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Major Powers (major + power)
Selected AbstractsIdentity Politics and the Domestic Context of Turkey's European Union AccessionGOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 4 2006Necati Polat This article observes a transformation in the largely essentializing, decontextualized form of identity politics that long defined political cosmology in Turkey, now in the process of negotiating accession to the European Union (EU). Accordingly, identity politics , not only the bread and butter of both Kurdish nationalism and Islamism, but also a justification for exhortations towards a limited, authoritarian democracy by Kemalists, the major power holders , is receding in favour of a civic, non-divisive political culture enabled by the EU anchorage. In danger of losing the longstanding centre,periphery configuration in an enhanced, participatory democracy and, concomitant with it, the periphery clientelism created by the waning identity politics, Kemalist nationalists, Islamists and Kurdish separatists appear to have stopped squabbling among themselves and joined forces against Turkey's EU bid. [source] China's Recovery: Why the Writing Was Always on the WallTHE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2009OLIVER TURNER China has been a major power for far longer than is typically acknowledged in the West. This paper seeks to redress established discourse of China as a ,rising' power which now enjoys common usage within Western policy-making, academic and popular circles, particularly within the United States; China can more accurately be conceived of as a ,recovering power'. A tendency by successive Washington administrations to view the world in realist terms has forced the label of ,rising' power onto China along with the negative connotations that inevitably follow. We should acknowledge the folly in utilising a theoretical approach largely devoid of any appreciation for the social and human dimensions of international relations as well as the importance of social discourse in the field. Finally, policy-makers in Washington must reconsider their realist stance and, with a fuller appreciation of world history, recognise that American hegemony was always destined to be short-lived. [source] NATO expansion: ,a policy error of historic importance'INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 6 2008MICHAEL MCCGWIRE European security depends on the effective collaboration of the five major powers; it will be undermined by the extension of NATO, a policy driven by US domestic politics. The main threats to security are: the breakdown of political and economic stability; unintended nuclear proliferation and/or failure of the START process; Russia's evolving political and territorial aspirations. All three will remain marginal as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West. NATO expansion threatens that engagement. It is seen by all strands of Russian opinion as violating the bargain struck in 1990 and will likely lead to the withdrawal of cooperation. Invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be rescinded, but the consequences can be mitigated by refraining from integrating them into NATO's military structure, by ceasing to insist that NATO membership is open to all, and by perpetuating the de facto nuclear-weapons-free zone that presently exists in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain's stance could be pivotal. [source] Billiard Balls or Snowflakes?INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2007Major Power Prestige, Practices, the International Diffusion of Institutions Do the institutions and practices of the major powers influence those of other states? Many international relations theorists have argued that these powerful states' prestige allows them to define what is normatively acceptable. This paper tests the influence of the internal characteristics of major powers on democratization, the extension of formal political equality to women, and the practice of jailing or killing the state's domestic political opponents. We find support for the major power prestige hypothesis in the latter two cases. In understanding some important international outcomes, it makes sense to treat major powers less like impenetrable "billiard balls," distinguished only by their relative power, and more like "snowflakes" with many relevant internal characteristics. [source] Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary HypothesisINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2005Jeffrey Pickering This article concentrates on two limitations in the literature on diversionary force. First is the common assumption that major powers are the only actors capable of diversion. Second is the narrow conceptualization of regime type prevalent in the literature. Instead of dichotomizing regimes, we distinguish mature democracies and autocracies from consolidating variants of these regimes. We draw hypotheses from the institutional approach and test them with time series cross-section negative binomial first-order autoregressive process estimates of 140 countries from 1950 to 1996. We find that not all democracies and not all autocracies divert. Mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are the only regime types prone to this type of force. Our results suggest that the diversionary literature would benefit from more discriminating operationalizations of regime type and by looking beyond major powers to the actions of less powerful states. [source] Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 2 2005Norrin M. Ripsman A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this essay, we examine the globalization school's main propositions by analyzing the national security strategies of four categories of states: (1) major powers, (2) states in stable regions, (3) states in regions of enduring rivalries, and (4) weak and failed states. We conclude that the globalizations school's claims are overstated given that states of all types pursue more traditional security policies than they would expect. To the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes rendered by globalization the most, states in regions of enduring rivalries the least. Although the weak and failed states also show signs of having been affected by globalization, many of the "symptoms" they manifest have more to do with internal difficulties than external challenges. [source] In Search of the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime BuildingPACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2005Tae-Hwan Kwak The author proposes a long-term, comprehensive roadmap for the Korean peninsula peace regime initiative for replacing the 1953 Korean armistice agreement with a Korean peninsula peace treaty. The two approaches to a Korean peninsula peace regime building are examined in detail at the inter-Korean and the international levels. The two Koreas at the inter-Korean level, and the six parties involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia at the international level may concurrently make efforts to build a peace regime by replacing the 1953 Korean armistice agreement with a peace treaty through confidence-building measures, national reconciliation and international cooperation. A peace regime can be institutionalized by implementing the inter-Korean basic agreement (1991) through inter-Korean cooperation and by concluding a Korean peninsula peace treaty through the four-party peace talks involving the U.S., China, and the two Koreas. However, the current North Korea's nuclear issue has been a key obstacle to the peace regime building process. Three major arguments in this paper are presented: First, the two Koreas and the four major powers need to agree on a comprehensive roadmap for the Korean peace regime. Second, in the short-term, the North Korea's nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully and diplomatically through the six-party process. Third, the two Koreas need to abandon their respective positions: the Seoul's proposal for an inter-Korean peace treaty and the Pyeongyang's proposal for a DPRK-U.S. peace treaty to replace the 1953 Korean armistice agreement. The author proposes that a Korean peninsula peace treaty among the four parties involving the ROK, the DPRK, the U.S. and China should be an alternative, and the proposal needs to be seriously considered. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||