Government Ownership (government + ownership)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Impact of Government Ownership on Investment Banks' Underwriting Performance: Evidence from China,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2010
Ning Jia
G21; G24; G28 Abstract This paper examines the effect of government ownership on investment banks' underwriting performance in China. A large number of Chinese investment banks are owned and controlled by their respective regional governments. While regional governments may capitalize on their superior local knowledge and administrative power to help affiliated investment banks identify and land high quality local issuers, they may also leverage affiliated underwriters to facilitate the capital market access of those underperformed but socially and/or politically desirable local firms. Empirical evidence favors the latter hypothesis. Specifically, using a sample of regional IPOs, we find that issuers underwritten by their respective regional government-affiliated investment banks exhibit lower earnings quality and poorer long-term performance compared with those underwritten by unaffiliated investment banks. However, this difference is attenuated after the abolition of the IPO quota system. Examination of underwriting fees and issuers' shareholder identity provides additional evidence supporting the latter hypothesis. [source]


Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing Economies: concepts and issues

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2004
T. G. Arun
This paper discusses the corporate governance of banking institutions in developing economies. This is an important issue given the essential role that banks play in the financial systems of developing economies and the widespread banking reforms that these economies have implemented. Based on a theoretical discussion of the corporate governance of banks, we suggest that banking reforms can only be fully implemented once a prudential regulatory system is in place. An integral part of banking reforms in developing economies is the privatisation of banks. We suggest that corporate governance reforms may be a prerequisite for the successful divestiture of government ownership. Furthermore, we also suggest that the increased competition resulting from the entrance of foreign banks may improve the corporate governance of developing-economy banks. [source]


The Bangladesh Health SWAp: Experience of a New Aid Instrument in Practice

DEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 4 2007
Howard White
Sector-wide approaches are being widely adopted as a new aid modality, incorporating government ownership, partnership and a move from project to programme support. The literature to date on their performance in practice is, at best, mixed. This article reviews these issues in the light of the experience of arguably the world's oldest and largest SWAp, the Bangladesh health sector programme. A positive picture emerges of an evolutionary institutional adaptation towards a programme approach, with positive systemic effects on government processes and a reduction in transaction costs in dealing with donors. There are, however, negative aspects, notably, donor dominance in ,dialogue', though with limited influence on the government's actual strategy. [source]


Changes in per capita alcohol sales during the partial privatization of British Columbia's retail alcohol monopoly 2003,2008: a multi-level local area analysis

ADDICTION, Issue 11 2009
Tim Stockwell
ABSTRACT Aim To investigate the independent effects on liquor sales of an increase in (a) the density of liquor outlets and (b) the proportion of liquor stores in private rather than government ownership in British Columbia between 2003/4 and 2007/8. Design The British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch provided data on litres of ethanol sold through different types of outlets in 89 local health areas of the province by beverage type. Multi-level regression models were used to examine the relationship between per capita alcohol sales and outlet densities for different types of liquor outlet after adjusting for potential confounding social, economic and demographic factors as well as spatial and temporal autocorrelation. Setting Liquor outlets in 89 local health areas of British Columbia, Canada. Findings The number of private stores per 10 000 residents was associated significantly and positively with per capita sales of ethanol in beer, coolers, spirits and wine, while the reverse held for government liquor stores. Significant positive effects were also identified for the number of bars and restaurants per head of population. The percentage of liquor stores in private versus government ownership was also associated significantly with per capita alcohol sales when controlling for density of liquor stores and of on-premise outlets (P < 0.01). Conclusion The trend towards privatisation of liquor outlets between 2003/04 and 2007/08 in British Columbia has contributed to increased per capita sales of alcohol and hence possibly also to increased alcohol-related harm. [source]


Debt financing, soft budget constraints, and government ownership Evidence from China1

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 3 2007
Lihui Tian
G32; G34; P34 Abstract Debt financing is expected to improve the quality of corporate governance, but we find, using a large sample of public listed companies (PLCs) from China, that an increase in bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and free cash flows and decreases corporate efficiency. We find that bank lending facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth in government-controlled firms, but constrains managerial agency costs in firms controlled by private owners. We argue that the failure of corporate governance may derive from the shared government ownership of lenders and borrowers, which nurtures soft budget constraints. [source]


Public Sector Banks in India: Rationale and Prerequisites for reform

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2002
T.G. Arun
This paper contributes to the debate on public sector banks by suggesting several rationales for government ownership of banks in India. The paper then proceeds to argue that due to high economic costs, the current public sector banking system is unsustainable. Although a policy of wider private ownership was introduced in the 1990s, it is suggested that there are several prerequisites to be met before such a reform can be more fully implemented. It is argued that these prerequisites arise from the rationales for government ownership, and they include a credible bank regulatory regime, and government promotion of co-operative banks and credit unions. [source]


Impact of Government Ownership on Investment Banks' Underwriting Performance: Evidence from China,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2010
Ning Jia
G21; G24; G28 Abstract This paper examines the effect of government ownership on investment banks' underwriting performance in China. A large number of Chinese investment banks are owned and controlled by their respective regional governments. While regional governments may capitalize on their superior local knowledge and administrative power to help affiliated investment banks identify and land high quality local issuers, they may also leverage affiliated underwriters to facilitate the capital market access of those underperformed but socially and/or politically desirable local firms. Empirical evidence favors the latter hypothesis. Specifically, using a sample of regional IPOs, we find that issuers underwritten by their respective regional government-affiliated investment banks exhibit lower earnings quality and poorer long-term performance compared with those underwritten by unaffiliated investment banks. However, this difference is attenuated after the abolition of the IPO quota system. Examination of underwriting fees and issuers' shareholder identity provides additional evidence supporting the latter hypothesis. [source]


Organizational Flexibility in Western and Asian Firms: An Examination of Control and Safeguard Rules in Five Countries

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, Issue 1 2001
Ignace Ng
This paper examines the influence of family and government ownerships and of labour unions on the adoption of control and safeguard rules in Asian (Hong Kong, Korea, and Malaysia) and Western (Australia and Canada) organizations. Following Ng and Dastmalchian (1998), control rules are those rules applied to employees and their behaviour at work, whereas safeguard rules are designed to address managerial discretion. Using data from 119 organizations, of which 58 are from Asia and the remaining 61 from the West, the results show that, contrary to general expectations, government organizations from both regions are no more rules-oriented than their non-government counterparts. Another unexpected finding is that unionized Asian organizations have fewer safeguard rules, not only in comparison with nonunion Asian firms but also relative to unionized Western organizations. The results also show that Asian family organizations have fewer safeguard rules in comparison with both other Asian firms and other family firms in the West. Résumé Cette étude évalue l'influence que peuvent avoir les syn-dicats, les sociétés d'état et les grandes firmes familiales sur l'adoption de règies de conduite et de précaution dans un nombre de sociétés en Asie (Hong Hong, Corée du Sud, la Malaisie) et en Occident (au Canada et en Australie). Conformément aux précisions formulées dans Ng and Dastmalchian (1998), nous entendons par règies de conduites celles qui gouvernent le comporte-ment des employés au travail, tandis que par règies de précaution nous désignons celles qui ont pour objet la marge de manoeuvre des gestionnaires. En basant nos données sur 119 sociétés, dont 58 en Asie et 61 au Canada et en Australie, nos résultats démontrent que, con-trairement aux attentes générates, les sociétés d'état dans ces deux aires géographiques ne sont pas plus lourdement réglementées que leurs homologues non-gouvernementaux. Autre surprise: les sociétés en Asie dont la main d'oeuvre n'est pas syndiquée ont moins de régies de précaution, non settlement par rapport avec les organismes non-syndiqués en Asie, mais aussi en com-paraison des sociétés syndiqués au Canada et Australie. Enfin, les résultats démontrent aussi que les grandes firmes familiales en Asie ont moins de règies de précaution que les autres sociétés d'Asie et que les firmes familiales au Canada et en Australie. [source]