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Alternative Argument (alternative + argument)
Selected AbstractsHölder continuity for two-phase flows in porous mediaMATHEMATICAL METHODS IN THE APPLIED SCIENCES, Issue 11 2006Li-Ming Yeh Abstract This work is to prove the Hölder continuity of the solutions of the degenerate differential equations describing two-phase, incompressible, immiscible flows in porous media. The differential equations allow degeneracy at two end points and the assumption on mild degeneracy is not required in this study. The regularity result is proved by an alternative argument. Uniqueness of the weak solutions of the differential equations is a direct consequence from this Hölder continuity. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd [source] Locke, Sincerity and the Rationality of PersecutionPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2003Paul Bou-Habib According to the most influential contemporary reading of John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), his main argument against religious persecution is unsuccessful. That argument holds that coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling religious beliefs in its victims. I propose a different reading of the Letter. Locke's main consideration against persecution is not the unsuccessful belief-based argument just outlined, but what I call the sincerity argument. He believes that religious coercion is irrational because it is ineffective as a means of inculcating the right intentions in people. Once this alternative argument is placed at its centre, the Letter is seen to be a more fertile source of political argument than is suggested by alternative readings. In particular, the sincerity argument gives us a powerful reason for rejecting state moral paternalism, the doctrine that the state may use coercion to make people morally virtuous. If moral virtue depends upon people having the right intentions, and if coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling the right intentions in people, then state moral paternalism is ineffective and hence irrational. [source] THE UBIQUITY OF DECEPTION AND THE ETHICS OF DECEPTIVE RESEARCHBIOETHICS, Issue 3 2008BRYAN BENHAM ABSTRACT Does the fact that deception is widely practised , even though there is a general prohibition against deception , provide insight into the ethics of deceptive methods in research, especially for social-behavioral research? I answer in the affirmative. The ubiquity of deception argument, as I will call it, points to the need for a concrete and nuanced understanding of the variety of deceptive practices, and thus promises an alternative route of analysis for why some deception may be permissible in social-behavioral research. As an alternative argument it also promises to break the stalemate that emerges in debates on the ethics of deceptive methods in social-behavioral research. In the current paper I (1) motivate and articulate the ubiquity argument in order to clarify the significance of ubiquity and discharge some initial objections. Then, on the recommendations of the ubiquity argument, I (2) highlight the importance of interpersonal relationships for understanding the ethics of deception. Following this insight I (3) provide an analysis of several features of the researcher-participant relationship relevant to the understanding of the ethics of deception in research. I then (4) conclude the argument with some recommendations for the ethical use of deceptive methods in social-behavioral research. [source] Can We Derive the Principle of Compositionality (if We Deflate Understanding)?DIALECTICA, Issue 2 2009Antonio Rauti Paul Horwich has claimed that we can derive a certain form of the principle of compositionality from a deflationary account of what it is to understand a complex expression. If this were the case, we would realize a surprising theoretical economy, and if the derivation involved basic ideas from a use theory of meaning, we would have a novel argument for use theories of meaning. Horwich does not offer a detailed derivation. In this paper I reconstruct a possible derivation and show that it begs the question. I then extend my discussion to explain why it is unlikely that alternative arguments can fare better. [source] | ||||||||||