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Market Transactions (market + transactions)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Reverse Auctions with Multiple Reinforcement Learning Agents,

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 1 2008
Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay
ABSTRACT Reverse auctions in business-to-business (B2B) exchanges provide numerous benefits to participants. Arguably the most notable benefit is that of lowered prices driven by increased competition in such auctions. The competition between sellers in reverse auctions has been analyzed using a game-theoretic framework and equilibria have been established for several scenarios. One finding of note is that, in a setting in which sellers can meet total demand with the highest-bidding seller being able to sell only a fraction of the total capacity, the sellers resort to a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Although price randomization in industrial bidding is an accepted norm, one might argue that in reality managers do not utilize advanced game theory calculations in placing bids. More likely, managers adopt simple learning strategies. In this situation, it remains an open question as to whether the bid prices converge to the theoretical equilibrium over time. To address this question, we model reverse-auction bidding behavior by artificial agents as both two-player and n -player games in a simulation environment. The agents begin the game with a minimal understanding of the environment but over time analyze wins and losses for use in determining future bids. To test for convergence, the agents explore the price space and exploit prices where profits are higher, given varying cost and capacity scenarios. In the two-player case, the agents do indeed converge toward the theoretical equilibrium. The n -player case provides results that reinforce our understanding of the theoretical equilibria. These results are promising enough to further consider the use of artificial learning mechanisms in reverse auctions and other electronic market transactions, especially as more sophisticated mechanisms are developed to tackle real-life complexities. We also develop the analytical results when one agent does not behave strategically while the other agent does and show that our simulations for this environment also result in convergence toward the theoretical equilibrium. Because the nature of the best response in the new setting is very different (pure strategy as opposed to mixed), it indicates the robustness of the devised algorithm. The use of artificial agents can also overcome the limitations in rationality demonstrated by human managers. The results thus have interesting implications for designing artificial agents in automating bid responses for large numbers of bids where human intervention might not always be possible. [source]

Some Empirical Evidence to Support the Relationship Between Audit Reports and Stock Prices , The French Case

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING, Issue 3 2000
Bahram Soltani
Acting as an independent intermediary, the auditor facilitates market transactions by providing an ,opinion' on financial statements which should help to reduce the information asymmetry between the company and its potential investors. Whether audit qualifications have informational value to investors is a question that needs further investigation, as previous empirical studies on this issue yield mixed results. Moreover, a majority of the research papers in this area have been conducted in Anglo-Saxon countries, in contrast to continental European countries where very little attention has been paid to the auditors' role in stock markets. The present study is based on a large sample of qualified opinions (543 for the period 1986,1995), using different expected event dates and market models. The results of the study demonstrate the significant negative abnormal returns around the announcement dates of audit opinions. The empirical part of this study was carried out in the French market which has some significant differences from the UK and the USA markets. The author believes that the differences, in the area of reporting, level of disclosure, and accounting and auditing practices, can play an important role in the research field of event studies. [source]

Public-Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 2 2002
Barry Bozeman
The familiar market-failure model remains quite useful for issues of price efficiency and traditional utilitarianism, but it has many shortcomings as a standard for public-value aspects of public policy and management. In a public-value-failure model, I present criteria for diagnosing values problems that are not easily addressed by market-failure models. Public-value failure occurs when: (1) mechanisms for values articulation and aggregation have broken down; (2) "imperfect monopolies" occur; (3) benefit hoarding occurs; (4) there is a scarcity of providers of public value; (5) a short time horizon threatens public value; (6) a focus on substitutability of assets threatens conservation of public resources; and (7) market transactions threaten fundamental human subsistence. After providing examples for diagnosis of public-values failure, including an extended example concerning the market for human organs, I introduce a "public-failure grid" to facilitate values choices in policy and public management. [source]

Property rights and the public trust doctrine in environmental protection and natural resource conservation,

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2009
Jedidiah Brewer
We examine the implications of the public trust doctrine in natural resource protection and conservation. A model of litigation and settlement among disputing parties suggests that the public trust doctrine introduces more costs and is more time consuming than would be the case with alternative approaches, such as the purchase of private rights through market transactions or application of eminent domain powers to reallocate the resource. Because the doctrine allows for uncompensated redistribution, it is resisted by current resource owners. Furthermore, by providing open standing to members of the public in challenging existing uses, public trust disputes encourage excessive demands, increasing the incidence of trial over settlement. This outcome is exacerbated if the plaintiffs derive utility from the ,cause' and provide litigation services at below-market rates, leading to greater investment in litigation. The costs of the public trust doctrine appear to have limited its application beyond the level anticipated by proponents. We present a case study of Mono Lake, part of the well-known 1983 litigation, National Audubon v. Superior Court to illustrate our arguments. [source]