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Liquidity Suppliers (liquidity + supplier)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2000
Bruno Biais
Consider strategic risk-neutral traders competing in schedules to supply liquidity to a risk-averse agent who is privately informed about the value of the asset and his hedging needs. Imperfect competition in this common value environment is analyzed as a multi-principal game in which liquidity suppliers offer trading mechanisms in a decentralized way. Each liquidity supplier behaves as a monopolist facing a residual demand curve resulting from the maximizing behavior of the informed agent and the trading mechanisms offered by his competitors. There exists a unique equilibrium in convex schedules. It is symmetric and differentiable and exhibits typical features of market-power: Equilibrium trading volume is lower than ex ante efficiency would require. Liquidity suppliers charge positive mark-ups and make positive expected profits, but these profits decrease with the number of competitors. In the limit, as this number goes to infinity, ask (resp. bid) prices converge towards the upper (resp. lower) tail expectations obtained in Glosten (1994) and expected profits are zero. [source]

Measuring Pricing Inefficiencies Under Stressful Market Conditions

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2003
Louis Cheng
This study examines the mispricing and time between arbitrage trades of the Hong Kong Hang Seng index futures and index options contracts under various stressed market conditions. Ex-ante trading profits and differences in time between trades across up and down as well as stressed and non-stressed markets are used to measure how well the derivative markets perform under emotional distress. We find evidence of illiquidity in stressed and down markets. In stressful markets and down markets, liquidity suppliers are less likely to trade against the informed traders. This, in turn, leads to longer time between trades and higher arbitrage profits. [source]

Dealer Liquidity in an Auction Market: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 522 2007
Sylvain Friederich
We analyse the trade characteristics and market conditions which determine the market share of a continuous auction trading system at the London Stock Exchange, where a network of broker-dealer firms is also available for trade. We show that execution and information risks govern the choice of execution venue. Further, we uncover strong commonality in the market share of the order book across stocks, and find that variables proxying for market-wide liquidity and informational risks also affect the choice of trading venue. Our results suggest that competing, off-book liquidity suppliers voluntarily perform at least some of the ,stabilisation' functions normally assigned to designated market-makers. [source]

Is it time to reduce the minimum tick sizes of the E-mini futures?

THE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 1 2005
Alexander Kurov
On the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), so-called "E-mini" index futures contracts trade on the electronic GLOBEX trading system alongside the corresponding full-size contracts that trade on the open outcry floor. This paper finds that the current minimum tick sizes of the E-mini S&P 500 and E-mini Nasdaq-100 futures contracts act as binding constraints on the bid-ask spreads by not allowing the spreads to decline to competitive levels. We also find that, while exchange locals trade very actively on GLOBEX, they do not tend to act as liquidity suppliers. Taken together, our empirical results suggest that it is time for the CME to consider decreasing the minimum tick sizes of the S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100 E-mini futures contracts. A tick size reduction is likely to result in lower trading costs in the E-mini futures markets. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 25:79,104, 2005 [source]