Analyst Forecast Accuracy (analyst + forecast_accuracy)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Selected Abstracts

Does the Capitalization of Development Costs Improve Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Evidence from the UK
It has been documented that investments in Research and Development (R&D) are associated with increased errors and inaccuracy in earnings forecasts made by financial analysts. These deficiencies have been generally attributed to information complexity and the uncertainty of the future benefits of R&D. This paper examines whether the capitalization of development costs can reduce analyst uncertainty about the future economic outcome of R&D investments, provide outsiders with a better matching of future R&D-related revenues and costs, and therefore promote accuracy in analyst forecasts. UK data is used, because accounting rules in the United Kingdom permitted firms to conditionally capitalize development costs even before the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards. The choice to expense R&D rather than conditionally capitalize development costs is found to relate positively to signed analyst forecast errors. This finding is robust to controlling for the influence of other factors that may affect errors, as well as for the influence of R&D investments on forecast errors. The decision to capitalize versus expense is not observed to have a significant influence on analyst forecast revisions. The findings are interpreted as evidence that the choice to capitalize as opposed to expense may help to reduce deficiencies in analyst forecasts; hence, is informative for users of financial statements. Increased informativeness is expected to have repercussions for the effectiveness with which analysts produce earnings forecasts, and, as a result, market efficiency. [source]

Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study

Ole-Kristian Hope
Using a sample from 22 countries, I investigate the relations between the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure, and between forecast accuracy and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. I document that firm-level disclosures are positively related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that such disclosures provide useful information to analysts. I construct a comprehensive measure of enforcement and find that strong enforcement is associated with higher forecast accuracy. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that enforcement encourages managers to follow prescribed accounting rules, which, in turn, reduces analysts' uncertainty about future earnings. I also find evidence consistent with disclosures being more important when analyst following is low and with enforcement being more important when more choice among accounting methods is allowed. [source]

Does corporate governance transparency affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts?

Gauri Bhat
M4; O1 Abstract Using country-level proxies for corporate governance transparency, this paper investigates how differences in transparency across 21 countries affect the average forecast accuracy of analysts for the country's firms. The association between financial transparency and analyst forecast accuracy has been well documented in previous published literature; however, the association between governance transparency and analyst forecast accuracy remains unexplored. Using the two distinct country-level factors isolated by Bushman et al. (2004), governance transparency and financial transparency, we investigate whether corporate governance information impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts over and above financial information. We document that governance transparency is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for financial transparency and other variables. Furthermore, our results suggest that governance-related disclosure plays a bigger role in improving the information environment when financial disclosures are less transparent. Our empirical evidence also suggests that the significance of governance transparency on analyst forecast accuracy is higher when legal enforcement is weak. [source]

Domestic Accounting Standards, International Accounting Standards, and the Predictability of Earnings

Hollis Ashbaugh
We investigate (1) whether the variation in accounting standards across national boundaries relative to International Accounting Standards (IAS) has an impact on the ability of financial analysts to forecast non-U.S. firms' earnings accurately, and (2) whether analyst forecast accuracy changes after firms adopt IAS. IAS are a set of financial reporting policies that typically require increased disclosure and restrict management's choices of measurement methods relative to the accounting standards of our sample firms' countries of domicile. We develop indexes of differences in countries' accounting disclosure and measurement policies relative to IAS, and document that greater differences in accounting standards relative to IAS are significantly and positively associated with the absolute value of analyst earnings forecast errors. Further, we show that analyst forecast accuracy improves after firms adopt IAS. More specifically, after controlling for changes in the market value of equity, changes in analyst following, and changes in the number of news reports, we find that the convergence in firms' accounting policies brought about by adopting IAS is positively associated with the reduction in analyst forecast errors. [source]

A Temporal Analysis of Earnings Surprises: Profits versus Losses

Lawrence D. Brown
I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are "a little bit of good news," and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an "extreme amount of bad news." My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider,namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report "a little bit of good news" in every year. [source]