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Internal Elements (internal + element)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Medical Sciences	40%
Humanities and Social Sciences	40%

Selected Abstracts

Newborns' Mooney-Face Perception

INFANCY, Issue 6 2009
Irene Leo
The aim of this study is to investigate whether newborns detect a face on the basis of a Gestalt representation based on first-order relational information (i.e., the basic arrangement of face features) by using Mooney stimuli. The incomplete 2-tone Mooney stimuli were used because they preclude focusing both on the local features (i.e., the fine details of the individual features) and on the second-order relational information (i.e., the distance between the internal elements); therefore, face detection can rely only on a Gestalt representation of a face. Two experiments were carried out by using a preferential looking procedure. Experiment 1 demonstrated that newborns prefer upright Mooney faces to inverted Mooney faces (180° rotated). Experiment 2 showed that newborns prefer a Mooney face as compared to a Mooney-like object equated for the number of elements in the upper part. Overall, the results indicate that newborns bind and organize the fragmentary parts of the Mooneized face stimulus into a whole and detect the first-order relations of a face on the basis of holistic processing. [source]

Reasonably Traditional: Self,Contradiction and Self,Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition,Based Rationality

JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 3 2002
Micah Lott
Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition,based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition,based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self,referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self,referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism. [source]

Investigating mechanical behaviour at a core,sheath interface in peripheral nerve

JOURNAL OF THE PERIPHERAL NERVOUS SYSTEM, Issue 4 2004
Rachel L. Tillett
Abstract As peripheral nerves bend and stretch, internal elements need to move in relation to each other. However, the way in which intraneural components interact is poorly understood. Previous work identified a distinct core and sheath in the rat sciatic nerve and provides a useful model with which to investigate this interaction. Here we have focused on identifying the mechanical and anatomical characteristics of the interface between core and sheath. Nerve samples, 15 and 20 mm long, of rat sciatic nerves were harvested and placed in a purpose-built jig, and a tensile testing machine was used to pull core from sheath. Mechanical tests of specimens in which core had been previously pulled from sheath by 25% of its initial length achieved a mean pull-out force approximately six times smaller than that achieved using intact controls. These results are consistent with the proposal that core,sheath interactions involve physical connections rather than a viscous fluid interface. Anatomical features of this interface were characterised using transmission electron microscopy. It appeared that sheath was derived from epineurium and most of the perineurium, whilst core consisted of endoneurium and a small proportion of the perineurium: the plane of cleavage appeared to involve the innermost perineurial cell layer. [source]

Enforcement, risk and discretion: the case of dangerous consumer products

LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2006
Peter Cartwright
This paper considers the effectiveness of the enforcement provisions of consumer product safety law by examining the new legislation in this area (the General Product Safety Regulations 2005), and the broader context in which it operates. The paper suggests that to understand the likely effectiveness of the Regulations, it is necessary to examine what the author refers to as the internal and external dimensions of enforcement. The paper is divided into three parts: part one sets out the enforcement provisions of the Regulations; part two examines the internal elements of enforcement; part three examines the external elements of enforcement. The internal elements are those provisions found in the statute that direct enforcement authorities in the action they can take. The external elements are those pressures outside the statute that inevitably impinge upon the ability of the enforcement authority to make a decision. It will be argued that while recent developments make some important strides forward in protecting consumers from dangerous products, there is a risk that the law will not be enforced satisfactorily. [source]

ON WILLIAMSON'S ARGUMENTS THAT KNOWLEDGE IS A MENTAL STATE

RATIO, Issue 2 2005
Adam Leite
In Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge is a purely mental state, that is, that it is never a complex state or condition comprising mental factors and non-mental, environmental factors. Three of his arguments are evaluated: arguments from (1) the non-analyzability of the concept of knowledge, (2) the ,primeness' of knowledge, and (3) the (alleged) inability to satisfactorily specify the ,internal' element involved in knowledge. None of these arguments succeeds. Moreover, consideration of the third argument points the way to a cogent argument that knowledge is not a purely mental state. [source]