Mechanism Design (mechanism + design)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


ON DETAIL-FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY,

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2005
HITOSHI MATSUSHIMAArticle first published online: 23 FEB 200
Mechanism design theory has been criticized, because mechanisms depend on the detail of specification and agents' behaviour relies on strong rationality assumptions. Hence the study of "detail-free" mechanism design with weak rationality is important as a practical theory. This paper emphasizes that, even if we confine our attention to detail-free mechanisms with weak rationality, there exists plenty of scope for the development of new and significant ideas. I describe my recent work along these lines, and argue that stochastic decisions work in large double auction environments, and that moral preferences improve the implementability of social choice functions. [source]


INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM DESIGN AND FIRM GROWTH: EXPERIENCES FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REGULATION

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2010
Sumit K. Majumdar
ABSTRACT**:,This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firm growth among the population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have had a negative impact on firm growth. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms' growth. These results highlight the importance of proper and appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to strive for superior performance. [source]


OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF A 3-LEG 6-DOF LINEAR MOTOR BASED PARALLEL MANIPULATOR

ASIAN JOURNAL OF CONTROL, Issue 1 2004
Thong-Shing Hwang
ABSTRACT This paper presents the optimal mechanism design and dynamic analysis of a prototype 3-leg 6-DOF (degree-of-freedom) parallel manipulator. Inverse kinematics, forward kinematics, inverse dynamics and working space characterizing the platform motion are derived. In the presented architecture, the base platform has three linear slideways individually actuated by a synchronous linear servo motor, and each extensible vertical link connecting the upper and base platforms is actuated by an inductive AC servo motor. The linear motors contribute high-speed movements to the upper platform. This kind of architecture using hybrid (linear and AC) motors yields high level performance of motions, especially in the working space. The novel result of maximal working angles is the significant contribution of this architecture. The Taguchi Experimental Method is applied to design the optimal mechanism of the platform system, and the result is used as the actual data to build this system. [source]


The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2002
Ilya Segal
The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem, paralleling Mirrlees's (1971) first-order analysis of standard mechanism design problems. We use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold-up and risk-sharing models. In particular, we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts, such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts (where only one agent sends a message). [source]


Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information Is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2003
Keith Waehrer
The siting of hazardous facilities often involves externalities that extend beyond the border of the community selected as a site. Thus, the private information of each community is potentially a vector of costs comprising a cost for each of the possible sites. I characterize the conditions for the existence of a direct mechanism that is incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balancing. Incentive compatibility implies a pattern of compensation payments that often conflicts with compensation policy goals. When nonparticipating communities cannot block the siting of the facility, it will often be possible to implement siting policies with a balanced budget. [source]


Call for Papers for a Special Issue of Production and Operations Management: Behavioral Mechanism Design for Operations Management

PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 5 2010
Elena Katok Guest Editors
No abstract is available for this article. [source]


A note on hinge-free topology design using the special triangulation of design elements

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR NUMERICAL METHODS IN BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING, Issue 12 2005
Jae Eun Kim
Abstract Hinges, the unrepeated checkerboard cells, may appear in the topology optimization using low-order finite elements, especially for compliant mechanism design. Existing hinge-controlling methods are based on the rectangular element discretization, so slant or curved boundary lines may not be represented satisfactorily. To avoid hinge formation and to represent curved boundary lines better, we consider a macro-design element method which subdivides the design element into eight triangular finite elements; the finite element calculation is carried out with triangular elements, but the design variables are defined at the nodes defining rectangular macro-design elements. For hinge-free results, different stiffness interpolations are suggested depending on whether the triangular element belongs to a master group or a slave group. The performance of the proposed method was checked with compliant mechanism design problems from the viewpoint of hinge suppression and the possibility of generating slant boundary lines. Copyright 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


ON DETAIL-FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY,

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2005
HITOSHI MATSUSHIMAArticle first published online: 23 FEB 200
Mechanism design theory has been criticized, because mechanisms depend on the detail of specification and agents' behaviour relies on strong rationality assumptions. Hence the study of "detail-free" mechanism design with weak rationality is important as a practical theory. This paper emphasizes that, even if we confine our attention to detail-free mechanisms with weak rationality, there exists plenty of scope for the development of new and significant ideas. I describe my recent work along these lines, and argue that stochastic decisions work in large double auction environments, and that moral preferences improve the implementability of social choice functions. [source]


INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM DESIGN AND FIRM GROWTH: EXPERIENCES FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REGULATION

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2010
Sumit K. Majumdar
ABSTRACT**:,This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firm growth among the population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have had a negative impact on firm growth. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms' growth. These results highlight the importance of proper and appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to strive for superior performance. [source]


OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF A 3-LEG 6-DOF LINEAR MOTOR BASED PARALLEL MANIPULATOR

ASIAN JOURNAL OF CONTROL, Issue 1 2004
Thong-Shing Hwang
ABSTRACT This paper presents the optimal mechanism design and dynamic analysis of a prototype 3-leg 6-DOF (degree-of-freedom) parallel manipulator. Inverse kinematics, forward kinematics, inverse dynamics and working space characterizing the platform motion are derived. In the presented architecture, the base platform has three linear slideways individually actuated by a synchronous linear servo motor, and each extensible vertical link connecting the upper and base platforms is actuated by an inductive AC servo motor. The linear motors contribute high-speed movements to the upper platform. This kind of architecture using hybrid (linear and AC) motors yields high level performance of motions, especially in the working space. The novel result of maximal working angles is the significant contribution of this architecture. The Taguchi Experimental Method is applied to design the optimal mechanism of the platform system, and the result is used as the actual data to build this system. [source]