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Input Suppliers (input + supplier)
Selected AbstractsInput Suppliers, Differential Pricing, and Information Sharing AgreementsJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2008Anthony Creane It is common for firms to systematically share information with their input suppliers. Although such agreements with horizontal rivals have been analyzed, there has been little work examining vertical sharing, and that analysis has focused on suppliers that set uniform prices. However, there has been a systematic change in the US policy toward vertical relationships in the past decades: both FTC inaction and courts rulings have curtailed the effect of Robinson-Patman, a law meant to prevent differential pricing. Furthermore, it is not clear if differential pricing reflects the suppliers' or the buyers' power. The interaction of these effects is examined. [source] Service quality in agronomic inputs: does the hierarchical model apply?AGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 4 2009Michael A. Gunderson Research regarding the quality of services is increasingly important as services account for more of the national economy. In agriculture many services are used, but are not systematically assessed in a manner similar to how products are assessed. This research aims to identify the compatibility of proposed service quality structures to the agriculture inputs sector. Results of a survey of Midwest row crop producers lend support to the hierarchical model of service quality structure. Input suppliers can use these results to structure their services more efficiently. [EconLit classification codes: M, Q]. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] SUNK COSTS OF CAPITAL AND THE FORM OF ENTERPRISE: INVESTOR-OWNED FIRMS AND WORKER-OWNED FIRMS,ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010Kazuhiko Mikami ABSTRACT,:,This paper examines implications of sunk costs of capital for efficient forms of enterprise. It is assumed that firm owners and outside traders are asymmetrically informed of venture risks, and that there are sunk costs associated with investment in physical and human capital. We then make an efficiency comparison between investor-owned and worker-owned firms. We find that the firm is efficient when it is owned by the input supplier (the investor or worker) who incurs large sunk costs. This is because such an input supplier can credibly signal to the other input supplier that he in fact has a safe project. An empirical study based on the Japanese manufacturing industry seems to support the theoretical result. [source] Input Suppliers, Differential Pricing, and Information Sharing AgreementsJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2008Anthony Creane It is common for firms to systematically share information with their input suppliers. Although such agreements with horizontal rivals have been analyzed, there has been little work examining vertical sharing, and that analysis has focused on suppliers that set uniform prices. However, there has been a systematic change in the US policy toward vertical relationships in the past decades: both FTC inaction and courts rulings have curtailed the effect of Robinson-Patman, a law meant to prevent differential pricing. Furthermore, it is not clear if differential pricing reflects the suppliers' or the buyers' power. The interaction of these effects is examined. [source] Effects of government programs to raise milk prices: Academic economists and public policyAGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 4 2005Daniel A. Sumner The Northeast Dairy Compact benefited milk suppliers (and allied input suppliers) and harmed those on the fluid milk demand side in the Compact region, while having opposite impacts on these groups outside the Compact region. These simulation results leave many questions unanswered, but seem relatively robust. Simulations require many assumptions, but so do all other approaches to policy analysis. The specific policy question addressed and available data determine the most promising approach. In some cases, as with the evaluating effects of the Compact, a variety of approaches to policy analysis are complementary. [EconLit citations: Q18, Q13, L10, L43]. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 21: 473,476, 2005. [source] Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2001Rajeev K. Tyagi The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare. [source] | ||||||||||