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La Porta Et Al. (la + porta_et_al)
Selected AbstractsWealth Effects of International Investments and Agency Problems for Korean Multinational FirmsJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3 2003Wi Saeng Kim This paper recognizes the recent surge in cross-border investments by MNCs from newly industrialized countries and investigates the wealth effects of FDI announcements by Korean firms, which are the leading FDI providers in Asia. The empirical results indicate that for Korean MNCs: 1) cross-border investments increase shareholder wealth; and 2) they do not obtain the firm-specific technological advantages over international competitors. The paper also presents evidence that cross-border investments do not increase shareholder wealth for the 30 largest chaebol -affiliates, and that shareholder wealth losses are greater when corporate ownership is concentrated, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998, 2000). [source] What Determines Rule of Law?KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 3 2009An Empirical Investigation of Rival Models SUMMARY In the growing literature on the creation of institutions, the theories emphasizing colonial origin (Mauro, 1995), legal origin and religious affiliation (La Porta et al., 1999), Western European influence (Hall and Jones, 1999), and settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), have been especially influential. The validity and influence of these studies rests heavily on empirical modeling, which, since the theories are obviously closely related, might actually capture the same primary mechanism. It is therefore unclear whether the empirical relationships found are the same or if they are different. Therefore, this paper takes the empirical models seriously in order to discriminate among the existing models and to identify the model and variables that best explain the variation in institutional quality. The aim of this paper is thus to provide answers to the following questions: (i) Is there one model which explains more of the variation in institutional quality than the other models? (ii) Do these models capture the same information? And (iii), if we let the information in the data decide, which combination of variables would be selected? [source] Does corporate ownership structure matter for economic growth?MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009A cross-country analysis The role of corporations in allocating resources has been of great importance in the debate about the manner in which enterprises should be governed to enhance economic growth. Corporate governance features seem to be central to the dynamics by which successful firms and economies improve their performance over time as well as relative to each other. In this paper we try to clarify the relationship between corporate ownership structure and output growth by using the data of La Porta et al. (J. Finance 1999; LIV: 471,517) on ownership structure of large- and medium-sized corporations in 27 economies. To search for empirical linkages, we use cross-country growth regressions. The evidence provided in the paper suggests that an environment with a higher percentage of directly and indirectly widely held companies and a lower degree of state than private ownership is associated with a higher growth rate of per capita income. We also conclude that a higher degree of institutional investment does not seem to enhance the growth performance of an economy. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Law and Finance in Transition EconomiesTHE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 2 2000Katharina Pistor This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of legal change in the protection of shareholder and creditor rights in transition economies and its impact on the propensity of firms to raise external finance. Following La Porta et al. (1998), the paper constructs an expanded set of legal indices to capture a range of potential conflicts between different stakeholders of the firm. It supplements the analysis of the law on the books with an analysis of the effectiveness of legal institutions. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of legal institutions has a much stronger impact on external finance than does the law on the books, despite legal change that has substantially improved shareholder and creditor rights. This finding supports the proposition that legal transplants and extensive legal reforms are not sufficient for the evolution of effective legal and market institutions. [source] | ||||||||||