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Incentive Compensation (incentive + compensation)
Selected AbstractsAudit Committee Incentive Compensation and Accounting Restatements,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2008Deborah S. Archambeault First page of article [source] Incentive compensation: Bridging theory and practiceJOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2008Joseph G. Fisher This article discusses the four roles that compensation and reward programs serve in organizations,motivating effort, directing attention, extracting information, and attracting able individuals. The article highlights the delicate interplay between compensation theory and practice,and the importance of matching the compensation program to the needs at hand. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] The Impact of Internal Auditor Compensation and Role on External Auditors' Planning Judgments and Decisions,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2001F. Todd Dezoort Abstract This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks , an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task , to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy-six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation. [source] Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009Yilei Zhang This paper investigates the governance implications of a firm's capital structure and managerial incentive compensation in controlling the free cash flow agency problem. The results suggest: debt and executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a firm's free cash flow problem; failure to incorporate the substitutability and endogeneity leads to underestimates of the magnitude and economic implication of the disciplinary role of both mechanisms; firm characteristics differ across the prevalence of debt usage versus option usage, suggesting the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of the monitoring devices; and all the above effects are more pronounced in firms that tend to have more severe agency problem. [source] The Impact of Human Resource Practices and Compensation Design on Performance: An Analysis of Family-Owned SMEsJOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2006Dawn S. Carlson A sample of 168 family-owned fast growth small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was used to empirically examine the consequences of five human resource practices on sales growth performance. The results suggest that training and development, recruitment package, maintaining morale, use of performance appraisals, and competitive compensation were more important for high sales-growth performing firms than for low sales-growth performing firms. In addition, we examined the use of incentive compensation in the form of cash, noncash, and benefits and perks for four different levels of employees in family-owned SMEs. The findings suggest that high sales-growth performing firms used more cash incentive compensation at every level in the organization. [source] | ||||||||||