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Loan Contracts (loan + contract)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis

KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 2 2005
Alexander S. Kritikos
Summary This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint-liability micro-lending contracts. Using our data set, we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as joint-liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. After the loan disbursement, the incentive system leads to peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure between the borrowers, thus helping the lending institution to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. This paper also demonstrates that the mechanism realizes repayment rates of nearly 100% if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we make clear that dynamic incentives, in contrast to theory, have to be restricted if the two long-term problems of the joint-liability approach, i.e. its mismatching problem and the domino effect, are to be tackled notably. [source]

The Evolution of the Financial Contract in Economic Development

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2 2004
Niloy Bose
This paper presents an analysis of the joint determination of real and financial development. The analysis is based on a simple endogenous growth model in which a borrower's risk type is private information. Our innovation is to determine jointly the equilibrium loan contract and the economy's growth path. We show that at a low level of development an economy is likely to experience a large incidence of credit rationing. As capital accumulates, credit rationing may fall as a result of the emergence of a new contract regime in which agents mitigate information friction by making use of available information. This change in behaviour results in a higher capital accumulation path and a higher steady-state capital stock. [source]

CREDIT CONSTRAINTS IN THE MARKET FOR CONSUMER DURABLES: EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA ON CAR LOANS,

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
Orazio P. Attanasio
We investigate the significance of borrowing constraints in the market for consumer loans. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey on auto loan contracts we estimate the elasticities of loan demand with respect to interest rate and maturity. We find that, with the exception of high income households, consumers are very responsive to maturity and less responsive to interest rate changes. Both elasticities vary with household income, with the maturity elasticity decreasing and the interest rate elasticity increasing with income. We argue that these results are consistent with the presence of binding credit constraints in the auto loan market. [source]

Costly State Verification with Varying Risk Preferences and Liability

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 1 2006
Gaia Garino
Abstract., In the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification, we examine how the properties of the set of states, different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments. In particular, we show that with risk-averse debtors, a general set of states, a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability, the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low, which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states. If the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral, this non-monotonicity of consumption disappears. Moreover, given the loan size, there is more monitoring under debtor-risk aversion than risk neutrality. We present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor-risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability. Finally, we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework. [source]