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Managerial Delegation (managerial + delegation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION, R&D AND COLLUSION

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010
Rupayan Pal
L10; L13 ABSTRACT Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full-collusive outcomes,cannot,be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi-collusion,always,yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct. [source]

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2009
Yasuhiko Nakamura
We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous-timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION, R&D AND COLLUSION

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010
Rupayan Pal
L10; L13 ABSTRACT Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full-collusive outcomes,cannot,be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi-collusion,always,yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct. [source]