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Market Signals (market + signal)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	50%

Selected Abstracts

Market Uncertainty and Socially Embedded Reputation

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 3 2009
Harris H. Kim
Both economists and sociologists generally recognize the importance of reputation in coordinating economic transactions. In a perfectly competitive and anonymous market characterized by faceless buyers and sellers, the issue of reputation would be irrelevant and unnecessary. In reality, however, markets are often filled with varying degrees of information asymmetry, which can threaten the very existence of the market system itself. In critical reaction to the standard neoclassical model, some economists, on the one hand, argue that when there is an information problem, reputation serves as a valuable source of market signal of quality. Sociologists of economic life similarly contend that reputation, along with trust, is critical in lowering transaction costs and thereby facilitating various economic activities among individual actors. The purpose of this article is to apply this broad theoretical observation to a specific empirical phenomenon. It does so by highlighting the role of social networks that connect actors on both demand and supply sides of the market. Specifically, this study examines how interpersonal networks in the market for legal services affect the duration of ties between buyers and sellers. Quantitative analysis based on a random sample of Chicago lawyers, a project funded by the American Bar Foundation, reveals that ceteris paribus the lawyer-client relations are significantly driven by social network factors. [source]

SURVEYING UNIVERSITY STUDENT STANDARDS IN ECONOMICS

ECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 2 2005
Peter Abelson
In late 2003 and early 2004 the Economic Society of Australia surveyed the Heads of Economics Departments in Australia to determine their views on three main issues: student standards; major factors affecting these standards; and policy implications. This paper describes the main results of the survey, reviews the conduct and value of this kind of survey, and discusses policy implications for economics in universities. Most respondents considered that student standards have declined and that the main causes include lower entry standards, high student/staff ratios, and a declining culture of study. However, some respondents argued that standards are multi-dimensional and that people may properly attach different weights to different attributes. Strong precautions assuring anonymity to respondents minimised strategic responses, but may not have eliminated them entirely. However, the respondents' views were based largely on experience rather than evidence and a major finding of this paper is the need for more evidence on standards and on the factors that influence them. Most respondents favoured a decentralised university-based approach to dealing with these issues, contending that centralised accreditation is inappropriate and that market forces would promote quality issues. In the writer's view, externally set and assessed exams as part of university examination procedures would lift standards and send out improved market signals. [source]

Launch decisions and competitive reactions: an exploratory market signaling study

THE JOURNAL OF PRODUCT INNOVATION MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2002
Erik Jan Hultink
When firms launch a new product into the marketplace they often aim to find a balance between building scale and provoking extensive and quick competitive reactions. Competitors react to new products when they perceive the product introduction as hostile, committed or when they feel that the product entry will have a large impact on their profitability. The present study develops a framework that shows how strong and fast incumbents react to perceived market signals resulting from a new product's launch decisions (broad targeting, penetration pricing, advertising intensity and product advantage). The strength of the relationships between the launch decisions and the perceived market signals was expected to depend on one industry characteristic (i.e., market growth) and on one entrant characteristic (i.e., aggressive reputation). We distinguished three market signals in our framework: hostility, commitment and consequences. Signal hostility refers to the extent to which the approach used by an acting firm to introduce the new product is perceived hostile whereas the commitment signal refers to the extent to which incumbents perceive the entrant firm to be committed to the new product introduction. The consequence signal is defined as the incumbents' perception of the impact of a new product entry on their profitability. We tested our framework using cross-sectional data provided by 73 managers in The Netherlands who recently reacted to a new product entry. The results clearly reveal which launch decisions create which market signals. For example, incumbents consider high advantage new products hostile and consequential. Penetration pricing and an intense advertising campaign are also considered hostile, especially in fast growing markets. Broad targeting is not perceived hostile, especially not when used by entrants with an aggressive reputation. In addition, this study explored the impact of three perceived market signals on the strength and speed of competitive reaction. The results reveal that perceived signals of hostility and commitment positively impact the strength of reaction, whereas the perceived consequence signal positively impacts the speed of reaction. The article concludes with the implications of our study for managers and academics. The relevance to managers was assessed from both the perspective of the incumbent firm that must defend, and that of the rival firm that is introducing the new product. [source]