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Latin American Governments (latin + american_government)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences75%

Selected Abstracts

Rethinking Social Security in Latin America

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 2-3 2005
Indermit Gill
In the past decade, many Latin American governments have radically restructured their old age income security systems, following the lead of Chile, which undertook its major pension reform in 1981. The defining characteristic of the reforms has been a shift in the basis of public pensions from social to individual responsibility: instead of the widely used system that "collectivized" or pooled the risk of being without the capacity to earn while aged, numerous countries in the region have adopted a system that relies on individual savings accounts. The reforms have maintained a role for a modified version of public pooling; this combination of individual and social savings to finance pensions is known as the "multipillar" approach. This article is based on a report prepared for the Office of the Chief Economist of the Latin America and Caribbean Region of the World Bank (Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2004).1 The report recognizes that the system of individual accounts, the essential aspect of the reform, has been a necessary and positive development, and one that is consistent with the economics of insurance and social welfare objectives. Beyond this recognition, however, the results of reform are much more complex. Each country has implemented its own version of the multipillar system. The article therefore draws on country evidence in order to determine: How has the new approach to public pensions in Latin America fared? In particular, have the changes left workers and their families in reform countries better off? The first section provides a brief description of the reforms. The second discusses the main macroeconomic concerns and effects. The third describes the impact on coverage levels, and other social welfare implications. The fourth evaluates the stagnation of coverage levels and presents various possible explanations. The fifth makes specific proposals to improve the multipillar pension system in Latin America. The last section concludes. [source]

Globalization and Pension Reform in Latin America

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2007
Sarah M. Brooks
ABSTRACT While financial globalization has created powerful incentives for Latin American governments to privatize old age pension systems, reliance on short-term capital flows has also constrained the ability of cash-strapped governments to enact that reform. Analysis of the technocratic process of pension reform in Argentina and Brazil provides evidence. Instead of simply generating unidirectional pressures for structural pension reform, financial globalization has created a double bind for Latin America's capital-scarce governments, fostering long-term incentives to privatize pension systems while heightening the risk of punishment in the short term. [source]

Latin American militancy grows

OIL AND ENERGY TRENDS, Issue 2 2007
Article first published online: 19 FEB 200
The growing nationalism of some Latin American governments is worrying international investors. Nationalization is back on the agenda in several countries and foreign oil companies are coming under other forms of official pressure, for example through a series of tax probes that conclude by presenting their victims with demands for large additional payments. The nationalists are particularly strong in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Some countries, though, are resisting the lure of state ownership. Peru has assured investors that it is well-disposed to outside investment and undoubtedly hopes to attract companies displaced from its more militant neighbours. [source]

The Problematic Relation between Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin America: Evidence from the Bolivian Case

BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH, Issue 1 2008
ANITA BREUER
During the wave of constitutional reforms, which started in the late 1980s, Institutions of Direct Democracy (IDD) have been incorporated into most Latin American constitutions, and over the past fifteen years, an increased use of these instruments by Latin American governments has been observed. This article deals with two questions related to this phenomenon: (1) what motivated the adoption and use of these institutions; and (2) what consequences can be expected with regard to democratic accountability in the region? To answer these questions, first, a classification of IDD is developed. In this, special attention is paid to the ability of the various types of IDD to introduce accountability into the representative structures of presidential systems. This classification is subsequently applied to analyse constitutional frameworks and direct democratic experience in the region. The findings suggest that the rise of IDD in Latin America was mainly induced by executive-legislative conflict and has done little to foster accountability. Finally, therefore, a detailed account of the specific constellation that led to the adoption of IDD in Bolivia is analysed in order to illustrate under which circumstances political actors choose to adopt and employ these tools. [source]