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Legal Judgment (legal + judgment)
Selected AbstractsConstitutional Privilege and Constituting Pluralism: Religious Freedom in National, Global, and Legal ContextJOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION, Issue 3 2003Peter Beyer Lori Beaman argues that religious freedom in Canada and the United States is well established in theory (or myth) but limited in practice, privileging Protestantism in particular and varieties of Christianity in general. Focusing on the treatment of other religions in the courts of the two countries, she defends the hypothesis that these legal systems tend to reinforce the hegemony of Christianity, using this as an implicit model of what constitutes a religion, and thereby maintaining the marginalization and restricting the freedom of other religions. The present article sets Beaman's arguments in a wider global context, exploring the extent to which Christianity does and does not serve as a global standard for religion; and addressing the question of why issues of religious freedom so frequently end up being the subject of legal judgment and political decision. The main conclusions drawn from this global contextualization are that maintenance of some kind of religious hegemony is the rule all across global society, not just in Canada and the United States, and that unfettered freedom of religion or genuine religious pluralization is correspondingly rare, if it exists anywhere. Moreover, it is argued that such limitations, frequently expressed in legal judgments and political decisions, are more or less to be expected because they flow from the peculiar way that religion has been constructed in the modern and global era as both a privileged and privatized, as both an encompassing and marginalized social domain. The article thereby simultaneously reinforces and takes issue with Beaman's position: the modern and global reconstruction of religion invites its infinite pluralization at the same time as it encourages its politicization and practical restriction. Religions act as important resources both for claims to inclusion and for strategies of relative exclusion. [source] The moral narrative of criminal responsibility and the principled justification of tariffs for murder: Myra Hindley and Thompson and VenablesLEGAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2003David Gumham This paper examines the role of retributivism as a principled justification for punishment in the context of the judicial tariff judgments on Myra Hindley and Thompson and Venables. The paper examines the development of retributivist theory from the foundational premise of liberal individualism to its contemporary understanding as a communication of public censure. It is argued that, against the background of legal judgment on tariff issues, retributivism cannot be meaningful in itself. Determining the retributive requirements of justice necessarily involves the construction of a moral narrative made up of both retributivist (retrospective) and consequentialist (prospective) elements. [source] Constitutional Privilege and Constituting Pluralism: Religious Freedom in National, Global, and Legal ContextJOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION, Issue 3 2003Peter Beyer Lori Beaman argues that religious freedom in Canada and the United States is well established in theory (or myth) but limited in practice, privileging Protestantism in particular and varieties of Christianity in general. Focusing on the treatment of other religions in the courts of the two countries, she defends the hypothesis that these legal systems tend to reinforce the hegemony of Christianity, using this as an implicit model of what constitutes a religion, and thereby maintaining the marginalization and restricting the freedom of other religions. The present article sets Beaman's arguments in a wider global context, exploring the extent to which Christianity does and does not serve as a global standard for religion; and addressing the question of why issues of religious freedom so frequently end up being the subject of legal judgment and political decision. The main conclusions drawn from this global contextualization are that maintenance of some kind of religious hegemony is the rule all across global society, not just in Canada and the United States, and that unfettered freedom of religion or genuine religious pluralization is correspondingly rare, if it exists anywhere. Moreover, it is argued that such limitations, frequently expressed in legal judgments and political decisions, are more or less to be expected because they flow from the peculiar way that religion has been constructed in the modern and global era as both a privileged and privatized, as both an encompassing and marginalized social domain. The article thereby simultaneously reinforces and takes issue with Beaman's position: the modern and global reconstruction of religion invites its infinite pluralization at the same time as it encourages its politicization and practical restriction. Religions act as important resources both for claims to inclusion and for strategies of relative exclusion. [source] SUBJECTIVITY, JUDGMENT, AND THE BASING RELATIONSHIPPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2009JOHN K. DAVIS Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a judgment can be based on the considerations the subject claims as justification even when it depends on personal traits. [source] | ||||||||||