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Justification
Kinds of Justification Selected AbstractsPIOUS LIES: THE JUSTIFICATION OF STATES AND WELFARE STATESECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2004Anthony de Jasay Institutions, customs, laws are often, and sometimes implausibly, credited with efficiency. They serve a good purpose and if they had not arisen, we would have invented them. The claim is reassuring, though it may be no more than a pious lie. The creation of the state by social contract, and the adoption of supposedly rational customs by primitive peoples, serve as examples. Interpreting the welfare state as a mutual insurance scheme from which all can expect to profit is a classic of the kind. [source] THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATIONRATIO, Issue 2 2009Joachim Horvath Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument, against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony, i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere.1 [source] THE VICE OF SNOBBERY: AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION AND VIRTUE IN ART APPRECIATIONTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 239 2010Matthew Kieran Apparently snobbery undermines justification for and legitimacy of aesthetic claims. It is also pervasive in the aesthetic realm, much more so than we tend to presume. If these two claims are combined, a fundamental problem arises: we do not know whether or not we are justified in believing or making aesthetic claims. Addressing this new challenge requires an epistemological story which underpins when, where and why snobbish judgement is problematic, and how appreciative claims can survive. This leads towards a virtue-theoretic account of art appreciation and aesthetic justification, as contrasted with a purely reliabilist one , a new direction for contemporary aesthetics. [source] ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM: MIND AND LANGUAGE, KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATIONANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2009CHRISTOPHER S. HILL First page of article [source] PESSIMISM OR OPTIMISM: A JUSTIFICATION TO VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2009JOHANNA ETNER This article analyses the determinants of voluntary contribution to environmental quality by introducing the perception of environmental risk. We consider individuals who are aware both of the impact of their voluntary contributions and of the quality of the current environment on the future quality of environment. Their preferences are represented by the RDU model. We distinguish three kinds of effect: environmental quality, wealth and risk perception. The first effects are not always sufficient to explain agents' implication in the improvement of environmental quality. [source] Democracy and Rights in South Africa: Beyond a Constitutional Culture of JustificationCONSTELLATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, Issue 3 2000Johan Van Der Walt First page of article [source] Salvation as Justification and Theosis: The Contribution of the New Finnish Luther Interpretation to Our Ecumenical Future1DIALOG, Issue 1 2006By Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen First page of article [source] Reconciliation and Forgiveness in an Unjust SocietyDIALOG, Issue 4 2002Ambrose Moyo Justification by faith necessarily leads to justice in society. IN post,apartheid South Africa, reconciliation has required truth telling plus confession and, most importantly, land redistribution. Failure at land redistribution in Zimbabwe has reduced the effectiveness of the post,colonial reconciliation program and perpetuated previous injustice. [source] A Justification, after the Postmodern Turn, of Universal Ethical Principles and Educational Ideals1EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 6 2005Mark Mason Abstract The implementation of education programmes in different cultures invites the question whether we are justified in doing so in cultures that may reject the programmes' underlying principles. Are there indeed ethical principles and educational ideals that can be justified as applicable to all cultures? After a consideration of Zygmunt Bauman's postmodern rejection of the possibility of universal ethics, , cite and extend Harvey Siegel's defence of multiculturalism as a transcultural ethical ideal. I conclude the paper with a justification of the transcultural normative reach of moral principles that I have elsewhere defended as the ethics of integrity. The paper's significance lies in its justification of educational interventions founded in these principles across different cultures. [source] The Role of Justification in Contemporary TheologyINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Issue 2 2006Article first published online: 13 APR 200 Books reviewed: Mark C. Mattes, The Role of Justification in Contemporary Theology. Reviewed by Richard Bell Nottingham University [source] Justification as Declaration and DeificationINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Issue 1 2002Bruce D. Marshall Theological accounts of the way God justifies sinners often struggle to combine forensic or declarative ideas about justification with transformationist ones. Luther seems to have especially steep problems here, not because he fails to think of justification as transformation , indeed deification , but because his forensic claims seem to take back what he says about transformation. Yet in the end Luther shows how forensic and transformationist ideas of even the boldest sort can cohere. At one level the concept of justifying faith as union with Christ extra nos combines the two, but their deeper unity is trinitarian: it lies in the Father's eternal verdict on the work of his incarnate Son, whose death and resurrection win for us the coming of the Spirit. [source] ,Justified by the Spirit': Soteriological Reflections on the ResurrectionINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Issue 1 2001D. Lyle Dabney Justification of the Spirit has been too often overlooked in Protestant theology. This article asserts that the recovery of this aspect of New Testament theology offers the possibility of a fuller and more adequate soteriology than has often been the case in western theology. Part I provides a survey of the New Testament's witness to the resurrection and of the soteriological implications for the followers of Jesus. The focus of this survey is the relation of resurrection to justification. Part II develops some implications which follow for a theology of salvation today. The article here suggests a threefold possibility for a soteriology which reclaims the relation of Spirit to resurrection: first, soteriology could speak of the whole of the life, death and resurrection of Christ; second, soteriology could speak of the salvation of the whole of our life and death in resurrection; and third, soteriology could be concerned with the material, social and embodied from the outset. [source] A Foundational Justification for a Weighted Likelihood Approach to InferenceINTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2004Russell J. Bowater Summary Two types of probability are discussed, one of which is additive whilst the other is non-additive. Popular theories that attempt to justify the importance of the additivity of probability are then critically reviewed. By making assumptions the two types of probability put forward are utilised to justify a method of inference which involves betting preferences being revised in light of the data. This method of inference can be viewed as a justification for a weighted likelihood approach to inference where the plausibility of different values of a parameter , based on the data X, is measured by the quantity q(,) =l(X,, ,)w(,), where l(X,, ,) is the likelihood function and w(,) is a weight function. Even though, unlike Bayesian inference, the method has the disadvantageous property that the measure q(,) is generally non-additive, it is argued that the method has other properties which may be considered very desirable and which have the potential to imply that when everything is taken into account, the method is a serious alternative to the Bayesian approach in many situations. The methodology that is developed is applied to both a toy example and a real example. Résumé Deux types de probabilité sont discutées, dont l'une est additive et l'autre non additive. Les théories populaires qui tentent de justifier l'importance de l'additivité des probabilités font l'objet d'une analyse critique. En faisant des hypothèses, on utilise les deux types de probabilité proposés pour justifier une méthode d'inférence concernant des préférences de paris que l'on révise en fonction des données. Cette méthode d'inférence peut être considérée comme une justification de l'approche de vraisemblance pondérée, oú l'on mesure la plausibilité de différentes valeurs d'un paramètre ,. Bien que dans cette méthode, la mesure du paramètre de vraisemblance ne soit pas additive, la méthode a d'autres propriétés intéressantes qui font qu'elle peut être considérée comme une alternative sérieuse à l'aproche Bayésienne dans de nombreuses situations. La méthodologie est appliquée à la fois à un exemple fictif et un exemple réel. [source] Comments on "A Foundational Justification for a Weighted Likelihood Approach to Inference"INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2004Glenn Shafer First page of article [source] Women's "Justification" of Domestic Violence in EgyptJOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY, Issue 5 2009Kathryn M. Yount We explored the influences of women's social learning, marital resources and constraints, and exposure to norms about women's family roles on their views about wife hitting or beating among 5,450 participants in the 2005 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey. One half justified wife hitting or beating for some reason. Women from rural areas who were exposed to domestic violence more often justified such acts. Dependent wives whose husbands had more schooling, were blood relatives, and were coresident more often justified such acts. In settings where women tended to marry at older ages, women less often justified such acts. Women's resources and constraints in marriage accounted for the largest share of the variability in their attitudes about domestic violence against women. [source] Donor quality of life before and after adult-to-adult right liver live donor liver transplantationLIVER TRANSPLANTATION, Issue 10 2006See Ching Chan Donor right hepatectomy for adult-to-adult live donor liver transplantation (ALDLT) is a major surgical operation for the benefit of the recipient. Justification of procedure mandates knowledge of the possible physical and psychological negative effects on the donor. We prospectively and longitudinally quantified donor quality of life using generic and condition-specific questionnaires up to 1 year. The generic questionnaires were the Karnofsky Performance Status scale and the Chinese (Hong Kong) version of the Medical Outcomes Study 36-Item Short-Form Survey, which measures 8 health concepts: 4 physical components and 4 mental components. Within 1 year, 30 consecutive donors were included. These 11 male and 19 female donors (36.7% and 63.3%, respectively) had a median age of 35 years (range, 21-56 years). There was no donor mortality or major complications. Donor quality-of-life worsening was most significant in the first 3 postoperative months, particularly among the physical components. The physical and mental components returned to the previous levels in 6 to 12 months' time, though the Karnofsky performance scores were slightly lower at 1 year (P = 0.011). Twenty-six (86.7%) donors declared that they would donate again if there were such a need and it were technically possible. It was noticed that older donors were more likely to express unwillingness to donate again. In conclusion, the temporary worsening of donor quality of life substantiates ALDLT as an acceptable treatment modality. Liver Transpl 12:1529,1536, 2006. © 2006 AASLD. [source] Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for Organizational Criminal LiabilityAMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 1 2010Regina A. Robson First page of article [source] Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger Justification of Unclean HandsAMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2008T. Leigh Anenson First page of article [source] The Lutheran-Catholic Agreement on Justification: Botch or Breakthrough?NEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 967 2001Aidan Nichols OP First page of article [source] Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive JustificationNOUS, Issue 2 2007Sanford C. Goldberg Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti-Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person authority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAI's implications for the epistemology of reasoning. In this paper I argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghossian's main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and "the a priority of logical abilities" (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossian's argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAI's implications for the nature of discursive justification. [source] Kant's Concepts of JustificationNOUS, Issue 1 2007Andrew Chignell First page of article [source] On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic JustificationPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010JOHN TURRI I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification. [source] Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and JustificationPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2001LOUIS E. LOEB Hume's claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined,though without his remarking on this fact,with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume's view, are steady dispositions (not lively ideas), nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume's epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief's influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise. [source] Social Identity, System Justification, and Social Dominance: Commentary on Reicher, Jost et al., and Sidanius et al.POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2004Mark Rubin The articles by Reicher (2004), Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004), and Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin (2004) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), and social dominance theory (Sidanius, 1993). The latter two theories grew out of a critique of social identity theory, but this critique relates more to deficiencies in social identity research than to deficiencies in the theory itself. More balanced and comprehensive social identity research is required in order to allow a fair assessment of the theory's limitations. In addition, Reicher (2004) and Huddy (2004) are correct that only social identity theory offers the potential for explaining social change and social stability. [source] Moral Pluralism, Political Justification and Deliberative DemocracyPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2000Ian Chowcat We can make progress in political justification if we avoid debates about the extent of moral pluralism. Just by having a political view we are committed to its realization but also to its defence upon justifying grounds. It would be inconsistent to seek to realize my view in ways that undermined my ability to justify it. Yet justifying a view implies that I am open to challenges to it, and that perpetually draws me potentially into dialogue with all others, regardless of my will, and into structures which allow an inclusive dialogue to take place, with decisions being made, on the basis of open public discussion, with which I may disagree. Thus a form of deliberative democracy, probably with representative institutions, is justified, without any normative assumptions being made. [source] The Rational Reconstruction of Weighing and Balancing on the Basis of Teleological-Evaluative Considerations in the Justification of Judicial DecisionsRATIO JURIS, Issue 4 2008EVELINE T. FETERIS In this contribution the author develops an argumentation model for the reconstruction of weighing and balancing on the basis of teleological-evaluative considerations. The model is intended as a heuristic and critical tool for the rational reconstruction of the justification of judicial decisions. From the perspective of a rational discussion, it makes explicit the choices underlying the weighing and balancing on the basis of goals and values so that they can be made explicit and submitted to rational critique. [source] Deduction and Justification in the Law.RATIO JURIS, Issue 2 2004Concepts, The Role of Legal Terms The paper distinguishes two problems regarding this use. One is the logical function of terms for deduction within a normative system. Specific problems dealt with in this connection are meaning, definition, and economy of expression. The other problem connected with middle terms is the "moulding" and possible manipulation of the meaning of legal terms, for arriving at desired conclusions in a given scheme of inference. It is indicated how the moulding of contested legal concepts, if not restricted, will obscure the ratio of legal rules. This problem is relevant, inter alia, to arguments ex analogia in the law. [source] Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal JustificationRATIO JURIS, Issue 4 2003Torben Spaak In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix). [source] Justification as a Process of DiscoveryRATIO JURIS, Issue 4 2000Rauno Halttunen Legal decision-making interests theoreticians in our discipline largely in terms of how a legal decision is justified. In his book, Bruce Anderson (1996) has posited a distinction between how a decision is arrived at, on one hand, and how it is justified, on the other. Anderson seems to be suggesting that legal theory should set out to continue the work of the American realists, that is, to develop legal decision-making as a process of discovery towards a solution. In my presentation, I will be looking at legal decision-making as a process of finding or discovering knowledge. What I mean by "discovery," however, is the discovery of new scientific knowledge. (The theory of science draws a distinction between proving and discovering knowledge.) I submit that for a justification to be valid the arguments comprising it ought to fulfill the logical conditions stipulated for the discovery of knowledge. In the present paper, I also hope to share with you the main ideas of a book I am currently writing on the subject. [source] What is Justification About?RELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 1 2010Edited by Michael Weinrich, John P. Burgess, Reformed Contributions to An Ecumenical Theme No abstract is available for this article. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||