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Major Decisions (major + decision)
Selected Abstracts"It wasn't ,let's get pregnant and go do it':" Decision Making in Lesbian Couples Planning Motherhood via Donor InseminationFAMILY RELATIONS, Issue 4 2004Jennifer M. Chabot The process that lesbian couples experienced in using donor insemination (DI) to become parents was examined in this study through interviews of 10 lesbians. Using a decision-making framework embedded in feminist theory, results identified the major decisions involved that conceptualized the transition to parenthood and describe how these decisions were experienced. [source] "Stuff Happens": Donald Rumsfeld and the Iraq WarFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2009Stephen Benedict Dyson Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld exercised great influence over U.S. policies in the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The Secretary's leadership presents a puzzle,accounts agree that Rumsfeld was a masterful bureaucratic infighter who ruthlessly gained control over the major decisions and marginalized colleagues, yet, having secured that control, was remarkably blasé about events on the ground in Iraq. I argue that Rumsfeld's paradoxical performance was rooted in key aspects of his worldview,measured through systematic content analysis of his verbal output on the principle that the words individuals say are related to the way they see the world,and his bureaucratic style, identified through interviews with Bush administration insiders. Rumsfeld's worldview centers on a low perception of the control of self in relation to macro-political events, and a very high conceptual complexity, indicating a nuanced view of issues. This low perception of control and heavily contingent worldview is the discursive, "stuff happens" side of Rumsfeld which so frustrated critics of the U.S. occupation. His bureaucratic style, however, was controlling, suspicious, and overbearing. I suggest that this approach offers a more complete explanation of Rumsfeld's actions, and so contributes to understanding of the Iraq story, as it is rooted in consideration of the basic dispositions that condition how individuals approach their roles. [source] Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile CrisisINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2001Mark L. Haas This article tests the predictions of expected-utility and prospect theories against the most important dimensions of the Cuban missile crisis. Largely through use of the most recently released information on the crisis from the American and Soviet governments, I attempt to ascertain the anticipated benefits, costs, and probabilities of success associated with each of the major policy choices that the key leaders in both superpowers perceived before each of the major decisions throughout the crisis was made. Using this information and the logic of extensive-form game-theoretic models of choice, I construct a baseline for expected-utility theory that helps us to understand when prospect or expected-utility theory provides the better explanation for a particular decision. Prospect theory predicts that when individuals perceive themselves to be experiencing losses at the time they make a decision, and when their probability estimates associated with their principal policy options are in the moderate to high range, they will tend to make excessively risky, non,value maximizing choices. I find that the evidence for the Cuban missile crisis supports this prediction for the most important decisions made by both Khrushchev and Kennedy. [source] Persistence of Traumatic Memories in World War II Prisoners of WarJOURNAL OF AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY, Issue 12 2009(See editorial comments by Dr. Jules Rosen, 2347), on pp 234 OBJECTIVES: To assess the long-term effects of the prisoner of war (POW) experience on U.S. World War II (WWII) veterans. DESIGN: Exploratory study. SETTING: Participants were recruited through the Hines Veterans Affairs Hospital; a POW reunion in Orlando, Florida; and the WWII veterans periodical, "The QUAN." PARTICIPANTS: One hundred fifty-seven American military veterans who were former WWII POWs. MEASURMENTS: Participants completed a mailed survey describing their POW experiences, POW effects on subsequent psychological and physical well-being, and ways in which these experiences shaped major decisions in their lives. RESULTS: Participants from the European and Pacific theaters reported that their captivity during WWII affected their long-term emotional well-being. Both groups reported high rates of reflection, dreaming, and flashbacks pertaining to their POW experiences, but Pacific theater POWs did so at higher rates in the present than in the past. Large portions of both groups reported greater rumination on POW experiences after retirement. Finally, 16.6% of participants met the requirements of a current, clinical diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) based on the Mississippi PTSD scale, with PTSD rates in Pacific theater POWs (34%) three times those of European theater POWs (12%). CONCLUSION: Traumatic memories and clinical levels of PTSD persist for WWII POWs as long as 65 years after their captivity. Additionally, rumination about these experiences, including flashbacks and persistent nightmares, may increase after retirement, particularly for those held in the Pacific theater. These findings inform the current therapeutic needs of this elderly population and future generations of POWs from other military conflicts. 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