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Managerial Incentives (managerial + incentive)
Selected AbstractsMANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2005Abraham L. Wickelgren Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi-product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade-off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price-coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra-firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi-product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit-sharing, intra-firm price competition can reduce quality-adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy. [source] The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear RiskFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 1 2003M. Andrew Fields Recent corporate events have brought a heightened public awareness to corporate governance issues. Much work has been accomplished to date, but it is clear that much more remains to be done. This paper provides a review of empirical research in four relevant areas of corporate governance. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of (a) the role that outside directors play in monitoring managers, (b) the emerging literature on the impact of board diversity, (c) the existence of and incentives for corporate executives to manage firm earnings, and (d) managerial incentives to bear risk. [source] Implicit Contracts, Managerial Incentives, and Financial StructureJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2001Roberta Dessí This paper examines how managers may be given incentives to exert effort, and to implement efficient implicit contracts with workers. Under certain assumptions, this can be achieved by tying managerial compensation to shareholder value. However, if reputation effects are weak, it is more efficient to adopt an incentive scheme in which the manager is punished by outside investor intervention when performance falls below a critical level, and otherwise retains control, receiving a fixed reward. The required form of outside intervention can be implemented through a financial structure combining hard debt with a dispersed ownership structure. [source] How Theories of Financial Intermediation and Corporate Risk-Management Influence Bank Risk-Taking BehaviorFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 5 2001Michael S. Pagano This paper examines the rationales for risk-taking and risk-management behavior from both a corporate finance and a banking perspective. After combining the theoretical insights from the corporate finance and banking literatures related to hedging and risk-taking, the paper reviews empirical tests based on these theories to determine which of these theories are best supported by the data. Managerial incentives are the most consistently supported rationale for describing how banks manage risk. In particular, moderate/high levels of equity ownership reduce bank risk while positive amounts of stock option grants increase bank risk-taking behavior. The review of empirical tests in the banking literature also suggests that financial intermediaries coordinate different aspects of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) in order to maintain a certain level of total risk. The empirical results indicate hedgeable risks such as interest rate risk represent only one dimension of the risk-management problem. This implies empirical tests of the theories of corporate risk-management need to consider individual sub-components of total risk and the bank's ability to trade these risks in a competitive financial market. This finding is consistent with the reality that banks have non-zero expected financial distress costs and bank managers cannot fully diversify their bank-related personal investments. [source] Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United KingdomACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Chrisostomos Florackis G3; G32 Abstract This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999,2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure. [source] Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial CompensationJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2002Kenneth K. Yung In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments. [source] Employee Stock Option Fair-Value Estimates: Do Managerial Discretion and Incentives Explain Accuracy?,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006Leslie Hodder Abstract We examine the determinants of managers' use of discretion over employee stock option (ESO) valuation-model inputs that determine ESO fair values. We also explore the consequences of such discretion. Firms exercise considerable discretion over all model inputs, and this discretion results in material differences in ESO fair-value estimates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a large proportion of firms exercise value-increasing discretion. Importantly, we find that using discretion improves predictive accuracy for about half of our sample firms. Moreover, we find that both opportunistic and informational managerial incentives together explain the accuracy of firms' ESO fair-value estimates. Partitioning on the direction of discretion improves our understanding of managerial incentives. Our analysis confirms that financial statement readers can use mandated contextual disclosures to construct powerful ex ante predictions of ex post accuracy. [source] Why Study Large Projects?EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2004An Introduction to Research on Project Finance G32; G34; L22; G31 Abstract Despite the fact that more than $200 billion of capital investment was financed through project companies in 2001, an amount that grew at a compound annual rate of almost 20% during the 1990s, there has been very little academic research on project finance. The purpose of this article is to explain why project finance in general and why large projects in particular merit separate academic research and instruction. In short, there are significant opportunities to study the relationship among structural attributes (i.e., high leverage, contractual details, and concentrated equity ownership), managerial incentives, and asset values, as well as improve current practice in this rapidly growing field of finance. [source] Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of US Casino ExecutivesFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2005Daniel A. Rogers I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects. Repricing may alleviate such incentives. I examine repricing activity by firms in the US gaming industry and find that risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results support the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management. [source] The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear RiskFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 1 2003M. Andrew Fields Recent corporate events have brought a heightened public awareness to corporate governance issues. Much work has been accomplished to date, but it is clear that much more remains to be done. This paper provides a review of empirical research in four relevant areas of corporate governance. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of (a) the role that outside directors play in monitoring managers, (b) the emerging literature on the impact of board diversity, (c) the existence of and incentives for corporate executives to manage firm earnings, and (d) managerial incentives to bear risk. [source] Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United KingdomACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Chrisostomos Florackis G3; G32 Abstract This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999,2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure. [source] Resource Allocation Auctions within FirmsJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2007STANLEY BAIMAN ABSTRACT There is growing interest in the use of markets within firms. Proponents have noted that markets are a simple and efficient mechanism for allocating resources in economies in which information is dispersed. In contrast to the use of markets in the broader economy, the efficiency of an internal market is determined in large part by the endogenous contractual incentives provided to the participating, privately informed agents. In this paper, we study the optimal design of managerial incentives when resources are allocated by an internal auction market, as well as the efficiency of the resulting resource allocations. We show that the internal auction market can achieve first-best resource allocations and decisions, but only at an excessive cost in compensation payments. We then identify conditions under which the internal auction market and associated optimal incentive contracts achieve the benchmark second-best outcome as determined using a direct revelation mechanism. The advantage of the auction is that it is easier to implement than the direct revelation mechanism. When the internal auction mechanism is unable to achieve second-best, we characterize the factors that determine the magnitude of the shortfall. Overall, our results speak to the robust performance of relatively simple market mechanisms and associated incentive systems in resolving resource allocation problems within firms. [source] Incentives, Discretion, and Asset Valuation in Closed,End Mutual FundsJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2002Nandini Chandar This paper studies earnings management using 363 closed,end mutual fund firm,years of data. Closed,end fund assets consist of unrestricted and restricted securities, and realized and unrealized income. While unrestricted securities are not subject to earnings management, restricted security values are largely discretionary. Managerial valuation of restricted securities is modeled as contingent on unrestricted returns relative to a performance benchmark. Four unrestricted performance regions are identified. Known multi,period compensation incentives become the basis for hypothesizing earnings management behaviors in the regions in the form of restricted security valuation. Across several benchmarks, the results are consistent with multi,period maximization rather than simpler single,period compensation maximization or income smoothing. Funds with extreme unrestricted performance show relatively larger income,decreasing earnings management, and funds with slightly,below benchmark returns show relatively larger income,increasing earnings management than those slightly above. These results clarify the relationship between complex earnings management behavior and managerial incentives. [source] Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and VolatilityJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002John Core The costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives, accounting choice, financing decisions, and the valuation of equity. We present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock-return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year's proxy statement or annual report. This method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm-wide option plans. In broad samples of actual and simulated CEO option portfolios, we show that these proxies capture more than 99% of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics, and is most severe in samples of CEOs with a large proportion of out-of-the-money options. However, the proxies' explanatory power remains above 95% in all subsamples. [source] Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to CrisisJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2008E. Han Kim In the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost over half its value against the dollar, and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were family-controlled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through "tunneling" activities and other means. The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market-based solutions and government intervention. The government-engineered, large-scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol,the so-called "big deals" that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business,turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37% at the end of 2006, up from just 13% ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol. The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies,notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards,have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO, the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange,as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett,are held up as a model of best practice. At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there continue to be many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run companies that have resisted such reforms. And aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement, but in reversing some of the previous gains. Most disturbing is the current push to allow American style anti-takeover devices, which, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control. [source] Realizing the Potential of Real Options: Does Theory Meet Practice?JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2005Alexander Triantis The idea of viewing corporate investment opportunities as "real options" has been around for over 25 years. Real options concepts and techniques now routinely appear in academic research in finance and economics, and have begun to influence scholarly work in virtually every business discipline, including strategy, organizations, management science, operations management, information systems, accounting, and marketing. Real options concepts have also made considerable headway in practice. Corporate managers are more likely to recognize options in their strategic planning process, and have become more proactive in designing flexibility into projects and contracts, frequently using real options vocabulary in their discussions. Thanks in part to the spread of real options thinking, today's strategic planners are more likely than their predecessors to recognize the "option" value of actions like the following: , dividing up large projects into a number of stages; , investing in the acquisition or production of information; , introducing "modularity" in manufacturing and design; , developing competing prototypes for new products; and , investing in overseas markets. But if real options has clearly succeeded as a way of thinking, the application of real options valuation methods has been limited to companies in relatively few industries and has thus failed to live up to expectations created in the mid- to late-1990s. Increased corporate acceptance and implementations of real options valuation techniques will require several changes coming together. On the theory side, we need more realistic models that better reflect differences between financial and real options, simple heuristic methods that can be more easily implemented (but that have been carefully benchmarked against more precise models), and better guidance on implementation issues such as the estimation of discount rates for the "optionless" underlying projects. On the practitioner side, we need user-friendly real options software, more senior-level buy-in, more deliberate diffusion of real options knowledge throughout organizations, better alignment of managerial incentives with long-term shareholder value, and better-designed contracts to correct the misalignment of incentives across the value chain. If these challenges can be met, there will continue to be a steady if gradual diffusion of real options analysis throughout organizations over the next few decades, with real options eventually becoming not only a standard part of corporate strategic planning, but also the primary valuation tool for assessing the expected shareholder effect of large capital investment projects. [source] Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial CompensationJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2002Kenneth K. Yung In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments. [source] The Role of International Financial Reporting Standards in Accounting Quality: Evidence from the European UnionJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3 2010Huifa Chen Previous studies on the effect of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on accounting quality often have difficulties to control for confounding factors on accounting quality. As a result, the observed changes in accounting quality could not be attributed mainly to IFRS. We use a unique research setting to address this issue by comparing the accounting quality of publicly listed companies in 15 member states of the European Union (EU) before and after the full adoption of IFRS in 2005. We use five indicators as proxies for accounting quality. We find that the majority of accounting quality indicators improved after IFRS adoption in the EU. That is, there is less of managing earnings toward a target, a lower magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals, and higher accruals quality. But our results also show that firms engage in more earnings smoothing and recognize large losses in a less timely manner in post-IFRS periods. In addition, we examine the effects of institutional variables on financial reporting quality. Our contribution to the literature is that we show the improved accounting quality is attributable to IFRS, rather than changes in managerial incentives, institutional features of capital markets, and general business environment, etc. [source] Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selectionMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2005Michel Cavagnac We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner,manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade-off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity-lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant-strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low-cost manager and output control for a high-cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2003Agency Reconsidered We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers diversify their firms for two reasons: to reduce idiosyncratic risk and to capture private benefits. We test the comparative static predictions of our model. In contrast to previous work, we find that diversification is positively related to managerial incentives. Further, the link between firm performance and managerial incentives is weaker for firms that experience changes in diversification than it is for firms that do not. Our findings suggest that managers diversify their firms in response to changes in private benefits rather than to reduce their exposure to risk. [source] Accounting for Executive Stock Options: A Case Study in Avoiding Tough DecisionsAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 26 2002Jeff Coulton We review the development of accounting requirements for executive stock options (ESOs) and find that the standard-setting process has been susceptible to pressure groups including the corporate sector, politicians and even the accounting profession itself. The failure of Australian and overseas accounting regulators to take tough decisions may have created a systematic bias towards the use of ESOs which can result in grossly inefficient compensation structures motivated by a desire to maximise reported profits rather than to create optimal managerial incentives. We conclude that most of the arguments against recognition of stock option expense can be dismissed as blatant self-interest at worst, or remarkably muddled thinking at best. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||