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Legislative Proposals (legislative + proposal)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences80%

Selected Abstracts

The GMO food arena in the EU (1998,2001)

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003
Rinus van Schendelen
Abstract A highly politicised arena in the EU has been caused by the 1998 Commission legislative proposal with regard to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The debate over different interests became more intense. During the EU decision-making process concerning GMOs, two larger coalitions cutting across institutions and countries waged the fight: one was led by industry and was in favour of GMOs and the other was against and mainly rooted in nongovernmental lobby groups. In mid-2001, the ,anti' movement had gained a (temporary) winning position. In an attempt to explain this, it was concluded that the industrial lobby has been nonchalant in its preparatory work for public affairs management, by not carefully studying the various stakeholders, issues, time developments and the boundaries of this arena. With the benefit of hindsight it can be seen that the industrial lobby itself has missed opportunities and made unforced errors. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications [source]

How Predictive Appeals Affect Policy Opinions

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2009
Jennifer Jerit
When political actors debate the merits of a public policy, they often focus on the consequences of a bill or legislative proposal, with supporters and opponents making stark but contradictory predictions about the future. Building upon the framing literature, I examine how rhetoric about a policy's consequences influences public opinion. I show that predictive appeals work largely by altering people's beliefs about the impact of a policy. Following in the tradition of recent framing research, this article also examines how opinions are influenced when people are exposed to opposing predictions. The analysis focuses on two strategies that are common in real-world debates,the direct rebuttal (in which an initial appeal is challenged by a statement making the opposite prediction) and the alternate frame (which counters an initial appeal by shifting the focus to some other consequence). There are important differences in the effectiveness of these two strategies,a finding that has implications for the study of competitive framing and the policymaking process more generally. [source]

Actor alignments in the European Union before and after enlargement

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 6 2009
ROBERT THOMSON
What impact has the 2004 enlargement had on legislative decision making in the European Union (EU)? This study answers this question by examining the controversies raised by a broad selection of legislative proposals from before and after the 2004 enlargement. The analyses focus on the alignments of decision-making actors found on those controversies. Member State representatives, the European Commission and the European Parliament vary considerably in the positions they take on controversial issues before and after enlargement. Consistent patterns in actor alignments are found for only a minority of controversial issues. To the extent that consistent patterns are found, the most common involve differences in the positions of Northern and Southern Member States and old and new Member States. The North-South alignment was more common in the EU-15 and reflected Northern Member States' preference for low levels of regulatory intervention. The new-old alignment that has been evident in the post-2004 EU reflects new Member States' preference for higher levels of financial subsidies. This study argues that the persistent diversity in actor alignments contributes to the EU's capacity to cope with enlargement. [source]

The Fog of Integration: Reassessing the Role of Economic Interests in European Integration

BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2008
Patrick Leblond
The main theories of European economic integration argue that private economic interests provide the impetus and pressures for integration to move forward. Public policy analyses of the European Union's legislative process, however, show that intense lobbying by such interests can prevent legislative proposals from being adopted, even if economic interests were initially in favour of supranational legislation. How do we explain this apparent contradiction? The answer is that economic interests initially face great uncertainty as to the precise costs and benefits of integrating a particular policy area; only once the ,fog of integration' lifts,as a result of concrete legislative proposals being tabled by the Commission,are economic interests able to calculate these costs and benefits and, consequently, decide whether to lobby for or against the proposal. To provide a first-run validation of the argument, the article examines the cases of the Software Patent and Takeover directives. [source]