International Institutions (international + institution)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Distribution within Humanities and Social Sciences


Selected Abstracts


In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe , By Rachel A. Epstein

GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2010
ANNA GRZYMALA-BUSSE
No abstract is available for this article. [source]


Treating International Institutions as Social Environments

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2001
Alastair Iain Johnston
Socialization theory is a neglected source of explanations for cooperation in international relations. Neorealism treats socialization (or selection, more properly) as a process by which autistic non-balancers are weeded out of the anarchical international system. Contractual institutionalists ignore or downplay the possibilities of socialization in international institutions in part because of the difficulties in observing changes in interests and preferences. For constructivists socialization is a central concept. But to date it has been undertheorized, or more precisely, the microprocesses of socialization have been generally left unexamined. This article focuses on two basic microprocesses in socialization theory,persuasion and social influence,and develops propositions about the social conditions under which one might expect to observe cooperation in institutions. Socialization theories pose questions for both the structural-functional foundations of contractual institutionalist hypotheses about institutional design and cooperation, and notions of optimal group size for collective action. [source]


National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary Integration

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001
James I. Walsh
How do states reach agreement on creating or changing international institutions? The dominant theory of international cooperation,institutional theory,specifies how states with shared interests use institutions to realize joint gains and to minimize the possibility of defection. But institutional theory has little to say about when states will hold the shared interests that lead them to create international institutions in the first place. I evaluate two general explanations of national preferences regarding international institutions against the record of attempts to institutionalize monetary cooperation in the European Union since the 1970s. Drawing on central insights of the constructivist tradition, idea diffusion theory holds that national preferences converged on those of German decision-makers by the late 1980s and that European governments willingly accepted German terms for monetary union. Recognition that German institutions and policies produced superior economic outcomes drove this change in preferences. A domestic-politics explanation holds that preferences varied because of differences in the structure of the domestic political economy and the political costs of achieving price stability, which was one of Germany's conditions for monetary integration. Lower inflation in the late 1980s reduced these costs enough for French and Italian governments to pursue a monetary union that included Germany. The evidence indicates that idea diffusion had little influence on the development of European monetary institutions. Governments held and advocated distinctly different preferences regarding such institutions from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. The finding that domestic politics rather than idea diffusion drives national preferences challenges some of the claims of recent constructivist literature in international politics about the importance of communication and ideas in promoting cooperation. In the conclusion I discuss how the findings of this article might be squared with constructivism by paying more attention to domestic politics. [source]


Global Inequality and International Institutions

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2001
Andrew Hurrell
This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice. [source]


International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2010
Bumba Mukherjee
Certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross-border movement of capital. How can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s? We argue that IMF stabilization programs provide a window of opportunity for governments to initiate financial reforms, but that policy makers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high. Large loans from the IMF shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform, while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government's,ex ante,promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms. We test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002. We employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in IMF programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion. The results provide strong support for the interactive effect of IMF programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization. [source]


International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2007
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
The ultimate litmus test of compliance theories occurs in situations where states' interests are directly opposed, such as competing interstate claims over territory, maritime areas, and cross-border rivers. This article considers the extent to which the involvement of international institutions in the settlement of contentious issues between states bolsters compliance with agreements that are struck. Institutions may influence the prospects for compliance actively and passively. Active institutional involvement in the conflict management process increases the chances for compliance with agreements, particularly for binding institutional activities, relative to the active involvement of noninstitutional third parties. More passively, joint membership in peace-promoting institutions enhances the likelihood that states will comply with peaceful agreements to resolve contentious issues. Empirical analyses demonstrate the relevance of international institutions for resolving contentious interstate issues both actively and passively, although the results suggest that institutions are more effective conflict managers when they choose binding settlement techniques. [source]


International institutions in a global economy

OXONOMICS, Issue 1 2006
Paul Volcker
Global economic integration has increased tremendously. But the political instinct to think globally has eroded. This is a particular problem in the context of the world economy's worrying dependence on American spending and Chinese saving and volatile exchange rates. We need heightened international coordination on currencies and, in the long run, perhaps a global currency. [source]


Fashioned Forest Pasts, Occluded Histories?

DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 1 2000
International Environmental Analysis in West African Locales
This article considers how environmental problematics are produced and interpreted, using case material from West Africa's humid forest zone. Examing the experiences of several countries over the long term, it is possible to identify a deforestation discourse produced through national and international institutions. This represents forest and social history in particular ways that structure forest conservation but which obscure the experience and knowledge of resource users. Using fine-grained ethnography to explore how such discourse is experienced and interpreted in a particular locale, the article uncovers problems with ,discourse' perspectives which produce analytical dichotomies which confront state and villager, and scientific and ,local' knowledges. The authors explore the day-to-day encounters between villagers and administrators, and the social and historical experiences which condition these. Instances where the deforestation discourse becomes juxtaposed with villagers' alternative ideas about landscape history prove relatively few and insignificant, while the powerful material effects of the discourse tend to be interpreted locally within other frames. These findings present departures from the ways relations between citizen sciences and expert institutions have been conceived in recent work on the sociology of science and public policy. [source]


,Knowledge' or Knowledgeable Banks?

DEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2010
International Financial Institutions' Generation of Knowledge in Times of Crisis
The food-price crisis is testing the capacity of so-called ,knowledge institutions' to generate relevant knowledge with which to serve their clients better. This article analyses the voluminous knowledge generated by such banks and other international institutions in the context of the food-price crisis: in particular, its technical features; the depth and merits of the subsequent policy discussion; and the connection between the knowledge generated and specific policy advocacy. It also provides an explanation for the inability of these institutions to anticipate the dire consequences of the crisis, other than the widely accepted ,perfect storm' storyline. [source]


Regulating the use of genetic resources , between international authorities

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2006
G. Kristin Rosendal
Abstract This article examines interaction between multilateral agreements and the assessment of implementation efforts. The first aim is to portray how regulations emanating from different international regimes are developed and implemented in an interdependent manner. The second main theme concerns the assessment of implementation measures in a situation of interaction. The focus here is on the high level of interaction between regulations pertaining to genetic resources and technological utilization of these through bioprospecting. Particular attention is given to where authority stems from in this context of multiple and interacting institutions. What is the most legitimate framework for making authoritative decisions on the use of genetic resources? Empirical evidence suggests a dual development. First, norm diffusion through international institutions increasingly plays a legitimizing role in international transactions with genetic resources. At the same time, there is a high correlation between dominating countries and key economic interests in the global economy of life sciences, and these interests wield their authority and power through a different set of institutions. Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source]


Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 2 2005
David Skidmore
How should we explain the recent unilateralist turn in U.S. foreign policy? Some accounts treat growing American unilateralism as a passing aberration attributable to the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration. This paper, by contrast, traces U.S. unilateralism to the structural effects, at home and abroad, of the end of the Cold War. Internationally, the removal of the Soviet threat has undermined the "institutional bargain" that once guided relations between the U.S. and its major allies. Absent Cold War imperatives, the U.S. is less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions and other states are less likely to defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal multilateral constraints. Domestically, the end of the Cold War has weakened the ability of presidents to resist the appeals of powerful veto players whose interests are threatened by multilateral commitments. These factors suggest that American unilateralism may have deeper roots and more staying power than many expect. [source]


Escaping the International Governance Dilemma?

GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2008
Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union
This article investigates the role of transgovernmental networks of national regulators in addressing collective action problems endemic to international cooperation. In contrast to recent work on transgovernmental actors, which emphasizes such networks as alternatives to more traditional international institutions, we examine the synergistic interaction between the two. Building on the broader premise that patterns of "dual delegation" above and below the nation-state enhance the coordinating role of networks of national agencies in two-level international governance, the article examines the formal incorporation of transgovernmental networks into European Union (EU) policymaking. The focus on authoritative rule-making adds a crucial dimension to the landscape of EU governance innovations while connecting to the broader study of transgovernmental networks in international governance. The article develops an analytical framework that maps these incorporated networks across different sectors in terms of function, emergence, and effectiveness. Two case studies of data privacy and energy market regulation are presented to apply and illustrate the insights of this mapping. [source]


Non-Governmental Organizations as Motors of Change

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 4 2007
Cornelia Beyer
On one hand, NGOs are seen as experts because of their proximity to the problems they address. They provide knowledge relevant to the solution of these problems and can bring this into the political process. They are able to increase the efficiency of global governance by participating in the policy-formation processes of international organizations. In this paper I will explain the role and functions of NGOs as described in the debate about their legitimacy and theorize , while applying Ernst Haas's theory of organizational learning , on the mechanisms likely to lead to their increasing integration into international institutions as well as the implications of this integration. [source]


The World Bank Approach to Pension Reform

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 1 2000
Robert Holzmann
This paper highlights the World Bank's thinking and worldwide involvement in pension reform. Both are driven by the Bank's mandate to help countries develop economically and to reduce poverty. The Bank has four key concerns in working with clients on pension policy: (1) short-term financing and long-term financial viability; (2) effects on economic growth; (3) adequacy and other distributive issues; and (4) political risk and sustainability. In response to these concerns and after review of the three main reform options for unfunded systems - mere PAYG reform, a rapid and complete shift to a mandatory funded system, and a gradual shift to a multipillar scheme - the Bank clearly favours the multipillar approach but in a pragmatic and country-specific manner. When helping to implement a pension reform the Bank fully takes account of country preferences and circumstances, bases its support on sound reform criteria, links the client assistance with knowledge management, provides training and other measures to enhance the reform capacity of a country, and seeks cooperation with other international institutions. In addition, the Bank has a comprehensive research agenda to improve the working of multipillar schemes, and the investigations include issues of coverage, administrative costs and annuities. [source]


Simulating Globalization: Oil in Chad

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 3 2004
Heidi H. Hobbs
The conflicting interests that underlie globalization can be difficult to grasp in a traditional classroom setting. The simulation presented here challenges students to examine the many different actors operating in the international system today. The focus is the Chad,Cameroon oil pipeline,a landmark example of cooperation and conflict between international institutions, non-governmental organizations and business interests. Given a scenario, students assume these roles and negotiate for the continued success of the pipeline. All the materials to run this exercise are included and if utilized, can provide a positive active learning experience. [source]


Ethics and Foreign Policy: Structured Debates for the International Studies Classroom

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 2 2004
Jeffrey S. Lantis
Debates about humanitarian intervention, foreign and defense policy priorities, and the ethics of the use of force have become highly politicized in the post-Cold War era. This article explores the value of structured classroom debates on ethical dimensions of international relations as active teaching and learning tools for introductory and advanced international studies courses. Specifically, this article presents design information for structured debates on the ethics of the use of military force, humanitarian interventions, and U.S. foreign policy toward international institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). Building on the literature on active teaching and learning, the article describes the development of these exercises and assesses their effectiveness through ten years of classroom application. [source]


Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2010
Todd Allee
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in "legal delegation" to ICSID across BITs and explain this important variation by drawing upon a bargaining framework. Home governments prefer and typically obtain ICSID clauses in their BITs, particularly when internal forces push strongly for such provisions and when they have significantly greater bargaining power than the other signatory. Yet some home governments are less likely to insist upon ICSID clauses if they have historical or military ties with the other government. On the other hand, although host governments are often hostile toward ICSID clauses, particularly when sovereignty costs are high, they are more likely to consent to such clauses when they are heavily constrained by their dependence on the global economy. Our findings have significant implications for those interested in FDI, legalization, international institutions, and interstate bargaining. [source]


Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and Doha

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2009
John S. Odell
Negotiations among members of international institutions often stalemate yet the outcomes vary. Sometimes talks end in impasse and other times in agreement. Several familiar theories are unable to explain the contrast between two prominent outcomes in the World Trade Organization,its 1999 deadlock in Seattle and its 2001 agreement in Doha, Qatar, on an agenda for a new round. Extensive original evidence from these cases documents mechanisms that can tip the negotiation process between impasse and agreement in any institution, not only economic ones. The study illustrates benefits for international relations research of building on the relatively neglected tradition of negotiation analysis, a substantial part of which is outside political science. [source]


Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2003
David H. Bearce
While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States. [source]


Treating International Institutions as Social Environments

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2001
Alastair Iain Johnston
Socialization theory is a neglected source of explanations for cooperation in international relations. Neorealism treats socialization (or selection, more properly) as a process by which autistic non-balancers are weeded out of the anarchical international system. Contractual institutionalists ignore or downplay the possibilities of socialization in international institutions in part because of the difficulties in observing changes in interests and preferences. For constructivists socialization is a central concept. But to date it has been undertheorized, or more precisely, the microprocesses of socialization have been generally left unexamined. This article focuses on two basic microprocesses in socialization theory,persuasion and social influence,and develops propositions about the social conditions under which one might expect to observe cooperation in institutions. Socialization theories pose questions for both the structural-functional foundations of contractual institutionalist hypotheses about institutional design and cooperation, and notions of optimal group size for collective action. [source]


The Intra-National Struggle to Define "US": External Involvement as a Two-Way Street

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2001
Andrea Grove
Three perspectives on the causes of communal conflict are visible in extant work: a focus on ancient hatreds, on leaders, or on the context that leaders "find" themselves in. Leaders therefore have all the power to mobilize people to fight (or not to) or leaders are driven by circumstantial opportunities or the primordial desires of the masses to resist peace or coexistence with historical enemies. Analysts who focus on leaders or context recognize that external actors affect internal conflicts, but little systematic research has explored the processes relating the domestic politics of nationalist mobilization to factors in the international arena. How does the international arena affect the competition among leaders? How do skillful leaders draw in external actors to lend credibility to their own views? This article asserts that leaders compete to frame identity and mission, and explores the degree to which international factors affect whose "definitions of the situation" are successful in precipitating mobilization shifts among potential followers. A unique finding of this longitudinal study of Northern Ireland is that the role played by international institutions and actors is affected by how domestic actors perceive, cultivate, and bring attention to the linkages between the two spheres. [source]


How Americans Think About Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2001
Richard K. Herrmann
Trade has again emerged as a controversial issue in America, yet we know little about the ideas that guide American thinking on these questions. By combining traditional survey methods with experimental manipulation of problem content, this study explores the ideational landscape among elite Americans and pays particular attention to how elite Americans combine their ideas about commerce with their ideas about national security and social justice. We find that most American leaders think like intuitive neoclassical economists and that only a minority think along intuitive neorealist or Rawlsian lines. Among the mass public, in contrast, a majority make judgments like intuitive neorealists and intuitive Rawlsians. Although elite respondents see international institutions as promising vehicles in principle, in practice they favor exploiting America's advantage in bilateral bargaining power over granting authority to the World Trade Organization. The distribution of these ideas in America is not arrayed neatly along traditional ideological divisions. To understand the ideational landscape, it is necessary to identify how distinctive mentaal models,mercantilist, neorealist, egalitarian, and neoclassical economic,sensitize or desensitize people to particular aspects of geopolitical problems, an approach we call cognitive interactionism. [source]


Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001
Liliana Botcheva
We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states' behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members' practices, whereas others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior, the design of the institution, and variation in the organization and access of private interests that share the goals of the institution. We illustrate these propositions with examples drawn from international institutions for development assistance, protection of the ozone layer, and completion of the European Union's internal market. We find that significant externalities and appropriately designed institutions lead to convergence of state behavior, whereas divergence can result from the absence of these conditions and the presence of heterogeneity in domestic politics. [source]


National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary Integration

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001
James I. Walsh
How do states reach agreement on creating or changing international institutions? The dominant theory of international cooperation,institutional theory,specifies how states with shared interests use institutions to realize joint gains and to minimize the possibility of defection. But institutional theory has little to say about when states will hold the shared interests that lead them to create international institutions in the first place. I evaluate two general explanations of national preferences regarding international institutions against the record of attempts to institutionalize monetary cooperation in the European Union since the 1970s. Drawing on central insights of the constructivist tradition, idea diffusion theory holds that national preferences converged on those of German decision-makers by the late 1980s and that European governments willingly accepted German terms for monetary union. Recognition that German institutions and policies produced superior economic outcomes drove this change in preferences. A domestic-politics explanation holds that preferences varied because of differences in the structure of the domestic political economy and the political costs of achieving price stability, which was one of Germany's conditions for monetary integration. Lower inflation in the late 1980s reduced these costs enough for French and Italian governments to pursue a monetary union that included Germany. The evidence indicates that idea diffusion had little influence on the development of European monetary institutions. Governments held and advocated distinctly different preferences regarding such institutions from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. The finding that domestic politics rather than idea diffusion drives national preferences challenges some of the claims of recent constructivist literature in international politics about the importance of communication and ideas in promoting cooperation. In the conclusion I discuss how the findings of this article might be squared with constructivism by paying more attention to domestic politics. [source]


Policy Wars for Peace: Network Model of NGO Behavior,

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2009
Anna Ohanyan
The challenge of orchestrating coordination and cooperation among the many international organizations active in international development has attracted much interest from academics and practitioners alike. This study addresses a particular piece of the larger puzzle: as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and their donors, each usually with much different policy orientations, coalesce within interorganizational networks, what determines whose policy preferences are pursued, implemented, and delivered on the ground? Within the network-based model of NGO behavior introduced in this article, certain attributes and the internal institutional composition of NGO,donor policy networks are significant determinants in shaping opportunities for NGOs and in giving both NGOs and donors leverage over the policy process. The model focuses specifically on demonstrating the effects of a network on NGO autonomy,that is, an NGO's ability to advance its own policy preferences regardless of their congruency with those of its donors. The network typology presented in this study identifies the comparative advantages of distinct network types in which the NGO is most empowered as an autonomous policy actor and is best equipped to withstand parochial donor preferences. Using network analysis and the proposed network-based model, this research takes the form of a comparative study of four NGO,donor policy networks from the postconflict microfinance sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The study also charts new research paths toward developing network-based approaches to the study of international institutions. [source]


Transaction Cost Estimation and International Regimes: Of Crystal Balls and Sheriff's Posses

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 1 2004
Michael Lipson
In the aftermath of the 2003 war in Iraq, there is growing concern over the durability of international institutions and their capacity to withstand international change. Transaction costs are a central factor in theoretical explanations of the conditions under which international institutions will persist or be replaced. Rational institutionalists expect regimes to persist after conditions underlying their creation have changed because of the transaction costs of negotiating a replacement regime. Andrew Moravcsik has recently challenged this view, arguing that such costs are generally low and, in any case, arise from domestic and transnational sources rather than interstate bargaining. Others have argued that transaction costs shape the structure of security institutions. All these approaches assume that states can accurately forecast the transaction costs of maintaining or replacing an international regime. However, as an examination of the replacement of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) by the Wassenaar Arrangement demonstrates, this assumption is not necessarily warranted. This essay reviews transaction-cost-based theories of international cooperation and proposes that incorporation of a variable concerned with states' capacity to estimate transaction costs would improve our theoretical understanding of institutional persistence and change. Moreover, it considers problems of defining and measuring transaction costs, assesses factors limiting states' accurate estimation of transaction costs, and presents some propositions regarding transaction cost estimation and regime persistence. The essay also examines the implications of inaccurate transaction cost estimation for recent US foreign policy and international order. [source]


Swaying the Hand of Justice: The Internal and External Dynamics of Regime Change at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 3 2006
John Hagan
This article develops a conflict approach for studying the field of international criminal law. Focusing on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, we draw on Burawoy's (2003) elaboration of reflexive ethnography to determine how external political changes affect the work of an international legal institution. We explore how political frameworks of legal liberalism, ad hoc legalism, and legal exceptionalism result in internal office, organizational, and normative changes within this Tribunal, thereby linking national political transformations with the construction of the global. Drawing on rolling field interviews and a two-wave panel survey, we conclude that the claims to universals that underwrite transnational legal fields cannot be understood solely through an analysis of external political forces, but must be combined with attention to how these are refracted through internal organizational change within international institutions. [source]


Misreading Islamist Terrorism: The "War Against Terrorism" and Just-War Theory

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2004
Joseph M. Schwartz
Abstract: The Bush administration's military war on terrorism is a blunt, ineffective, and unjust response to the threat posed to innocent civilians by terrorism. Decentralized terrorist networks can only be effectively fought by international cooperation among police and intelligence agencies representing diverse nation-states, including ones with predominantly Islamic populations. The Bush administration's allegations of a global Islamist terrorist threat to the national interests of the United States misread the decentralized and complex nature of Islamist politics. Undoubtedly there exists a "combat fundamentalist" element within Islamism. But the threat posed to U.S. citizens by Islamist terrorism neither necessitates nor justifies as a response massive military invasions of other nations. Not only does the Bush administration's war on alleged "terrorist states" violate the doctrine of just war, but in addition these wars arise from a new, unilateral, imperial foreign-policy doctrine of "preventive wars." Such a doctrine will isolate the United States from international institutions and long-standing allies. The weakening of these institutions and alliances will only weaken the ability of the international community to deter terrorism. [source]


Global Inequality and International Institutions

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2001
Andrew Hurrell
This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice. [source]


Fixing national subjects in the 1920s southern Balkans: Also an international practice

AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, Issue 2 2008
JANE K. COWAN
ABSTRACT The momentous transition from empire to nation-state in the early 20th century entailed a challenge for European states to produce "national" subjects,citizens. Scholars examining how diverse populations were incorporated into national projects have typically taken the nation-state's territorial boundaries as analytical boundaries and have rarely considered nation-building comparatively or investigated the creation of national subjects as an international practice. Taking the case of the League of Nation's supervision of the Greco,Bulgarian Convention Concerning Reciprocal and Voluntary Emigration in the 1920s, I explore collaboration between international and national agents in disambiguating multistranded affiliations of certain subjects in pursuit of homogeneous nation-states. [international institutions, nation-building, supervision, subjects, migration, borders, minorities] [source]