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Human Capital Accumulation (human + capital_accumulation)
Selected AbstractsHUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, HOME PRODUCTION AND EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS*THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2008YUNFANG HU In this paper, we construct a three-sector endogenous growth model in which long-run growth is propelled by human capital accumulation. We show that although the addition of a home sector to the standard two-sector endogenous growth model preserves the well-behaved balanced growth equilibrium properties, it generates new transitional dynamics around the balanced growth path. It is shown that, when there is a positive shock to physical capital, our model is more likely to exhibit paradoxical growth than are standard multisector endogenous growth models that exclude home production. Our analysis adds new results to those from the related literature on leisure. [source] Poverty Traps and Human Capital AccumulationECONOMICA, Issue 270 2001Carlotta Berti Ceroni In this paper I show that persistent inequality in the distribution of human capital and a negative relation between initial inequality and steady-state aggregate output may follow from the fact that the poor require relatively higher returns to increase expenditure on education. Moreover, I show that poverty traps emerging in models where individual transitions do not depend on aggregate dynamics, though not robust to the introduction of idiosyncratic uncertainty, may still be relevant observationally, if idiosyncratic shocks occur with low probability. In this context, I also analyse the implications of introducing a public education system. [source] The Quality of Education, Educational Institutions, and Cross-Country Differences in Human Capital AccumulationGROWTH AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2005SHAWN D. KNABB ABSTRACT Cross-country studies of education and economic prosperity often reach conflicting results when using growth rates as the measure of economic development. However, growth rates lack persistence over time and may not accurately measure long-term economic success over relatively short economic horizons. To overcome this potential specification problem, we estimate the relationship between key education variables and the capital to physical labor ratio. Using both cross-sectional and panel specifications, we find that both the primary-pupil,teacher ratio and decentralized education finance are associated with a larger capital to physical labor ratio. The relationship between human capital and expenditures, private education, and test scores are less robust. [source] Taxation, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic GrowthTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2001Shuanglin Lin Previous studies have shown that tax rates and the growth rate of output are negatively related under the assumption that government wastes tax revenues. This paper shows that, if tax revenues are used for human capital accumulation, tax rates and the growth rate can be positively related. An increase in the human capital tax rate will increase (decrease) the growth rate when the initial tax rate is small (large). An increase in the physical capital tax rate will increase the growth rate when savings are completely interest-inelastic. The effects of income taxes and lump-sum taxes on growth are also analysed. JEL Classification Numbers: E6, H2, O4. [source] A Dynamic Incentive-Based Argument for Conditional Transfers,THE ECONOMIC RECORD, Issue 2008DILIP MOOKHERJEE We compare the long-run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees' income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman,Ljungqvist,Mookherjee,Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long-run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations. [source] The Experience of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the CaribbeanDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 5 2006Sudhanshu Handa This article discusses the experience of six conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America, a model of social safety-nets which has grown to dominate the social protection sector in the region during the past decade. While they have been generally successful in terms of achieving their core objective, it is still not clear whether these programmes constitute the most cost-efficient or sustainable solution to the development bottleneck they seek to address. Furthermore, the almost exclusive focus on the human capital accumulation of children leads to missed opportunties in terms of impact on household welfare and the broader rural development context. [source] Effectiveness versus Efficiency: Growth-Accelerating Policies in a Model of Growth without Scale EffectsGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2006Bettina Büttner Endogenous growth; scale effects; welfare Abstract. Recent R&D growth models without strong scale effects imply that long-run growth rates depend only on parameters that are usually taken to be exogenous. However, integrating human capital accumulation into models of this type, Arnold (2002) demonstrates that subsidizing education accelerates growth. The present paper addresses welfare issues in Arnold's model. The main theoretical finding of the paper is that a system of subsidies that implements the optimal balanced growth path as a decentralized equilibrium includes zero subsidies to education, while R&D activity should be either subsidized or taxed. To shed further light on the latter result, the model is calibrated and it turns out that along the balanced growth path, the decentralized economy underinvests in R&D, i.e. R&D activities should be subsidized. [source] Innovation and Regional Growth in the Enlarged Europe: The Role of Local Innovative Capabilities, Peripherality, and EducationGROWTH AND CHANGE, Issue 4 2005RICCARDO CRESCENZI ABSTRACT In this paper, a formal model for the relationship between innovation and growth in European Union regions is developed drawing upon the theoretical contribution of the systems of innovation approach. The model combines the analytical approach of the regional growth models with the insights of the systemic approach. The cross-sectional analysis, covering all the Enlarged Europe (EU-25) regions (for which data are available), shows that regional innovative activities (for which a specific measure is developed) play a significant role in determining differential regional growth patterns. Furthermore, the model sheds light on how geographical accessibility and human capital accumulation, by shaping the regional system of innovation, interact (in a statistically significant way) with local innovative activities, thus allowing them to be more (or less) effectively translated into economic growth. The paper shows that an increase in innovative effort is not necessarily likely to produce the same effect in all EU-25 regions. Indeed, the empirical analysis suggests that in order to allow innovative efforts in peripheral regions to be as productive as in core areas, they need to be complemented by huge investments in human capital. [source] ON THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2005Dirk Krueger This article studies the effects of child labor legislation on human capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth and welfare. We calibrate our model to U.S. data circa 1880 and find that the consequences of restricting child labor or providing tax-financed education depend on the main source of individual household income. Households with significant financial assets unambiguously lose from government intervention, whereas high-wage workers benefit most from a child labor ban, and low-wage workers benefit most from free education. Introducing free education results in substantial welfare gains, whereas a child labor ban induces small welfare losses. [source] The distributive consequences of machismo: a simulation analysis of intra-household discrimination,JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 8 2006José Cuesta Abstract Empirical evidence questions the unitary allocation model of the household that underpins the standard measurement of monetary poverty and inequality. Intra-household gender discrimination has been widely shown to shape expenditure decisions, nutrition status, and human capital accumulation of household members. However, conventional poverty and inequality analyses are conducted for the household as a whole, which might lead to different conclusions compared with studies based on individuals. Using recent developments in intra-household bargaining modelling, this paper constructs non-cooperative allocation rules dominated by gender discrimination among household members. Estimates for Chile show a substantial worsening of poverty and inequality under such allocation rules. This suggests that intra-household discrimination deserves some of the attention typically directed to extra-household discrimination in labour markets, access to public services or political participation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] With Friends Like These: Endogenous Labor Market Segregation with Homogeneous, Nonprejudiced AgentsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 3 2009Article first published online: 3 JUN 200, Tavis Barr In the economics literature, labor market segregation is typically assumed to arise either from prejudice (Becker 1971) or from group differences in human capital accumulation (Benabou 1993; Durlauf 2006; Fryer 2006). Many sociological studies, by contrast, consider social network structure as an embodiment of various forms of social capital, including the creation of obligations, information channels, and enforceable trust (Coleman 1988; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). When firms hire by referral, social network segregation can lead to labor market segregation (Tilly 1998). Various social network structures may arise from the actions of self-interested individuals (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Jackson 2006); by incorporating concepts of social capital into an economic framework of profit-maximizing firms, this article develops a model of labor markets in which segregation arises endogenously even though agents are homogeneous and have no dislike for each other. Firms hire through referrals, and can enforce discipline by bribing a referrer to prevent a hiree from getting any outside job offers from other friends if he or she shirks. This is possible only if social networks are reasonably closed, so that the referee knows a majority of his or her friends' friends. By segregating into small communities, workers can more effectively create closed social networks. Social networks with different reservation wages will receive different wages; firms can induce such segregation and wage discrimination in the interest of profit. Workers may not benefit from such segregation, except as a best response to being in a society where it already exists; the "friends" in these social networks act as a worker discipline device, and in this way treat each other inimically. [source] Choice of Technology and Labour Market Consequences: An Explanation of US-Japanese DifferencesTHE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 468 2001Hodaka Morita This paper provides an explanation for U.S.-Japanese differences concerning continuous process improvement, turnover rate, and the level and firm-specificity of human capital accumulation. Connection between continuous process improvement and the firm-specificity of training causes multiplicity of equilibria. In the Japanese equilibrium, each firm conducts continuous process improvement because other firms do so, and as a consequence training provided by such a firm becomes less effective in other firms. This lowers the turnover rate, which, in turn, increases firms' incentives to train employees. In the US equilibrium, training is general, which raises the turnover rate and decreases incentives to train. [source] HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, HOME PRODUCTION AND EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS*THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2008YUNFANG HU In this paper, we construct a three-sector endogenous growth model in which long-run growth is propelled by human capital accumulation. We show that although the addition of a home sector to the standard two-sector endogenous growth model preserves the well-behaved balanced growth equilibrium properties, it generates new transitional dynamics around the balanced growth path. It is shown that, when there is a positive shock to physical capital, our model is more likely to exhibit paradoxical growth than are standard multisector endogenous growth models that exclude home production. Our analysis adds new results to those from the related literature on leisure. [source] SECTOR-SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES AND STATUS PREFERENCES IN THE UZAWA-LUCAS MODEL,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2008KOICHI KAWAMOTO This paper shows that introducing preferences for social status based on human capital holdings modifies the finding of Gómez (2004) that sector-specific externalities associated with human capital in the goods sector do not violate the optimality of the competitive economy in the Uzawa,Lucas model. The effect of an increase in the degree of sector-specific externalities is qualitatively the same as that of an increase in the strength of the desire for status. Hence, paradoxically, a greater degree of sector-specific externalities makes human capital accumulation more excessive from the social point of view. [source] Taxation, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic GrowthTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2001Shuanglin Lin Previous studies have shown that tax rates and the growth rate of output are negatively related under the assumption that government wastes tax revenues. This paper shows that, if tax revenues are used for human capital accumulation, tax rates and the growth rate can be positively related. An increase in the human capital tax rate will increase (decrease) the growth rate when the initial tax rate is small (large). An increase in the physical capital tax rate will increase the growth rate when savings are completely interest-inelastic. The effects of income taxes and lump-sum taxes on growth are also analysed. JEL Classification Numbers: E6, H2, O4. [source] Output Taxation, Human Capital and GrowthTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2 2000Rosa Capolupo In this paper we investigate the long-run effects of government spending and taxation in an endogenous growth setting. The model is a variant of Barro's model (,Government Expenditure in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, 1990, pp. S103,S125) and Lucas's model (,On the Mechanics of Economic Development', Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 22, 1988, pp. 3,42) in which human capital accumulation is driven by government spending on public education. To balance the budget the government levies a tax on output in two alternative specifications of the human capital accumulation equation. The results consolidate some recent findings that taxation, when it is used for productive purposes, may lead to faster growth. Growth rates increase with taxes up to a level around 60,70 per cent. [source] Demographic Change and Economic Growth in AsiaASIAN ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2009David E. BLOOM J11; O11 Abstract Trade openness, high savings rates, human capital accumulation, and macroeconomic policy only accounted for part of the 1965,1990 growth performance in East Asia. Subsequently, demographic change was shown to be a missing factor in explaining the East Asian growth premium. Since 1990, East Asia has undertaken major economic reforms in response to financial crises and other factors. We reexamine the role of the demographic transition in contributing to cross-country differences in economic growth through to 2005, with a particular focus on East Asia. We highlight the need for policy to offset potential negative effects of aging populations in the future. [source] Should Education be Publicly Provided?BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 4 2002Philip A Trostel This study suggests that a subsidy in the form of public provision has the potential to be the most efficient educational policy because it stimulates investment in human capital, which would otherwise be inefficiently low because of distortionary income taxation and possible external benefits. Moreover, it can potentially do this without grossly distorting the mix of investments in human capital. Other policies do not have the potential to achieve both these ends without introducing additional, perhaps overwhelming, problems. Thus public provision of education appears to provide incentives for human capital accumulation which are more efficient than any other feasible policy. [source] Measuring Human Capital Like Physical Capital: What Does It Tell Us?BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Ruth Judson In this paper, I develop a measure of human capital stock that is similar to measuring physical capital by its replacement cost. This measure builds on measures of average educational attainment of the labour force. While it is far from an ideal measure, it is an interesting complement to the educational attainment series and other existing measures of human capital accumulation. In cross,country panel regressions, use of this measure of human capital accumulation yields a positive and significant, but relatively small (about ten per cent) elasticity with percapita GDP growth. Unlike physical capital, the stock of human capital as a share of GDP increases with GDP. This is consistent with the Barro et al. (1995) model of growth with non,mobile human capital and with some predictions of Romer's (1990) model of endogenous growth, but it is not consistent with the predictions of some other growth models. [source] Why is the rate of single-parenthood lower in Canada than in the U.S.?CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2009A dynamic equilibrium analysis of welfare policies Restricting aid to single mothers, for instance, has the potential to distort behaviour along three demographic margins: marriage, fertility, and divorce. We contrast the Canadian and the U.S. policies within an equilibrium model of household formation and human capital investment on children. Policy differences we consider are eligibility, dependence of transfers on the number of children, and generosity of transfers. Our simulations indicate that the policy differences can account for the higher rate of single-parenthood in the U.S. They also show that Canadian welfare policy is more effective for fostering human capital accumulation among children from poor families. Interestingly, a majority of agents in our benchmark economy prefers a welfare system that targets single mothers (as the U.S. system does), yet (unlike the U.S. system) does not make transfers dependent on the number of children. Une question critique dans le design des politiques sociales est à savoir s'il faut cibler l'aide selon la composition du ménage, comme on le fait aux Etats-Unis dans le cadre du programme Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) ou s'en remettre exclusivement à une enquête sur les ressources disponibles. Limiter l'aide aux mères monoparentales, par exemple, peut influencer le comportement à la marge selon trois axes démographiques: mariage, fécondité, divorce. On compare les politiques canadienne et américaine dans le cadre d'un modèle d'équilibre de formation des ménages et d'investissement en capital humain dans les enfants. Les différences dans les politiques portent sur l'éligibilité, la dépendance des transferts sur le nombre d'enfants, et la générosité des transferts. Les simulations indiquent que les différences dans les politiques peuvent expliquer le plus haut taux de monoparentalité aux Etats-Unis. On montre aussi que la politique canadienne est plus effective pour encourager l'accumulation du capital humain dans les enfants des familles pauvres. On note qu'une majorité des agents dans l'économie de référence préfère une politique qui cible les mères monoparentales (comme on le fait aux Etats-Unis) mais qui (contrairement à ce qui se fait aux Etats-Unis) ne rend pas les transferts dépendants du nombre d'enfants. [source] | |||||||||||||