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Loan Officers (loan + officer)
Selected AbstractsThe effect of service quality on trust and commitment varying across generationsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSUMER STUDIES, Issue 4 2009Jinsook E. Cho Abstract We examine the effect of service quality on consumer trust and commitment in the context of obtaining a financial loan and how these relationships vary across different generational cohorts. We find that the service quality offered by a loan officer has a significant effect on consumer trust towards a financial institution, which in turn influences consumer commitment to a financial institution for a future transaction. We also find that relative strengths of a few paths in the model differ across different age cohorts, indicating some generational variability in the relationship between service quality, trust and commitment. [source] Loan Officer Turnover and Credit Availability for Small FirmsJOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2006Jonathan A. Scott This paper presents empirical evidence on the role loan officers play in facilitating small firm access to commercial bank loans. If loan officers use soft information (for example, assessments of character, information from customers and suppliers) to make lending decisions that would not otherwise be made on the basis of hard information (for example, tax returns or financial statements), then, frequent turnover in loan officers should be associated with an adverse effect on credit availability. This relationship is confirmed empirically using survey data of U.S. small firms in 1995 and 2001, where loan officer turnover is positively related to the turndown rate on the most recent loan application. Although loan officer turnover could be influenced by the turndown rate (for example, an owner changes banks and gets a new loan officer as a result of a recent turndown), its negative effect on credit availability persists under several different tests. [source] Variable selection and oversampling in the use of smooth support vector machines for predicting the default risk of companiesJOURNAL OF FORECASTING, Issue 6 2009Wolfgang Härdle Abstract In the era of Basel II a powerful tool for bankruptcy prognosis is vital for banks. The tool must be precise but also easily adaptable to the bank's objectives regarding the relation of false acceptances (Type I error) and false rejections (Type II error). We explore the suitability of smooth support vector machines (SSVM), and investigate how important factors such as the selection of appropriate accounting ratios (predictors), length of training period and structure of the training sample influence the precision of prediction. Moreover, we show that oversampling can be employed to control the trade-off between error types, and we compare SSVM with both logistic and discriminant analysis. Finally, we illustrate graphically how different models can be used jointly to support the decision-making process of loan officers. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Loan Officer Turnover and Credit Availability for Small FirmsJOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2006Jonathan A. Scott This paper presents empirical evidence on the role loan officers play in facilitating small firm access to commercial bank loans. If loan officers use soft information (for example, assessments of character, information from customers and suppliers) to make lending decisions that would not otherwise be made on the basis of hard information (for example, tax returns or financial statements), then, frequent turnover in loan officers should be associated with an adverse effect on credit availability. This relationship is confirmed empirically using survey data of U.S. small firms in 1995 and 2001, where loan officer turnover is positively related to the turndown rate on the most recent loan application. Although loan officer turnover could be influenced by the turndown rate (for example, an owner changes banks and gets a new loan officer as a result of a recent turndown), its negative effect on credit availability persists under several different tests. [source] PLACE-BASED AND RACE-BASED EXCLUSION FROM MORTGAGE LOANS: EVIDENCE FROM THREE CITIES IN THE NETHERLANDSJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2007MANUEL B. AALBERS ABSTRACT:,Do place and race matter in mortgage loan applications? This article presents evidence from mortgage markets in the Dutch cities of Arnhem, The Hague, and Rotterdam, suggesting that place, and to a lesser extent also race, do matter. In general, race and place are not factors of direct exclusion, but (1) zip codes are included in credit scoring systems, and (2) both place and race are significant factors in the assessments by loan officers because applicants who do not meet all formal criteria are more often accepted ("overrides") for indigenous Dutch and low-risk neighborhoods than for ethnic minorities and high-risk neighborhoods. In addition, a "national mortgage guarantee" is compulsory for loan applications in high-risk neighborhoods and thereby used as a substitute for redlining, comparable to the compulsoriness of private mortgage insurance in the United States. Some lenders also engage in direct redlining by rejecting low-risk "national mortgage guarantee" loans in high-risk neighborhoods, a practice potentially explained by transaction cost economizing. Since the high-risk neighborhoods in all three cities accommodate relatively large shares of ethnic minority groups, they are hit twice: through place-based and through race-based exclusion. In other words, place-based disparate treatment results in race-based disparate impact. The neighborhood does matter; place-based exclusion in the mortgage market has a neighborhood effect. [source] Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical AnalysisKYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 2 2005Alexander S. Kritikos Summary This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint-liability micro-lending contracts. Using our data set, we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as joint-liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. After the loan disbursement, the incentive system leads to peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure between the borrowers, thus helping the lending institution to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. This paper also demonstrates that the mechanism realizes repayment rates of nearly 100% if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we make clear that dynamic incentives, in contrast to theory, have to be restricted if the two long-term problems of the joint-liability approach, i.e. its mismatching problem and the domino effect, are to be tackled notably. [source] Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer RotationTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010ANDREW HERTZBERG ABSTRACT We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self-reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor. [source] The ethics of creative accounting some Spanish evidenceBUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 3 2000John Blake Creative accounting involves accountants in making accounting policy choices or manipulating transactions in such a way as to convey a preferred and deliberately chosen impression in the accounts. Although it is regarded as unethical by most observers, a defense of creative accounting can be based on the assumption that users of accounts can identify bias in accounting policy choices and make appropriate adjustments. In this paper we take the example of the Barcelona Football Club where the club management made three key accounting policy choices that resulted in the presentation of a favourable position, and a supporters club presented an alternative report choosing three alternative accounting policies that presented an unfavourable position. We presented each of these financial reports to one of two groups of Spanish bank loan officers: we found that the more favourable set of accounts was significantly more likely to attract a positive response to a loan request. This result undermines the validity of defending creative accounting based on the argument that accounts users can identify manipulation. [source] | ||||||||||