cruciale et essentielle au fonctionnement d'une démocratie parlementaire; que malgré la concentration exagérée de pouvoir entre les mains des premiers ministres, les pouvoirs de l'appareil gouvernemental ne devraient pas être réduits; et que les premiers ministres en particulier devraient prêter une plus grande attention à la responsabilité ministérielle en tant que fondement de l'appareil gouvernemental. [source]

Not Just Parliamentary ,Cowboys and Indians': Ministerial Responsibility and Bureaucratic Drift

GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2000
Christopher Kam
A strict interpretation of the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility requires that the minister alone bear public responsibility for her department's actions. Critics charge that it is not sensible to hold a mminister solel responsible for departmental errors when government departments are so large and complex, and senior bureaucrats so powerful in their own right; senior bureaucrats should be made directly accountable to Parliament. The paper uses a game theoretic model to show that this criticism is misguided. To the extent that politicians more effectively police the bureaucracy when they are governed by a doctrine of ministerial responsibility than when they are not, the doctrine strengthens accountability. Much of the doctrine's force comes from the threat of ministerial resignation, but the opportunities that the doctrine creates for opposition parties to embarrass the government also contribute to its efficacy. [source]

KEEPING IN CONTROL: THE MODEST IMPACT OF THE EU ON DANISH LEGISLATION

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 1 2010
JØRGEN GRØNNEGAARD CHRISTENSEN
Membership of the EU and the scope of European integration are still contested issues in Danish politics. However, the impact of EU legislation on Danish legislation is relatively modest and highly concentrated within the field generally related to the regulation of the internal market. Strong upstream procedures at both the interdepartmental and the parliamentary level have been installed that effectively protect Danish policy-makers against political surprises in EU legislative politics. Upstream procedures are much stronger than the downstream ones for overseeing the implementation of EU policies and they ensure a high degree of consensus on specific EU legislation, both among the political parties in the Danish Parliament and among affected interests. As a result the transposition of directives is mainly a ministerial responsibility, and within the well-established fields of cooperation, the decree is the preferred legal instrument. [source]

Individual Ministerial Responsibility During the Howard Years: 1996,2007

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 2 2008
Luke Raffin
Upon winning the 1996 election, John Howard became the first Australian prime minister to codify his understanding of individual ministerial responsibility by publishing A Guide on Key Elements of Ministerial Responsibility. This article examines how this ministerial code of conduct was applied to significant allegations of ministerial impropriety that occurred during the 1996,2007 Howard era, and highlights the relationship between the media, the Prime Minister's response and the ultimate outcome. It finds that Howard's early rigorous application of the Guide to allegations of conflicts of interest involved political pain and instigated its decline. Howard retreated, redefined ministerial responsibility as requiring deliberate wrongdoing and raised the threshold required for a minister's dismissal. His inability to firmly apply the Guide to instances of ministerial misconduct betrays the traditional view that ministers are responsible for their own actions. The contemporary practice is that ministers do not resign for departmental failures for which they are not personally responsible, irrespective of the gravity of that wrongdoing. [source]

Ministerial responsibility and the machinery of government

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 2 2007
Nicholas D'Ombrain
It discusses how constitutional government and the practical day-to-day functioning of a parliamentary democracy depend on ministerial responsibility as the bedrock principle for the organization and operation of the machinery of government across the range of government organizations. It concludes that ministerial responsibility remains the pivotal constitutional doctrine essential to the functioning of a parliamentary democracy; that notwithstanding the undue concentration of authority in the hands of first ministers, their machinery of government powers ought not to be reduced; and that first ministers in particular should pay closer attention to ministerial responsibility as the foundation of the machinery of government. Sommaire: Le présent article porte sur les relations entre la responsabilité ministéri-elle et l'appareil gouvernemental. Il examine comment le gouvernement constitutionnel et le fonctionnement pratique quotidien d'une démocratie parlementaire reposent sur la responsabilité ministérielle comme principe de base de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de l'appareil gouvernemental dans tous les types d'organismes gouvernementaux. L'auteur conclut que la responsabilité ministérielle demeure la doctrine constitutionnelle cruciale et essentielle au fonctionnement d'une démocratie parlementaire; que malgré la concentration exagérée de pouvoir entre les mains des premiers ministres, les pouvoirs de l'appareil gouvernemental ne devraient pas être réduits; et que les premiers ministres en particulier devraient prêter une plus grande attention à la responsabilité ministérielle en tant que fondement de l'appareil gouvernemental. [source]

Independent foundations, public money and public accountability: Whither ministerial responsibility as democratic governance?

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 1 2003
Peter Aucoin
The democratic control that is meant to obtain under the Constitution is not present in the design of these foundations. This article examines the ways in which their organizational design is contrary to the principles of responsible government as well as to the government's own policy on so-called alternative service-delivery structures. The article also discusses how the designers of these foundations relied primarily on results-based reporting instead of the traditional system of ministerial responsibility. The author concludes that these organizational designs are beyond the pale of the Constitution's requirements for democratic control over public administration and suggests measures that may correct these deficiences. Sommaire: Au cours de la demière décennie, le gouvernement fédéeral a mis sur pied un certain nombre de fondations indépendantes visant à consacrer des fonds publics aux affaires publiques. Ces fondations ne comportent pas dans leur conception le contrôle démocratique prévu par la Constitution. Le présent article examine comment leur conception organisationnelle va à l'encontre des principes de gouvemement responsable ainsi que la politique même du gouvernement sur ce qu'on appelle les modes altematifs de prestation de services. L'article examine également la manière dont les concepteurs de ces fondations se sont fiés essentiellement à la reddition de comptes axés sur les résultats plutôt qu'au système traditionnel de respon-sabilité ministérielle. L'auteur conclut que ces conceptions organisationnelles ne repondent pas aux exigences de la Constitution pour ce qui est du contrôle démocratique de l'administration publique et propose des mesures qui pourraient pallier à ces insuffisances. [source]