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Historical Explanation (historical + explanation)
Selected AbstractsThe Psychological Basis of Historical Explanation: Reenactment, Simulation, and the Fusion of HorizonsHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2002Karsten R. Stueber In this article I will challenge a received orthodoxy in the philosophy of social science by showing that Collingwood was right in insisting that reenactment is epistemically central for historical explanations of individual agency. Situating Collingwood within the context of the debate between simulation theory and what has come to be called "theory theory" in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology, I will develop two systematic arguments that attempt to show the essential importance of reenactment for our understanding of rational agency. I will furthermore show that Gadamer's influential critique of the reenactment model distinguishes insufficiently between the interpretation of certain types of texts and the explanation of individual actions. In providing an account of individual agency, we are committed to a realistic understanding of our ordinary scheme of action-explanations and have thus to recognize the centrality of reenactment. Nevertheless, Collingwood's emphasis on reenactment is certainly one-sided. I will demonstrate its limitations even for accounting for individual agency, and show how it has to be supplemented by various theoretical considerations, by analyzing the different explanatory strategies that Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen use to explain the behavior of the ordinary men in Reserve Battalion 101 during World War II. [source] Reconstructing Culture in Historical Explanation: Narratives as Cultural Structure and PracticeHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2000Anne Kane The problem of how to access and deploy the explanatory power of culture in historical accounts has long remained vexing. A recent approach, combining and transcending the "culture as structure"/"culture as practice" divide among social historians, puts explanatory focus on the recursivity of meaning, agency, and structure in historical transformation. This article argues that meaning construction is at the nexus of culture, social structure, and social action, and must be the explicit target of investigation into the cultural dimension of historical explanation. Through an empirical analysis of political alliance during the Irish Land War, 1879,1882, I demonstrate that historians can uncover meaning construction by analyzing the symbolic structures and practices of narrative discourse. [source] Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical ExplanationHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2000John R. Hall One way to recast the problem of cultural explanation in historical inquiry is to distinguish two conceptualizations involving culture: (1) cultural meanings as contents of signification (however theorized) that inform meaningful courses of action in historically unfolding circumstances; and (2) cultural structures as institutionalized patterns of social life that may be elaborated in more than one concrete construction of meaning. This distinction helps to suggest how explanation can operate in accounting for cultural processes of meaning-formation, as well as in other ways that transcend specific meanings, yet are nonetheless cultural. Examples of historical explanation involving each construct are offered, and their potential examined. [source] Historical explanation and the concept of progress in primatologyEVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY, Issue S1 2002Matt Cartmill First page of article [source] Associational links with home among Zimbabweans in the UK: reflections on long-distance nationalismsGLOBAL NETWORKS, Issue 2 2009JOANN MCGREGOR Abstract In this article, I provide an overview of the character of associations formed in Britain by Zimbabweans in the context of the mass exodus that gathered pace from the late 1990s. I discuss the politicization of the Zimbabwe diaspora, which infuses many aspects of associational life beyond specifically political organizations, and also emphasize the importance of Zimbabwean church fellowships. I offer an historical explanation for the strength of nationalism expressed in the diaspora and the absence of ,translocal' associations characteristic of other African diaspora groups, such as hometown associations, and explore reasons why burial societies, which have been centrally important for Zimbabwean migrants in other periods and contexts, are less prevalent in Britain. I build my argument on an historical discussion of continuities and changes in the associational forms characteristic of labour migrancy and urbanization within the southern African region. I emphasize the legacies of a strong segregationist settler state, the mobilizations and international solidarities of the protracted struggle for independence, the Christianization of elite African culture in Zimbabwe's cities, and the international politics of the recent multifaceted crisis. My discussion of the associational expression of ,long distance nationalisms' is based on interviews conducted in 2004,5, participation in diaspora meetings and events, and reading of diaspora media and websites. In the article I aim to highlight the specific social histories of association and the political context of diaspora formation, which are essential for understanding the nature of institutions connecting with home, and ideas about home itself. [source] 3. HISTORIOGRAPHY WITHOUT GOD: A REPLY TO GREGORY,HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2008TOR EGIL FØRLAND ABSTRACT This reply aims both to respond to Gregory and to move forward the debate about God's place in historiography. The first section is devoted to the nature of science and God. Whereas Gregory thinks science is based on metaphysical naturalism with a methodological corollary of critical-realist empiricism, I see critical, empiricist methodology as basic, and naturalism as a consequence. Gregory's exposition of his apophatic theology, in which univocity is eschewed, illustrates the fissure between religious and scientific worldviews,no matter which basic scientific theory one subscribes to. The second section is allotted to miracles. As I do, Gregory thinks no miracle occurred on Fox Lakes in 1652, but he restricts himself to understanding the actors and explaining change over time, and refuses to explain past or contemporary actions and events. Marc Bloch, in his book The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France, is willing to go much further than Gregory. Using his superior medical knowledge to substitute his own explanation of the phenomenon for that of the actors, Bloch dismisses the actors' beliefs that they or others had been miraculously cured, and explains that they believed they saw miraculous healing because they were expecting to see it. In the third section, on historical explanation, I rephrase the question whether historians can accommodate both believers in God and naturalist scientists, asking whether God, acting miraculously or not, can be part of the ideal explanatory text. I reply in the negative, and explicate how the concept of a plural subject suggests how scientists can also be believers. This approach may be compatible with two options presented by Peter Lipton for resolving the tension between religion and science. The first is to see the truth claims of religious texts as untranslatable into scientific language (and vice versa); the other is to immerse oneself in religious texts by accepting them as a guide but not believing in their truth claims when these contradict science. [source] EXPLICATION, EXPLANATION, AND HISTORYHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2008CARL HAMMER ABSTRACT To date, no satisfactory account of the connection between natural-scientific and historical explanation has been given, and philosophers seem to have largely given up on the problem. This paper is an attempt to resolve this old issue and to sort out and clarify some areas of historical explanation by developing and applying a method that will be called "pragmatic explication" involving the construction of definitions that are justified on pragmatic grounds. Explanations in general can be divided into "dynamic" and "static" explanations, which are those that essentially require relations across time and those that do not, respectively. The problem of assimilating historical explanations concerns dynamic explanation, so a general analysis of dynamic explanation that captures both the structure of natural-scientific and historical explanation is offered. This is done in three stages: In the first stage, pragmatic explication is introduced and compared to other philosophical methods of explication. In the second stage pragmatic explication is used to tie together a series of definitions that are introduced in order to establish an account of explanation. This involves an investigation of the conditions that play the role in historiography that laws and statistical regularities play in the natural sciences. The essay argues that in the natural sciences, as well as in history, the model of explanation presented represents the aims and overarching structure of actual causal explanations offered in those disciplines. In the third stage the system arrived at in the preceding stage is filled in with conditions available to and relevant for historical inquiry. Further, the nature and treatment of causes in history and everyday life are explored and related to the system being proposed. This in turn makes room for a view connecting aspects of historical explanation and what we generally take to be causal relations. [source] THE PRICE OF METAPHORHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2005JOSEPH FRACCHIA ABSTRACT In his critical response to our skeptical inquiry, "Does Culture Evolve?" (History and Theory, Theme Issue 38 [December 1999], 52,78), W. G. Runciman affirms that "Culture Does Evolve." However, we find nothing in his essay that convinces us to alter our initial position. And we must confess that in composing an answer to Runciman, our first temptation was simply to urge those interested to read our original article,both as a basis for evaluating Runciman's attempted refutation of it and as a framework for reading this essay, which addresses in greater detail issues we have already raised. Runciman views the "selectionist paradigm" as a "scientific""puzzle-solving device" now validated by an "expanding literature" that has successfully modeled social and cultural change as "evolutionary." All paradigms, however, including scientific ones, give rise to self-validating "normal science." The real issue, accordingly, is not whether explanations can be successfully manufactured on the basis of paradigmatic assumptions, but whether the paradigmatic assumptions are appropriate to the object of analysis. The selectionist paradigm requires the reduction of society and culture to inheritance systems that consist of randomly varying, individual units, some of which are selected, and some not; and with society and culture thus reduced to inheritance systems, history can be reduced to "evolution." But these reductions, which are required by the selectionist paradigm, exclude much that is essential to a satisfactory historical explanation,particularly the systemic properties of society and culture and the combination of systemic logic and contingency. Now as before, therefore, we conclude that while historical phenomena can always be modeled selectionistically, selectionist explanations do no work, nor do they contribute anything new except a misleading vocabulary that anesthetizes history. [source] Reconstructing Culture in Historical Explanation: Narratives as Cultural Structure and PracticeHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2000Anne Kane The problem of how to access and deploy the explanatory power of culture in historical accounts has long remained vexing. A recent approach, combining and transcending the "culture as structure"/"culture as practice" divide among social historians, puts explanatory focus on the recursivity of meaning, agency, and structure in historical transformation. This article argues that meaning construction is at the nexus of culture, social structure, and social action, and must be the explicit target of investigation into the cultural dimension of historical explanation. Through an empirical analysis of political alliance during the Irish Land War, 1879,1882, I demonstrate that historians can uncover meaning construction by analyzing the symbolic structures and practices of narrative discourse. [source] Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical ExplanationHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2000John R. Hall One way to recast the problem of cultural explanation in historical inquiry is to distinguish two conceptualizations involving culture: (1) cultural meanings as contents of signification (however theorized) that inform meaningful courses of action in historically unfolding circumstances; and (2) cultural structures as institutionalized patterns of social life that may be elaborated in more than one concrete construction of meaning. This distinction helps to suggest how explanation can operate in accounting for cultural processes of meaning-formation, as well as in other ways that transcend specific meanings, yet are nonetheless cultural. Examples of historical explanation involving each construct are offered, and their potential examined. [source] The biogeography of Gunnera L.: vicariance and dispersalJOURNAL OF BIOGEOGRAPHY, Issue 7 2003Livia Wanntorp Abstract Aim The genus Gunnera is distributed in South America, Africa and the Australasian region, a few species reaching Hawaii and southern Mexico in the North. A cladogram was used to (1) discuss the biogeography of Gunnera and (2) subsequently compare this biogeographical pattern with the geological history of continents and the patterns reported for other Southern Hemisphere organisms. Location Africa, northern South America, southern South America, Tasmania, New Zealand, New Guinea/Malaya, Hawaii, North America, Antarctica. Methods A phylogenetic analysis of twenty-six species of Gunnera combining morphological characters and new as well as published sequences of the ITS region, rbcL and the rps16 intron, was used to interpret the biogeographical patterns in Gunnera. Vicariance was applied in the first place and dispersal was only assumed as a second best explanation. Results The Uruguayan/Brazilian Gunnera herteri Osten (subgenus Ostenigunnera Mattfeld) is sister to the rest of the genus, followed sequentially upwards by the African G. perpensa L. (subgenus Gunnera), in turn sister to all other, American and Australasian, species. These are divided into two clades, one containing American/Hawaiian species, the other containing all Australasian species. Within the Australasian clade, G. macrophylla Blume (subgenus Pseudogunnera Schindler), occurring in New Guinea and Malaya, is sister to a clade including the species from New Zealand and Tasmania (subgenus Milligania Schindler). The southern South American subgenus Misandra Schindler is sister to a clade containing the remaining American, as well as the Hawaiian species (subgenus Panke Schindler). Within subgenus Panke, G. mexicana Brandegee, the only North American species in the genus, is sister to a clade wherein the Hawaiian species are basal to all south and central American taxa. Main conclusions According to the cladogram, South America appears in two places, suggesting an historical explanation for northern South America to be separate from southern South America. Following a well-known biogeographical pattern of vicariance, Africa is the sister area to the combined southern South America/Australasian clade. Within the Australasian clade, New Zealand is more closely related to New Guinea/Malaya than to southern South America, a pattern found in other plant cladograms, contradictory to some of the patterns supported by animal clades and by the geological hypothesis, respectively. The position of the Tasmanian G. cordifolia, nested within the New Zealand clade indicates dispersal of this species to Tasmania. The position of G. mexicana, the only North American species, as sister to the remaining species of subgenus Panke together with the subsequent sister relation between Hawaii and southern South America, may reflect a North American origin of Panke and a recolonization of South America from the north. This is in agreement with the early North American fossil record of Gunnera and the apparent young age of the South American clade. [source] SUCCESS, TRUTH, AND MODERNISM IN HOLOCAUST HISTORIOGRAPHY: READING SAUL FRIEDLÄNDER THIRTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF METAHISTORY,HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2009WULF KANSTEINER ABSTRACT This essay provides a close reading of Saul Friedländer's exceptionally successful comprehensive history of the Holocaust from the theoretical perspective of Hayden White's philosophy of history. Friedländer's The Years of Extermination has been celebrated as the first synthetic history of the "Final Solution" that acknowledges the experiences of the victims of Nazi genocide. But Friedländer has not simply added the voices of the victims to a conventional historical account of the Holocaust. Instead, by displacing linear notions of time and space and subtly deconstructing conventional concepts of causality, he has invented a new type of historical prose that performs rather than analyzes the victims' point of view. Friedländer's innovation has particularly radical consequences for the construction of historical explanations. On the one hand, Friedländer explicitly argues that anti-Semitism was the single most important cause of the Holocaust. On the other hand, his transnational, multifaceted history of the "Final Solution" provides a wealth of data that escapes the conceptual grasp of his explicit model of causation. Friedländer chooses this radically self-reflexive strategy of historical representation to impress on the reader the existential sense of disbelief with which the victims experienced Nazi persecution. To Friedländer, that sense of disbelief constitutes the most appropriate ethical response to the Holocaust. Thus the narratological analysis of The Years of Extermination reveals that the exceptional quality of the book, as well as presumably its success, is the result of an extraordinarily creative act of narrative imagination. Or, put into terms developed by White, who shares Friedländer's appreciation of modernist forms of writing, The Years of Extermination is the first modernist history of the Holocaust that captures, through literary figuration, an important and long neglected reality of the "Final Solution." [source] INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, INCONCEIVABILITY, AND METHODOLOGICAL HOLISM,HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2007BRANKO MITROVI ABSTRACT The debate between individualism and holism in the philosophy of history pertains to the nature of the entities relied on in historical explanations. The question is whether explanations of historical items (for example, events, actions, artifacts) require the assumption that the collective historical entities (for example, civilizations, cultures, and so on) used in these explanations are (sometimes) conceived of as irreducible to the actions, thoughts, and beliefs of individual human beings. In this paper I analyze two methodological problems that holist explanations face in the writing of intellectual history. The first problem derives from the fact that holist explanations in intellectual history have to rely on the claim that certain beliefs were inconceivable to some individuals because they were members of specific collectives, whereas it is unclear how historical research can justify such claims when made from the holist position. The second problem pertains to the difficulties the holist position faces when it has to account for the novel properties of artifacts studied by intellectual history. [source] The Psychological Basis of Historical Explanation: Reenactment, Simulation, and the Fusion of HorizonsHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2002Karsten R. Stueber In this article I will challenge a received orthodoxy in the philosophy of social science by showing that Collingwood was right in insisting that reenactment is epistemically central for historical explanations of individual agency. Situating Collingwood within the context of the debate between simulation theory and what has come to be called "theory theory" in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology, I will develop two systematic arguments that attempt to show the essential importance of reenactment for our understanding of rational agency. I will furthermore show that Gadamer's influential critique of the reenactment model distinguishes insufficiently between the interpretation of certain types of texts and the explanation of individual actions. In providing an account of individual agency, we are committed to a realistic understanding of our ordinary scheme of action-explanations and have thus to recognize the centrality of reenactment. Nevertheless, Collingwood's emphasis on reenactment is certainly one-sided. I will demonstrate its limitations even for accounting for individual agency, and show how it has to be supplemented by various theoretical considerations, by analyzing the different explanatory strategies that Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen use to explain the behavior of the ordinary men in Reserve Battalion 101 during World War II. [source] Time and space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil diasporaNATIONS AND NATIONALISM, Issue 2 2001Øivind Fuglerud Based upon fieldwork in Sri Lanka and among Tamil migrants in Norway, this article discusses the relationship between space, time and national identity. The author argues that in the Sri Lanka-Tamil diaspora one finds two different conceptions of Tamil culture, the ,traditional' and the ,revolutionary'. The first expresses a space-time relationship that is nomadic and grounded in heritage; the second one is sedentary and historicist. The latter serves as a basis for Tamil separatism, the first does not. By propagating the ,revolutionary' model of culture, with its particular understanding of space and time, the Tamil separatist movement Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has adopted viewpoints that throughout this century have fuelled the nationalism of the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. The author argues that instead of explaining social change historically, which is one trend within anthropological theory today, anthropologists should concentrate on exploring under which conditions historical explanations are seen as more valid than their alternatives. [source] | ||||||||||