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Increased Transparency (increased + transparency)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	40%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	40%

Selected Abstracts

Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2001
Jon Faust
We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and inferred from the policy outcome. Increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This moderates the bank's policy and induces the bank to follow a policy closer to the socially optimal one. Full transparency of the central bank's intentions is generally socially beneficial but frequently worse for the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating influence on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium. [source]

Dynamics of NGO legitimacy: how organising betrays core missions of INGOs

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 1 2008
Ringo Ossewaarde
Abstract International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) are prominent actors in the international arena, aiming to improve the life of disadvantaged people. However, INGOs often do not succeed in doing this. Consequently, INGO legitimacy is regularly questioned. Increased transparency and tightened accountability mechanisms are often-mentioned solutions to this problem. Based on an analysis of four dimensions of INGO legitimacy,normative, regulatory, cognitive and output legitimacy,we argue that this is not necessarily adequate. We conclude that INGO mission statements create a normative source of legitimacy, but that this, in itself, is not enough to ground INGO legitimacy: it also needs to be institutionalised and organised. However, as a result of power relations and resulting pressures for accountability and transparency, as defined by their external stakeholders, INGOs experience a permanent struggle to reconcile their mission with the requirements for regulatory, cognitive and output legitimacy. The more these stakeholders press for increased organisation of INGO work, the more the pursuit of the core objectives of INGOs is obstructed. We illustrate this argument with the case of the post-Tsunami humanitarian intervention (2004/2005). Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to Crisis

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2008
E. Han Kim
In the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost over half its value against the dollar, and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were family-controlled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through "tunneling" activities and other means. The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market-based solutions and government intervention. The government-engineered, large-scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol,the so-called "big deals" that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business,turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37% at the end of 2006, up from just 13% ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol. The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies,notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards,have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO, the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange,as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett,are held up as a model of best practice. At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there continue to be many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run companies that have resisted such reforms. And aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement, but in reversing some of the previous gains. Most disturbing is the current push to allow American style anti-takeover devices, which, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control. [source]

Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring

POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 1 2003
Dara O'Rourke
A range of new nongovernmental systems for advancing labor standards and enforcement have emerged over the last 5 years. This article comparatively assesses these multistakeholder systems of codes of conduct and monitoring, discusses their underlying models of regulation, and proposes a set of criteria for evaluating their effectiveness, including their legitimacy, rigor, accountability, and complementarity. Critical issues are raised about the transparency of existing initiatives, independence of monitors, convergence of standards, and dynamics among nongovernmental regulation, unions, and state enforcement. The article concludes by arguing that with increased transparency, improved technical capacities, and new mechanisms of accountability to workers and consumers, nongovernmental monitoring could complement existing state regulatory systems. [source]

Nurse editors' views on the peer review process

RESEARCH IN NURSING & HEALTH, Issue 6 2005
Margaret H. Kearney
Abstract A growing body of research challenges the inter-rater reliability of peer reviewers and the value of reviewer training or blinding in improving the quality of manuscript reviews, but double-blinded peer review of papers remains a relatively unexamined standard for nursing journals. Using data from a larger emailed survey, the views of 88 nurse editors on peer review were analyzed using content analysis. The majority of nurse editors reported that blinding was important in peer review, to maintain objectivity and avoid negative personal or professional consequences. The minority who saw potential benefits of open review valued increased transparency in the reviewing and editorial decision-making process. An excellent review was viewed as containing specific instructions on how the deficits in a manuscript might be remedied. Common weaknesses of reviews were lack of specificity and inappropriate focus. Virtually all editors provided some form of preparation or guidance to reviewers. Peer review has an impact on nurses' workload and careers, and training in writing and critique should be included in nursing education. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Res Nurs Health 28:444,452, 2005 [source]