Intelligence Officials (intelligence + official)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


"Made in China" Label Won't Survive Without Rule of Law

NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2007
MINXIN PEI
As it prepares to host the 2008 Olympics, China's authoritarian development model, which has sustained high growth for two decades, is entering a fragile new stage. Tainted toys and other products have made the American consumers on whom China relies wary even as the debt-and-deficit ridden American economy relies on China's massive foreign reserves to keep going. In the meantime, China's aggressive search for raw materials in Africa is causing a backlash while its cyberspying probes into Western defense systems are reviving Cold War-like tensions. The US treasury secretary, a top China expert and former intelligence officials offer their views. [source]


Document: Qiao Shi on China's Long March to the Rule of Law

NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2007
QIAO SHI
As it prepares to host the 2008 Olympics, China's authoritarian development model, which has sustained high growth for two decades, is entering a fragile new stage. Tainted toys and other products have made the American consumers on whom China relies wary even as the debt-and-deficit ridden American economy relies on China's massive foreign reserves to keep going. In the meantime, China's aggressive search for raw materials in Africa is causing a backlash while its cyberspying probes into Western defense systems are reviving Cold War-like tensions. The US treasury secretary, a top China expert and former intelligence officials offer their views. [source]


How Can the United States Take the Initiative in the Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis?

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2005
Jin H. Pak
On September 19, 2005, the last day of the fourth round of six-party talks, a deal was announced in which North Korea pledged to end its nuclear program in return for a number of concessions. Within 24 hours of that announcement, North Korea clarified its position by stating that the United States "should not even dream" it would dismantle its nuclear weapons until it receives a light-water nuclear reactor. Despite four rounds of six-party talks over a three year period, it seems that almost no real progress has been made, except for North Korea; US intelligence officials estimate that North Korea could have made as many as 8 or 9 nuclear weapons already. So it seems North Korea has cleverly increased its bargaining position vis--vis the United States. As lengthy negotiations over the provision of a Light Water Reactor (LWR) will undoubtedly ensue, it can use that time to steadily increase its nuclear deterrent. Why did the United States agree to this sub-optimal outcome? Why was it so difficult for the United States to exert more influence on North Korea and the other countries in the six-party talks? The answer to these questions lies in the changing trends affecting Northeast Asian security dynamics. For various reasons that this article will explain, these trends affect the ability of the United States to take the initiative in the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. As long as the United States fails to account for various changes in Northeast Asian regional dynamics, its strategy will to deter North Korea from continuing its nuclear program will not succeed. [source]


MI 6's Requirements Directorate: Integrating Intelligence into the Machinery of British Central Government

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 1 2000
Philip H.J. DaviesArticle first published online: 17 DEC 200
The following article examines the relationship between the British Secret Intelli-gence Service (SIS, a.k.a. MI 6) and the machinery of central government, particularly departments of state and other agencies which employ information generated by the SIS. It is argued the main link between the SIS and its consumers in British government is the SIS's requirements ,side', embodied throughout most of the post-war era in the form of a Requirements Directorate. The article argues that the Requirements mechanism operates as a line of communication between the SIS and its consumers separate from the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), although there is overlap and interdependency between the two architectures. This discussion traces the development of the ,requirements side' from the interwar period up to the post-Cold War era using information from archival sources and a programme of interviews with former UK intelligence officials. It is further argued that the structure and process of the SIS ,requirements side' has developed and changed as a consequence of changes in the structure of demand in the machinery of British government, including adapting to the increasingly central role of the JIO. However, despite that increasingly central role of the JIO, the ,requirements side' has continued to serve as the first point of contact between the SIS and its customers in Whitehall. [source]