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Military Intervention (military + intervention)
Selected AbstractsGoing in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2008Stephen E. Gent Conventional wisdom suggests that biased military interventions in civil conflicts should increase the probability that the supported side will win. However, while this is the case for rebel groups, the same is not true for governments. The explanation for this surprising finding becomes clear once one considers the decision of a third-party intervener. Since interveners want to impact the outcomes of civil conflict, government- and rebel-biased interventions will be more likely when the government is facing a stronger rebel group. Given that government-biased third parties intervene in the ,,toughest'' cases, empirically they appear to be less effective than rebel-biased interveners. [source] Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary HypothesisINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2005Jeffrey Pickering This article concentrates on two limitations in the literature on diversionary force. First is the common assumption that major powers are the only actors capable of diversion. Second is the narrow conceptualization of regime type prevalent in the literature. Instead of dichotomizing regimes, we distinguish mature democracies and autocracies from consolidating variants of these regimes. We draw hypotheses from the institutional approach and test them with time series cross-section negative binomial first-order autoregressive process estimates of 140 countries from 1950 to 1996. We find that not all democracies and not all autocracies divert. Mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are the only regime types prone to this type of force. Our results suggest that the diversionary literature would benefit from more discriminating operationalizations of regime type and by looking beyond major powers to the actions of less powerful states. [source] Responsibility after Military Intervention: What is Regime Change?POLAR: POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REVIEW, Issue 1 2003John Borneman First page of article [source] Nation Building and Women: The Effect of Intervention on Women's AgencyFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2008Mary Caprioli Regardless of the primary motive, international military intervention aimed at nation building is partly intended to establish democratic societies. And scholars have demonstrated that intervention does have a positive impact on democratization. With democratization generally follows greater support for human rights. Feminist scholars, however, have questioned definitions of democracy in which at minimal, women's political rights are absent. This brings into question the impact of intervention on the status of women. Particularly in both Iraq and Afghanistan women's rights have become prominent in the post-invasion American political rhetoric. Since intervention seems to be associated with the spread of democratic principles, we seek to discover whether intervention actually moves societies toward gender equality. We examine all six cases of completed military intervention aimed at nation building in sovereign states during the post Cold War period. Three of the cases,El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia,evidence democratic change; whereas, the remaining three states,Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia,remain undemocratized. We test the extent to which intervention has or has not improved women's equality and find no dramatic effect, either positive or negative, of intervention on the status of women in any of the six states. [source] ,Saving the Solomons': a New Geopolitics in the ,Arc of Instability'?GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2006JOHN CONNELL Abstract The recent crisis in the Solomon Islands is reviewed in the context of historical and regional antecedents. In the past two decades political and ethnic disputes have flared in several parts of Melanesia and nearby parts of the ,arc of instability'. Tensions and violence in the Solomon Islands, based on social, economic and political issues, exemplify regional development concerns. The collapse of the economy and civil order resulted in the Solomon Islands being characterised as a ,failed State'. Localised warfare brought external military intervention, with a regional assistance mission led by Australia, which paralleled other involvement in the region. Involvement has emphasised renewed Australian interest in the region, in the light of global geopolitical shifts, and a more controversial approach to regional security and development. [source] The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military interventionINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2008ALEX J. BELLAMY The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has come a long way in a relatively short space of time. From inauspicious beginnings, the principle was endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005 and unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (Resolution 1674). However, the principle remains hotly contested primarily because of its association with humanitarian intervention and the pervasive belief that its principal aim is to create a pathway for the legitimization of unilateral military intervention. This article sets forth the argument that a deepening consensus on R2P is dependent on its dissociation from the politics of humanitarian intervention and suggests that one way of doing this is by abandoning the search for criteria for decision-making about the use of force, one of the centre pieces of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 report that coined the phrase R2P. Criteria were never likely to win international support, the article maintains, and were less likely to improve decision-making on how best to respond to major humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, R2P can make an important contribution to thinking about the problem of military intervention by mitigating potential ,moral hazards', overcoming the tendency of international actors to focus exclusively on military methods and giving impetus to efforts to operationalize protection in the field. [source] Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protectINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 6 2007ALEX DE WAAL When official representatives of more than 170 countries adopted the principle of the ,responsibility to protect' (R2P) at the September 2005 World Summit, Darfur was quickly identified as the test case for this new doctrine. The general verdict is that the international community has failed the test due to lack of political will. This article argues that the failure is real but that it is more fundamentally located within the doctrine of R2P itself. Fulfilling the aspiration of R2P demands an international protection capability that does not exist now and cannot be realistically expected. The critical weakness in R2P is that the ,responsibility to react' has been framed as coercive protection, which attempts to be a middle way between classic peacekeeping and outright military intervention that can be undertaken without the consent of the host government. Thus far, theoretical and practical attempts to create this intermediate space for coercive protection have failed to resolve basic strategic and operational issues. In addition, the very act of raising the prospect of external military intervention for human protection purposes changes and distorts the political process and can in fact make a resolution more difficult. Following an introductory section that provides background to the war in Darfur and international engagement, this article examines the debates over the R2P that swirled around the Darfur crisis and operational concepts developed for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and its hybrid successor, the UN,African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), especially during the Abuja peace negotiations. Three operational concepts are examined: ceasefire, disarmament and civilian protection. Unfortunately, the international policy priority o bringing UN troops to Darfur had an adverse impact on the Darfur peace talks without grappling with the central question of what international forces would do to resolve the crisis. Advocacy for the R2P set an unrealistic ideal which became the enemy of achievable goals. [source] "Post-Heroic Warfare" and Ghosts,The Social Control of Dead American Soldiers in Iraq,INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, Issue 2 2008Christophe Wasinski According to some researchers, the public acceptance of military intervention is conditional upon the minimization of military mortality. Once a threshold of military death is crossed, political leaders are obliged to limit their ambitions. This research proposes to consider the idea of threshold as mythical. Instead, it suggests focusing at the presence of the ghosts the dead American soldiers in the public sphere and the way they are "ventriloquated" in order to support or contest the intervention. [source] American Democratic Interventionism: Romancing the Iconic Woodrow WilsonINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 3 2008Constance G. Anthony There is an American foreign policy tradition in respect to military interventions in the Third World, which validates the importance of democratic ideals as central to the success of the policy. Woodrow Wilson is the founding father of this tradition. While the normative commitments of Wilson made sense in Victorian America and can probably be considered innovative for his day, the manifest lack of success in transferring democracy through military intervention leads us to question the character of Wilson's interventions and the ideals that motivated them. This essay will consider the content of Wilson's democratic theory and its integration into ideals of national mission and destiny; how this became the philosophical basis for policies of military intervention; the assessments offered by historians of the success of this policy; and the role of racial paternalism in legitimating the policy at the time. In a contemporary respect, we are left with the question of whether we want such a philosophy of democratic interventionism to be the basis for transferring democratic values and practices to Third World countries today. [source] Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of InterventionINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2008Thomas C. Walker Compared with the realist tradition, relatively few students of international relations explore variations within liberalism. This paper introduces a particular interpretation of Immanuel Kant's evolutionary liberalism and then compares it with Thomas Paine's revolutionary liberalism. Paine was an ebullient optimist while Kant was more guarded and cautious. These different assumptions lead to distinct liberal views on voting rights, how trade fosters peace, and defense policies. The most striking disagreement, and one that endures in contemporary liberal circles, revolves around the question of military interventions to spread democratic rule. Kant advocated nonintervention while Paine actively pursued military intervention to spread democratic rule. Differences between Kant and Paine represent some enduring tensions still residing within the liberal tradition in international relations. [source] "A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation": Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976,2001INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2008Reed M. Wood While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention, sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state-sponsored repression of human rights. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature, I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Specifically, sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent. The empirical results support this theory. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political, social, and physical hardship on civilian populations. They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign-policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability. [source] The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the BalkansINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2008Alan J. Kuperman This article explores a perverse consequence of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or "Responsibility to Protect," contrary to its intent of protecting civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing. The root of the problem is that such genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. The emerging norm, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence. It creates moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur. Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate that in at least two recent cases the moral-hazard hypothesis explains why members of a vulnerable group rebelled and thereby triggered genocidal retaliation. The article concludes by exploring whether potential interveners could mitigate genocidal violence by modifying their intervention policies to reduce moral hazard. [source] Forging Democracy at GunpointINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2006JEFFREY PICKERING Can liberal interventionism build liberal democracy? This manuscript examines the military interventions undertaken by the U.S., U.K., France, and the UN in the post-World War II era to see if they had a positive impact on democracy in target countries. Empirical analysis centers on multivariate time series, cross section PCSE and relogit regressions of political liberalization and democratization from 1946 to 1996. The former is operationalized with annual difference data drawn from the Polity IV data collection, whereas the latter is a binary variable denoting countries that cross a threshold commonly used to indicate the establishment of democratic institutions. An updated version of the International Military Intervention data set enumerates foreign military interventions. We find little evidence that military intervention by liberal states helps to foster democracy in target countries. Although a few states have democratized in the wake of hostile U.S. military interventions, the small number of cases involved makes it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from the U.S. record. We find stronger evidence, however, that supportive interventions by the UN's "Blue Helmets" can help to democratize target states. [source] International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and PoliticidesINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2005Matthew Krain This study examines the effectiveness of overt military intervention in slowing or stopping the killing during ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. Six alternative hypotheses regarding the potential effects of intervention on genocide/politicide severity are tested in a cross-national longitudinal analysis of all ongoing genodices or politicides from 1995 to 1997. The results suggest that interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator or aid the target of the brutal policy are the only effective type of military responses, increasing the probability that the magnitude of the slaughter can be slowed or stopped. Impartial interventions seem to be ineffective at reducing severity, and interventions to challenge the perpetrator do not make matters worse for the targets of genocide or politicide. The findings are consistent with recent arguments that attempts to prevent or alleviate mass killings should focus on opposing, restraining, or disarming perpetrators and/or removing them from power. [source] A Realist's Moral Opposition to War: Han J. Morgenthau and VietnamPEACE & CHANGE, Issue 1 2001Ellen Glaser Rafshoon This article examines Hans J. Morgenthau's critique of U.S. policies in Vietnam. Morgenthau, renowned for his advocacy of realism in foreign affairs, was one of the few political commentators to raise questions about nation-building efforts in South Vietnam in the 1950s. After full-scale military intervention in the 1960s, he became the foremost academic critic of the war. Morgenthau demonstrated a dramatic evolution in his views. In the 1950s, he expressed reservations about Indochina policies based on pragmatic concerns. Over time, however, his analysis of Vietnam policies focused on their ethical shortcomings. His examination of the ethics of the Vietnam war led him to revise his notion of how national interests should be determined in making foreign policy, from a calculation based on purely strategic factors to one that also takes moral factors into account. [source] The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical InvestigationAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2009Peter T. Leeson According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and "infect" neighboring countries, increasing or decreasing their democracy in turn. Using spatial econometrics and panel data that cover over 130 countries between 1850 and 2000, this article empirically investigates the democratic domino theory. We find that democratic dominoes do in fact fall as the theory contends. However, these dominoes fall significantly "lighter" than the importance of this model suggests. Countries "catch" only about 11% of the increases or decreases in their average geographic neighbors' increases or decreases in democracy. This finding has potentially important foreign policy implications. The "lightness" with which democratic dominoes fall suggests that even if foreign military intervention aimed at promoting democracy in undemocratic countries succeeds in democratizing these nations, intervention is likely to have only a small effect on democracy in their broader regions. [source] Cosmopolitanism and violence: difficulties of judgmentTHE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2006Robert Fine Abstract This paper addresses the difficult relation of cosmopolitan ideas to the existence of war and violence. It explores the ambivalences within the cosmopolitan outlook as it seeks to reconcile its attentiveness to the actuality of violence in the modern age with its normative vision of perpetual peace. I address these ambivalences through a discussion of a) what it is to learn from the catastrophes of the twentieth century; b) the contribution Kant's theory of cosmopolitan law to the solution to contemporary problems of violence; c) the reconstruction of cosmopolitan thinking in the wake of the Holocaust as an attempt to take atrocities seriously; d) the application of cosmopolitan criteria to the justification and authorization of humanitarian military intervention; and e) the attempt on the part of Habermas and Derrida to address the ambivalence involved in reconciling cosmopolitanism and violence in Kosovo and Iraq. While cosmopolitanism is usually understood as a reference to a worldly legal and institutional order, the cosmopolitan outlook is also a mode of understanding the world, an ethic of responsibility and an ongoing exercise of political judgment in the face of violence. [source] Revisiting the ,Responsibility to Protect'THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2009MICHAEL NEWMAN The Declaration on ,the responsibility to protect' (R2P), unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in April 2006, identified both national and international responsibilities in relation to genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This was highly significant in appearing to accept that the prevention of mass atrocities was a legitimate international concern. Subsequently, there has been some disappointment about the limited practical impact of R2P, and also anxiety that its progress may be impeded by the fear that it is designed to legitimise military intervention. However, this article concentrates on a different concern. Arguing that an earlier version of R2P (in the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty of 2001) linked the issues with those of human security and development, it suggests that the contemporary focus is far narrower, undermining its critical potential with regard to the policies of the global North and reducing its appeal to developing countries. [source] Front and Back Covers, Volume 24, Number 5.ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Issue 5 2008June 200 Front & Back cover caption, volume 24 issue 5 Iron Mike (see back cover) represents a generic soldier at Fort Bragg, one of the world's largest military bases, in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Here he appears to patrol streets under martial law, empty and grey. The Pawn Shop Target Practice (see front cover) is also in Fayetteville. At the back of the shop you can buy guns, bullets, jewellery and more, and also take aim at various targets , images of a woman in a bikini, an anonymous silhouette, a deer. Violence is found in Fayetteville as a symbol of protection, as entertainment, and certainly as a commodity. The absence of living people in these photographs underscores a clinical attitude cultivated in the military towards the largely dehumanized adversary other , a long way from the kind of engagement anthropologists seek through participant-observation. It may well be that the military would benefit from being ,anthropologized'. However, given Keenan's and Besteman's experiences in Africa, as described in this issue, what is the guarantee that the African peoples will actually benefit from militarization at this time of US military expansion? MILITARIZING THE DISCIPLINE? US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates approvingly cites Montgomery McFate: ,I'm frequently accused of militarizing anthropology. But we're really anthropologizing the military'.* This issue of ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY draws attention to the launch of two initiatives in October this year, both of which will have an impact on the peoples we work with and on anthropology as a discipline. The first is the launch of Minerva, a new Pentagon initiative to recruit social scientists for research, for which proposals are due this month. As Catherine Lutz argues in her editorial, this programme may soon outspend civilian funds within our discipline, and will thus undoubtedly influence our research agenda and restrict the public sphere in which we work. If the Pentagon wants high-quality research, why not commission this from reputable and experienced civilian research agencies, who should be able to manage peer review at arm's length from the Pentagon? The second initiative is AFRICOM, the newly unified regional US command for Africa. Although presented benignly as supporting development in Africa, it was originally cast in the security discourse of the global ,war on terror', with the aim of securing North America's oil supplies in Africa. In this issue, Africanist anthropologists Jeremy Keenan and Catherine Besteman criticize AFRICOM's destabilizing and militarizing effect on the regions in which they work, which collapses development into military security. Once deployed to the ends of military securitization, can anthropology remain non-partisan? Alf Hornborg, in his editorial, asks if we can continue to rely on the cornucopia of cheap energy, arguing that military intervention to securitize oil supplies, and academic discourse that mystifies the logic of the global system, benefit only a small minority of the world's population. In the light of developments such as Minerva and AFRICOM, can anthropology continue to offer an independent reflexive ,cultural critique' of the socio-political system from which our discipline has sprung? *Montgomery McFate, quoted by Robert M. Gates (,Nonmilitary work essential for long-term peace, Secretary of Defense says'. Manhattan, Kansas State University, Landon Lecture, 26.11.2007), as cited in Rohde, David, ,Army enlists anthropology in war zones' (New York Times, 05.10.2007). [source] Front and Back Covers, Volume 22, Number 1.ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Issue 1 2006February 200 Front and back cover caption, volume 22 issue 1 Front cover 'Strasbourg: 15th night of rioting. A French riot police officer gestures to direct the fire fighters to a torched car after vandalism in the eastern French city of Strasbourg early Wednesday 9 November 2005. Police forces have been deployed in the city as authorities expect a 13th night of disturbances all around France. Schiltigheim, France, 10/11/2005.' This photo illustrates Didier Fassin's editorial on the riots in the French banlieues. Although the immediate cause of the riots must be ascribed, at least in part, to the ill-advised reactions of the French police and government, the Prime Minister proceeded to proclaim a state of emergency, using a 1955 law passed during the war in Algeria. These events call for serious examination not only of what France stands for, especially in terms of racial discrimination, but also of why anthropologists should have felt so uncomfortable about analysing these events, just as they did with the controversy over the veil. The political foundations of the discipline in France posit a knowledge of remote societies rather than of others close to home, and aspire to theoretical universalism combined with an element of colour-blindness which ignores local social realities. Back cover Saving Children. In the back cover photo, a little girl holds a dummy pistol in Bella Camp, near Nazran, Ingushetia, Russia, in November 2002. In this issue Jason Hart considers the ways in which children are commonly represented. Particularly in conditions seen as especially adverse, children's lives have overwhelmingly been viewed through the prism of humanitarianism. Accounts of children living amidst conflict, social upheaval and extreme poverty produced by humanitarian organizations are commonly framed by contrast to Romantic ideals of childhood. The disparity thereby demonstrated has fuelled popular imagination in the developed economies of the world - useful not only in eliciting support for humanitarian action but also, under the current world order, in discrediting certain societies and ultimately in justifying military intervention. Hart argues that anthropology has a valuable role to play in enhancing understanding of the lives of children globally. Key to this is locating children within social, economic and political processes that extend beyond the local to the national and international. Taking the issue of 'child soldiers' as an example, Hart argues for the importance of including a focus upon the ways in which such phenomena as the global arms trade and the foreign and economic policies of Western governments contribute to the circumstances in which children come to engage as combatants. Furthermore, the dangers of such engagement need to be placed in the context of the diverse array of risks encountered by children in impoverished and marginal settings. We urgently need a child-centred ethnography attentive to the interaction between the global and the local in the everyday lives of the young so that we may interrogate more closely the moral authority of those who justify their actions in terms of 'saving children'. [source] Australia's Response to the Indochina Crisis of 1954 amidst the Anglo-American ConfrontationAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 3 2006Hiroyuki Umetsu Meeting in Berlin in February 1954, the Great Powers decided to convene an international conference in Geneva in April to discuss the restoration of peace in Indochina and thereby opened the door to a crisis. Their decision triggered a Vietnamese communist offensive against the French union forces at Dien Bien Phu, and a subsequent US proposal for multilateral military intervention which put great strain upon Anglo-American relations. This article examines Australia's response to the Indochina crisis of 1954 amidst the Anglo-American confrontation, focusing on the disagreement between the UK and USA with its origins in their different assessments of the will of the French and Vietnamese to continue fighting; on the impetus that events such as the Berlin conference gave to Australia to redefine its own position on Indochina; and on the (relatively minor) role which Australia, as the military situation in Indochina worsened, played in assisting the US to alter its proposal for allied military intervention. [source] American Democratic Interventionism: Romancing the Iconic Woodrow WilsonINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 3 2008Constance G. Anthony There is an American foreign policy tradition in respect to military interventions in the Third World, which validates the importance of democratic ideals as central to the success of the policy. Woodrow Wilson is the founding father of this tradition. While the normative commitments of Wilson made sense in Victorian America and can probably be considered innovative for his day, the manifest lack of success in transferring democracy through military intervention leads us to question the character of Wilson's interventions and the ideals that motivated them. This essay will consider the content of Wilson's democratic theory and its integration into ideals of national mission and destiny; how this became the philosophical basis for policies of military intervention; the assessments offered by historians of the success of this policy; and the role of racial paternalism in legitimating the policy at the time. In a contemporary respect, we are left with the question of whether we want such a philosophy of democratic interventionism to be the basis for transferring democratic values and practices to Third World countries today. [source] Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2008Stephen E. Gent Conventional wisdom suggests that biased military interventions in civil conflicts should increase the probability that the supported side will win. However, while this is the case for rebel groups, the same is not true for governments. The explanation for this surprising finding becomes clear once one considers the decision of a third-party intervener. Since interveners want to impact the outcomes of civil conflict, government- and rebel-biased interventions will be more likely when the government is facing a stronger rebel group. Given that government-biased third parties intervene in the ,,toughest'' cases, empirically they appear to be less effective than rebel-biased interveners. [source] Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of InterventionINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2008Thomas C. Walker Compared with the realist tradition, relatively few students of international relations explore variations within liberalism. This paper introduces a particular interpretation of Immanuel Kant's evolutionary liberalism and then compares it with Thomas Paine's revolutionary liberalism. Paine was an ebullient optimist while Kant was more guarded and cautious. These different assumptions lead to distinct liberal views on voting rights, how trade fosters peace, and defense policies. The most striking disagreement, and one that endures in contemporary liberal circles, revolves around the question of military interventions to spread democratic rule. Kant advocated nonintervention while Paine actively pursued military intervention to spread democratic rule. Differences between Kant and Paine represent some enduring tensions still residing within the liberal tradition in international relations. [source] Forging Democracy at GunpointINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2006JEFFREY PICKERING Can liberal interventionism build liberal democracy? This manuscript examines the military interventions undertaken by the U.S., U.K., France, and the UN in the post-World War II era to see if they had a positive impact on democracy in target countries. Empirical analysis centers on multivariate time series, cross section PCSE and relogit regressions of political liberalization and democratization from 1946 to 1996. The former is operationalized with annual difference data drawn from the Polity IV data collection, whereas the latter is a binary variable denoting countries that cross a threshold commonly used to indicate the establishment of democratic institutions. An updated version of the International Military Intervention data set enumerates foreign military interventions. We find little evidence that military intervention by liberal states helps to foster democracy in target countries. Although a few states have democratized in the wake of hostile U.S. military interventions, the small number of cases involved makes it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from the U.S. record. We find stronger evidence, however, that supportive interventions by the UN's "Blue Helmets" can help to democratize target states. [source] Are Humanitarian Military Interventions Obligatory?JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2008JOVANA DAVIDOVIC abstract I argue here that certain species of war, namely humanitarian military interventions (HMIs), can be obligatory within particular contexts. Specifically, I look at the notion of HMIs through the lens of just war theory and argue that when a minimal account of jus ad bellum implies that an intervention is permissible, it also implies that it is obligatory. I begin by clarifying the jus ad bellum conditions (such as just cause, right intentions, etc.) under which an intervention is permissible. I then turn to the claim that permissibility necessitates obligation, by first showing that whenever an intervention is permissible, it is also minimally decent. Second, I show that minimally decent actions are morally obligatory by arguing that the notion of minimal decency is a conceptual bridge between negative and positive duties. Third, I argue that performing minimally decent actions is necessary for a state to be just. Ultimately, my conclusion arises from the following observation: if a humanitarian crisis is bad enough for one to hold that it is permissible to breach sovereignty of a nation, then it is bad enough to hold that there is an obligation to intervene. [source] Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the PeripheryPOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2004Jeffrey W. Taliaferro Great powers frequently initiate risky diplomatic and military interventions in the periphery,regions that do not directly threaten the security of a great power's homeland. Such risky interventions are driven by leaders' aversion to losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. These leaders often persist in such courses of action even when they incur mounting political, economic, and military costs. More surprisingly, they undertake risky strategies toward other great powers in an effort to continue these failing interventions. Hypotheses concerning such interventions are derived from the prospect theory and defensive realist literatures. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||