Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
International Capital Mobility (international + capital_mobility)
Selected AbstractsINTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYINGECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2004Michael J. Hiscox Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong. [source] International Capital Mobility in the Short Run and the Long Run: A Daily Data Study for Japan, Singapore and Taiwan*ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 1 2008Han-Min Hsing F32; F41; G15 Using daily data from between 1993 and 2003, covered interest differential and cointegration tests are applied to examine short-run and long-run international capital mobility for Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, and, for comparison purposes, the UK. Despite the high short-run mobility in Japan (Singapore and Taiwan), being slightly (significantly) lower than in the UK, perfect long-run mobility exists in all three Asian economies, especially when the Asian currency crisis is excluded. Different short-run and long-run mobility implies the existence of a response lag in the financial market. As expected, although the impulse response reaches the significant long-run equilibrium level shortly after the shock in the UK, lagged responses appear in the three Asian economies, particularly in Singapore and Taiwan. [source] INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYINGECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2004Michael J. Hiscox Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong. [source] ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION ON INVESTMENTPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2006Terrie L. Walmsley More recently, with China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) a reality, FDI has once again picked up. This paper explores the linkage between WTO accession and investment in China. We find that investment and capital stocks increase substantially. Moreover, foreign ownership of Chinese assets doubles by 2020. Central to this increase is the expected catch-up in the productivity of the services sectors driven by reforms. These estimates are far larger than those predicted by earlier studies, which ignored the reforms affecting Chinese services sectors, and abstracted from international capital mobility. [source] International Capital Mobility in the Short Run and the Long Run: A Daily Data Study for Japan, Singapore and Taiwan*ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 1 2008Han-Min Hsing F32; F41; G15 Using daily data from between 1993 and 2003, covered interest differential and cointegration tests are applied to examine short-run and long-run international capital mobility for Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, and, for comparison purposes, the UK. Despite the high short-run mobility in Japan (Singapore and Taiwan), being slightly (significantly) lower than in the UK, perfect long-run mobility exists in all three Asian economies, especially when the Asian currency crisis is excluded. Different short-run and long-run mobility implies the existence of a response lag in the financial market. As expected, although the impulse response reaches the significant long-run equilibrium level shortly after the shock in the UK, lagged responses appear in the three Asian economies, particularly in Singapore and Taiwan. [source] | ||||||||||