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Host Government (host + government)
Selected AbstractsDarfur and the failure of the responsibility to protectINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 6 2007ALEX DE WAAL When official representatives of more than 170 countries adopted the principle of the ,responsibility to protect' (R2P) at the September 2005 World Summit, Darfur was quickly identified as the test case for this new doctrine. The general verdict is that the international community has failed the test due to lack of political will. This article argues that the failure is real but that it is more fundamentally located within the doctrine of R2P itself. Fulfilling the aspiration of R2P demands an international protection capability that does not exist now and cannot be realistically expected. The critical weakness in R2P is that the ,responsibility to react' has been framed as coercive protection, which attempts to be a middle way between classic peacekeeping and outright military intervention that can be undertaken without the consent of the host government. Thus far, theoretical and practical attempts to create this intermediate space for coercive protection have failed to resolve basic strategic and operational issues. In addition, the very act of raising the prospect of external military intervention for human protection purposes changes and distorts the political process and can in fact make a resolution more difficult. Following an introductory section that provides background to the war in Darfur and international engagement, this article examines the debates over the R2P that swirled around the Darfur crisis and operational concepts developed for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and its hybrid successor, the UN,African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), especially during the Abuja peace negotiations. Three operational concepts are examined: ceasefire, disarmament and civilian protection. Unfortunately, the international policy priority o bringing UN troops to Darfur had an adverse impact on the Darfur peace talks without grappling with the central question of what international forces would do to resolve the crisis. Advocacy for the R2P set an unrealistic ideal which became the enemy of achievable goals. [source] Training and Technology TransferAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2003Neil Campbell This paper analyses technology transfer from a multinational corporation (MNC) to a developing economy via training of local workers by the MNC. The paper analyses the determinants of the level of training by the MNC assuming a local entrant can subsequently hire MNC,trained workers and compete with the MNC. It is shown that a small training subsidy paid by the host government may cause the MNC to switch from entry,deterring behaviour to entry,accommodating behaviour. Such a subsidy will cause an increase in the number of skilled workers but may increase or decrease the domestic welfare of the developing country. [source] Child Labour in African Artisanal Mining Communities: Experiences from Northern GhanaDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2010Gavin Hilson ABSTRACT The issue of child labour in the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) economy is attracting significant attention worldwide. This article critically examines this ,problem' in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where a lack of formal sector employment opportunities and/or the need to provide financial support to their impoverished families has led tens of thousands of children to take up work in this industry. The article begins by engaging with the main debates on child labour in an attempt to explain why young boys and girls elect to pursue arduous work in ASM camps across the region. The remainder of the article uses the Ghana experience to further articulate the challenges associated with eradicating child labour at ASM camps, drawing upon recent fieldwork undertaken in Talensi-Nabdam District, Upper East Region. Overall, the issue of child labour in African ASM communities has been diagnosed far too superficially, and until donor agencies and host governments fully come to grips with the underlying causes of the poverty responsible for its existence, it will continue to burgeon. [source] Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution ProvisionsINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2010Todd Allee Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in "legal delegation" to ICSID across BITs and explain this important variation by drawing upon a bargaining framework. Home governments prefer and typically obtain ICSID clauses in their BITs, particularly when internal forces push strongly for such provisions and when they have significantly greater bargaining power than the other signatory. Yet some home governments are less likely to insist upon ICSID clauses if they have historical or military ties with the other government. On the other hand, although host governments are often hostile toward ICSID clauses, particularly when sovereignty costs are high, they are more likely to consent to such clauses when they are heavily constrained by their dependence on the global economy. Our findings have significant implications for those interested in FDI, legalization, international institutions, and interstate bargaining. 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