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Governance Structures (governance + structure)
Selected AbstractsFirm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy*JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 6 2006Michael Firth abstract Recent research has argued that political and regulatory environments have a significant impact on corporate governance systems. In particular, countries with poor investor protection laws and weak law enforcement have low levels of corporate governance that manifests itself in substandard financial performance, management entrenchment, and the expropriation of minority shareholders. One implication of this research is that China will have poor corporate governance and entrenched managers as its legal system is relatively underdeveloped and inefficient. However, using data on top management turnover in China's listed firms, our results refute the prediction of entrenched management. We find evidence of very high turnover of company chairmen and there are many cases that we interpret to be forced departures. Our results show that chairman turnover is related to a firm's profitability but not to its stock returns. Turnover-performance sensitivity is higher if legal entities are major shareholders but the proportion of non-executive directors perversely affects it. We find no evidence that profitability improves after a change in chairman and this suggests that a firm's governance structure is ineffective as it is unable to recruit suitable replacements that can turn around its financial performance. [source] Redesigning Corporate Governance Structures and Systems for the Twenty First CenturyCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001Robert A.G. Monks How a corporation is governed has become in recent years an increasingly important element in how it is valued by the market place. McKinsey & Company in June 2000 published the results of an Investor Opinion Survey of attitudes about the corporate governance of portfolio companies. The survey gathered responses about investment intentions from over 200 institutions who together manage approximately $3.25 trillion in assets. Ranging from 17 per cent in the US and Britain to over 27 per cent in Venezuela, investors placed a specific premium on what was called "Board Governance". To put this into perspective, consider how greatly sales would have to increase, expenses be cut and margins improved to achieve a comparable impact on value. "For purposes of the survey, a well governed company is defined as having a majority of outside directors on the board with no management ties; holding formal evaluations of directors; and being responsive to investor requests for information on governance issues. In addition, directors hold significant stockholdings in the company, and a large proportion of directors' pay is in the form of stock options." This correlation of governance with market value by one of the most respected consulting companies in the world creates the foundations of a new language for management accountability. McKinsey has great credibility as a value-adding advisor to corporate managements. Governance is not a cause or a theology for McKinsey; it is an important element in the value of an enterprise. By getting the opinion of what we call Global Investors with portfolios of holdings on every continent, McKinsey has importantly impacted the cost of capital for all corporations henceforth. Admittedly, McKinsey's criteria of "board governance" are blunt. "Every organization attempting to accomplish something has to ask and answer the following question," writes Harvard Business School professor Michael C. Jensen in the introduction to his recent working paper: "What are we trying to accomplish? Or, put even more simply: When all is said and done, how do we measure better versus worse? Even more simply: How do we keep score... . I say long-term market value to recognize that it is possible for markets not to know the full implications of a firm's policies until they begin to show up.... Value creation does not mean succumbing to the vagaries of the movements in a firm's values from day to day. The market is inevitably ignorant of many of our actions and opportunities, at least in the short run...". Surprisingly little attention is paid to what we all intuitively know, that talented people are not entirely motivated by financial compensation. Directors therefore must pay special attention to creating an appropriate environment for stimulating optimum management performance. [source] Torres Strait Governance Structures and the Centenary of Australian Federation: A Missed Opportunity?AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 3 2000Will Sanders In his 1993 Boyer lecture, Getano Lui Jnr called for a change in the status of Torres Strait governance structures within the Australian federation, nominating the centenary of Federation on 1 January 2001 as a possible time for change. In 1996, the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs initiated a parliamentary committee inquiry into greater autonomy for the people of the Torres Strait, which reported favourably in 1997. This report was not, however, greeted all that favourably by Torres Strait Islanders and it now seems unlikely that any significantly new governance structures for Torres Strait will be in place by the centenary of Federation. This paper attempts to explain why. [source] To Manage Is to GovernPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 5 2002Martha S. Feldman Governance structures constrain and enable the actions of public managers. Principal,agent theory has played a dominant role in our understanding of governance structures. This theory suggests that politicians create relatively static governance structures in a top,down fashion and hold managers accountable for mandated results. In other words, public managers are influenced by governance structures but do not affect governance structures. However, we argue that public managers do affect governance structures, and, in order to understand how this influence takes place, we need a new way of thinking about governance structures. We propose thinking about governance structures as relationships created through the interactions of people in different and reciprocal roles that are relatively dynamic. Public managers are an important source of the multiple, reciprocal, and dynamic interactions that produce governance (relationship) structures. As such, managers are accountable not only for policy outcomes, but also for the appropriateness of the relationships they create and support. [source] The Role of the Venture Capitalist as Monitor of the Company: a corporate governance perspectiveCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2002L.A.A. Van den Berghe The monitoring and stewardship role of the owner is an important corporate governance issue that deserves far more attention. Our analysis focuses on the role of the venture capitalist (VC) as monitor of high,tech venture,backed companies. We provide evidence from the literature as well as a qualitative descriptive view of the experiences of Belgian VCs. The position of the VC sheds more light on the plenitude of roles an active owner can play. Furthermore, our findings highlight the need for a better understanding of the governance structure and processes of high,tech companies. [source] Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United KingdomACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Chrisostomos Florackis G3; G32 Abstract This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999,2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure. [source] The Value-relevance of Earnings and Book Value, Ownership Structure, and Business Group Affiliation: Evidence From Korean Business GroupsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 5-6 2007Kee-Hong Bae Abstract:, We investigate the quality of two primary accounting summary measures, i.e., earnings and book value, provided by firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols). We find that the value-relevance of earnings and book value is significantly smaller for firms affiliated with business groups. We also find that cross-equity ownership (a proxy for the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders) negatively affects value-relevance, while foreign equity ownership (a proxy for the monitoring effect) positively affects value-relevance. This evidence is consistent with the view that the poor quality of earnings and book value provided by chaebol-affiliated firms is due to the inherently poor governance structure of chaebols. [source] Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy*JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 6 2006Michael Firth abstract Recent research has argued that political and regulatory environments have a significant impact on corporate governance systems. In particular, countries with poor investor protection laws and weak law enforcement have low levels of corporate governance that manifests itself in substandard financial performance, management entrenchment, and the expropriation of minority shareholders. One implication of this research is that China will have poor corporate governance and entrenched managers as its legal system is relatively underdeveloped and inefficient. However, using data on top management turnover in China's listed firms, our results refute the prediction of entrenched management. We find evidence of very high turnover of company chairmen and there are many cases that we interpret to be forced departures. Our results show that chairman turnover is related to a firm's profitability but not to its stock returns. Turnover-performance sensitivity is higher if legal entities are major shareholders but the proportion of non-executive directors perversely affects it. We find no evidence that profitability improves after a change in chairman and this suggests that a firm's governance structure is ineffective as it is unable to recruit suitable replacements that can turn around its financial performance. [source] The Purchasing and Control of Supplementary Third-Party Logistics ServicesJOURNAL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2000Remko I. van Hoek SUMMARY Mass customization poses a challenge to the development of competitive supply chains. Third-party logistics service providers are targeting customizing operations to supplement their transport and warehousing services. Their expansion is driven by strategies for adding value and upgrading customer relations. This article assesses the development of these relations by presenting the results of a survey conducted among service providers. The assessment covers the nature of the purchasing policy and governance structure applied in this particular type of interfirm relations, including the type of services, contracts, frequency, level, and content of coordination and communication among parties in the chain. It was found that the new transactional context does not represent a market environment in which third parties can escape traditional arm's-length fixed contracts. It was also found that supplementary customizing services are not often applied. Recommendations are made about purchasing these services and about initiatives for third parties to start expanding their competence within the governance structure. [source] Extending the Resource-based View to the Mega-event: Entrepreneurial Rents and InnovationMANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION REVIEW, Issue 2 2010Marc J. Dollinger abstract The resource-based view of the firm has previously been expanded by including relational rents and rent from network and alliance participation. This paper extends the Dyer-Singh-Lavie synthesis by considering the special circumstances arising from the relationships, alliances, and networks of a mega-event, using the Beijing Olympics as a case for our analyses. The mega-event that is organized as a cartel increases the pricing power of the participants, produces relational rent, and is an ideal venue to introduce innovations. We discuss six factors that can influence the rent creation and capture from a mega-event and offer related propositions: periodicity (Proposition 1), event location (Proposition 2), governance structure (Proposition 3), media coverage (Proposition 4), network connectivity (Proposition 5), and membership rules (Proposition 6). We identify four innovation types associated with such mega-events and contend that the same factors can affect the entrepreneurial rent creation and capture within these innovation types (Proposition 7). [source] Structuring residual income and decision rights under internal governance: results from the Hungarian trucking industryMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2005Josef Windsperger The paper offers a property rights and monitoring cost explanation for the allocation of residual income and decision rights between the carriers and truck drivers under internal governance. First, by applying the property rights theory, we argue that the structure of residual income rights depends on the importance of noncontractible (intangible) assets of the truck driver to generate residual surplus. The more important the truck driver's intangible knowledge assets, the more residual income rights should be transferred to him. Second, we controlled for the monitoring costs as an additional explanatory variable of the allocation of residual income rights. According to agency theory, the variable proportion of the driver's income should be higher where monitoring costs are higher. Third, we investigate the relationship between residual income and residual decision rights under internal governance. If the contractual relation is governed by an employment contract, residual decision and residual income rights may be substitutes because, under fiat, a certain incentive effect of the governance structure may result either from the allocation of high-powered incentives or the transfer of residual decision rights to the driver. These hypotheses were tested by using data from the Hungarian trucking industry. The data provide partial support for the hypotheses. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Understanding the changing role of public sector performance measurement in less developed countriesPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 3 2010Sandra Tillema Abstract This article develops a framework for understanding changes in the demand for and supply of performance information in public sector organizations in less developed countries (LDCs). New Institutional Sociology (NIS) is used to argue that pressures from specific stakeholders stimulate organizations to produce particular performance information. The article distinguishes three groups of stakeholders (i.e. funding bodies, statutory boards and purchasers), and elaborates on the performance dimensions these stakeholders are interested in. The group of funding bodies, with their interest in financial performance information, used to be the most important group of stakeholders. However, statutory boards and purchasers are gaining importance as a result of recent public sector reforms, which include decentralization, marketization and the implementation of anti-corruption programs. As a consequence of pressures coming from these stakeholders, new performance dimensions, such as the quality and quantity of services and the political governance structure, will be added to organizations' performance measurement (PM) systems. Whether these and other,often more traditional financial,performance dimensions will be balanced and integrated throughout organizations depends on the power positions of the various stakeholders. The arguments presented in this article intend to stimulate public sector organizations in LDCs to design and redesign PM systems as a response to changing stakeholder interests. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock RepurchasesREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010Chinmoy Ghosh This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers. [source] Coordination failure, property rights and non-profit organizationsANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2000Bernard Enjolras This paper advances a socio-economic theory of nonprofit organizations aiming at conceiving this organizational form in its complexity and at analysing it from both the viewpoints of its economical and political (democratic) dimensions. This theoretical approach accounts for the existence of nonprofit organizations and the reasons why nonprofit organizations are relatively more efficient when compared with for-profit and government organizations in particular circumstances. The various current explanations of the existence of nonprofit organizations (contract failure, government failure, philanthropic failure) are regrouped around the concept of coordination failure. The paper then examines how nonprofit organizations are able to mitigate these coordination failures. The central thesis is that the specific distribution of property rights characterizing nonprofit organizations results in a particular type of governance structure which allows them to mitigate coordination failures. In turn, the ability of the organization to mitigate coordination failures and therefore its efficiency is conditioned on its democratic functioning. [source] How to Make the Japanese Public Pension System Reliable and WorkableASIAN ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2009Noriyuki TAKAYAMA G23; G38; H55 This paper has two objectives. The first is to identify current problems in Japan's pension administration. The chief problem is a weak governance structure. In particular, the current governance structure ignores the role of pension participants. A rigorous division and clear assignment of responsibilities to each of the pension participants, the Social Insurance Agency, and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare is urgently needed. Given rapid demographic change, the second objective is to consider the case for full tax financing of the National Basic Pension. It is estimated that the net burden would vary across different cohorts, but we demonstrate that the net burden can be smoothed across different cohorts. This result is quite different from that in the 2008 Interim Report of the Japanese National Council on Social Security. [source] Corporate Governance and Business Ethics: insights from the strategic planning experience*CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2005Ingrid Bonn In this paper we develop an integrated approach towards corporate governance and business ethics. Our central argument is that organisations can learn from the development of strategic planning in the 1970s and 1980s. We identify three weaknesses , a bureaucratic and formalised approach, lack of implementation and lack of integration throughout the organisation , which were prevalent in strategic planning in the past and which are potentially just as problematic for an integrated corporate governance approach to business ethics. We suggest ways these weaknesses might be avoided and provide questions for boards of directors to consider when integrating ethical concerns into their organisations' corporate governance structures. [source] Learning from Difference: Considerations for Schools as CommunitiesCURRICULUM INQUIRY, Issue 3 2000Carolyn M. Shields In today's highly complex and heterogeneous public schools, the current notion of schools as homogeneous communities with shared beliefs, norms, and alues is inadequate. Drawing on Barth's (1990) question of how to use ifference as a resource, I take up ideas from feminism, multiculturalism, and inclusive education to consider the development of community in schools. I argue that despite the valuable contributions of these theoretical perspectives, each lso includes the potential for increased fragmentation and polarization. As we consider how to use differences as a foundation for community, it is important ot to reify any particular perspective, thus marginalizing others and erecting new barriers. Explicitly embracing the need to identify and respect difference, being open to new ideas without taking an exclusionary position, and committing to ongoing participation in dialogical processes may help schools to develop as more authentic communities of difference. Among the dominant issues identified in today's climate of turbulent educational reform are concerns about how to restructure schools to ensure equality of student opportunity and excellence of instruction (Elmore, 1990; Lieberman, 1992; Murphy, 1991). Many proposals include modifying present leadership and governance structures, overcoming the hegemony of existing power bases, developing mechanisms for accountability, enhancing professionalism, and co-ordinating community resources. One of the suggestions frequently made to address these issues is to change from a focus on schools as organizations to a recognition of schools as communities (Barth, 1990; Fullan, 1993; Lupart & Webber, 1996; Senge, 1990). However, despite the widespread use of the metaphor of community as an alternative to the generally accepted concept of schools as rational or functional organizations, there seems to be little clarity about the concept of community, what it might look like, how it might be implemented, or what policies might sustain it. Indeed, theories about schools as communities have often drawn from Tönnies (1887/1971) concept of gemeinschaft,a concept which perhaps evokes a more homogeneous and romanticized view of the past than one which could be helpful for improving education in today's dynamic, complex, and heterogeneous context (Beck & Kratzer, 1994; Sergiovanni, 1994a). More recently, several writers (Fine et al., 1997; Furman, 1998; Shields & Seltzer, 1997) have advanced the notion of communities of otherness or difference. These authors have suggested that rather than thinking of schools as communities that exist because of a common affiliation to an established school ethos or tradition, it might be more helpful to explore an alternative concept. A school community founded on difference would be one in which the common centre would not be taken as a given but would be co-constructed from the negotiation of disparate beliefs and values as participants learn to respect, and to listen to, each other. In this concept, bonds among members are not assumed, but forged, and boundaries are not imposed but negotiated. Over the past eight years, as I have visited and worked with a large number of schools trying earnestly to address the needs of their diverse student bodies, I have become increasingly aware of the limitations of the concept of community used in the gemeinschaft sense with its emphasis on shared values, norms, and beliefs, and have begun to reflect on the question framed by Barth (1990): ,How can we make conscious, deliberate use of differences in social class, gender, age, ability, race, and interest as resources for learning?' (p. 514). In this article, I consider how learning from three of these areas of difference: gender, race, and ability, may help us to a better understanding of educational community. This article begins with some illustrations and examples from practice, moves to consider how some theoretical perspectives may illuminate them, and concludes with reflections on how the implications of the combined reflections on practice and theory might actually help to reconceptualize and to improve practice. While it draws heavily on questions and impressions which have arisen out of much of my fieldwork, it is not intended to be an empirical paper, but a conceptual one,one which promotes reflection and discussion on the concept of schools as communities of difference. The examples of life in schools taken from longitudinal research studies in which I have been involved demonstrate several common ways in which difference is dealt with in today's schools and some of the problems inherent in these approaches. Some ideas drawn from alternative perspectives then begin to address Barth's question of how to make deliberate use of diversity as a way of thinking about community. Taken together, I hope that these ideas will be helpful in creating what I have elsewhere called ,schools as communities of difference' (Shields & Seltzer, 1997). [source] Curricular Planning along the Fault Line between Instrumental and Academic Agendas: A Response to the Report of the Modern Language Association on Foreign Languages and Higher Education: New Structures for a Changed World,DIE UNTERRICHTSPRAXIS/TEACHING GERMAN, Issue 2 2009Ingeborg Walther In calling for new governance structures and unified curricula, the MLA Report distinguishes between instrumental and constitutive views of language that characterize our often schizophrenic agendas of language acquisition on the one hand, and disciplinary knowledge on the other. This paper explores some common theoretical insights from the fields of language acquisition and cultural studies that interrogate these views, providing a basis for sustained collaboration around curricula among faculty on both sides of the divide. While these have already yielded the kinds of curricular innovations recommended by the Report, a case is made for more radical changes in hiring practices, distribution of teaching and service, reward structures, and graduate education , changes which have the capacity to transform the institutional values upon which they will also depend. [source] The evolution of Chinese policies and governance structures on environment, energy and climateENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2010Stephen Tsang Abstract Although a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol has not yet materialized, the 2009 Copenhagen meeting underlined the importance of China in international debates on climate and energy. This is based not only on China's current climate emissions, but also on its expected energy use and economic growth. Within China, climate issues have, like environmental pollution more generally, received increasing government and societal attention, but so has energy , topics that relate to one other but also have different priorities and actor interests behind them. However, while climate change has become more prominent, as shown in the targets included in the current five-year plan, its institutional embeddedness in relation to particularly energy issues has received limited attention. This paper aims to help shed some light on how Chinese policies and governance structures on energy, climate and environment have evolved, particularly considering the roles of national and provincial authorities. Administrative structures and policy-making processes turn out to be very complex, with a range of units and bodies at different levels with distinct responsibilities as well as inter-linkages. Moreover, tensions and conflicts can be found regarding climate change and environmental policies on the one hand, and prevailing objectives to further economic development on the other. Energy policies serve the same economic goals, with climate change being most often operationalized in terms of energy conservation. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Sustainable development and the ,governance challenge': the French experience with Natura 2000ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2008Darren McCauley Abstract Sustainable development is conceptualized in this paper as a serious challenge for governance structures and processes in nation states. Global and European agreements have placed the inclusion of civil society actors in policy-making at the heart of the sustainability agenda. This commitment is particularly evident in the Commission's White Paper on Governance and the EU Sustainable Development Strategy. From this perspective, the European Commission has consistently underlined the integral role of dialogue with social partners in any sustainability agenda. In contrast, there is a clear mismatch between these principles of civil society inclusion and policy-making in France. Long-standing traditions of meso-corporatism have struggled to adapt to extending participation to civil society actors. This paper assesses the implementation of sustainable development as civil society inclusion with reference to the French experience in dealing with EU biodiversity policy. It is argued that this governance challenge has effectively presented nation states with an ,interpretation dilemma' with regards to sustainable development. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Participation and/or/versus sustainability?ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2005Austria, Tensions between procedural, substantive goals in Two Local Agenda 21 processes in Sweden Abstract Local Agenda 21 (LA21) is committed to two types of goal: procedural goals substantiated primarily in the requirement to encourage greater participation in local decision making and substantive goals predominantly attached to the call for a sustainable development. In this article, we report on the LA21 processes of two communities, Helsingborg, Sweden, and Vienna, Austria. We analyse what kind of normative tension the two communities have experienced by concurrently striving for democracy and sustainability. We also discuss what impact the two LA21 processes have on local governance structures and what potentials for more fundamental system changes they hold. Our analysis shows that the challenge of actually reconciling possibly conflicting goals is far from easy. In Helsingborg, the apparent harmony of goals has been achieved partly by falling back on political rhetoric, partly by interpreting the two goals in a narrow way, i.e. sustainability policy has been reduced to environmental issues and citizen participation has been equated with ,paternalistic' consultation. The Viennese LA21 process has managed to implement the two goals in a more comprehensive way, but this has come at the cost of being marginalized by the central political actors. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Principles for Public Management Practice: From Dichotomies to InterdependenceGOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001Martha S. Feldman In this essay we explore the relationship between management practices and a basic governance dilemma: how to manage flexibly and accountably. The challenge is both practical and theoretical. Managers must respond flexibly to the changing demands and expectations of the public and the ever-changing nature of public problems, yet they must do so in a manner that provides accountability to the public and political overseers. A dichotomous approach to the study of leadership as management action and the governance structures within which managers operate has inhibited the search for a public management theory that reconciles the dilemma. Emphasis upon managers as leaders typically focuses on the flexible actions managers might take to overcome structural "barriers," while emphasis upon governance structures typically focuses on the essential role of structure in ensuring accountability and restraining or motivating particular management efforts. The practicing manager, however, cannot deal with these aspects of the work separately. Managers must attend to demands for both flexible leadership action and structures that promise accountability. Anecdotal evidence provides illustrations of some of the ways that managers can integrate these demands. We suggest that these efforts point to an alternative theoretical framework that understands action and structure as mutually constitutive, creating a dynamic tension in which attention to one requires attention to the other. [source] Beyond the Producer-driven/Buyer-driven Dichotomy The Evolution of Global Value Chains in the Internet EraIDS BULLETIN, Issue 3 2001Gary Gereffi Summaries The Internet is still in the early stages of its development, but its impact on global value chains is already evident. While it may be premature to try to identify lasting changes on producer-driven and buyer-driven chains, several possible scenarios are emerging and they are not mutually exclusive. The first scenario is that electronic commerce will lead to the emergence of infomediary-based value chains that privilege direct on-line access to consumers. A second scenario is that the Internet is really just extending the logic of buyer-driven chains as both information and power continue to shift inexorably from manufacturers, marketers and retailers to consumers. A third scenario is that the impact of the Internet will be captured and integrated into the practices of large established companies, thus reinforcing power relationships in existing producer-driven and buyer-driven governance structures. Although there is evidence to support all three scenarios, the third model currently seems to be dominant. [source] Cooperation Costs, Governance Choice and Alliance Evolution*JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 7 2005Steven White abstract While researchers in alliance management have identified the duality of cooperation and control within alliances, comparative governance scholars have not yet developed a coherent framework for relating the costs of cooperation to governance choices. This paper proposes a theory of cooperation costs highlighting the importance of joint task complexity, interpartner diversity, equity and strategic implications on the perception of alliance value and the formation and evolution of hybrid governance structures. A tolerance frontier is used to predict conditions for alliance failure both ex ante and after formation, as well as conditions under which an alliance will evolve once formed. The framework is illustrated through an analysis of the initial structuring and subsequent changes in the NedCar alliance between Mitsubishi Motors and Volvo, and implications for further research are discussed. [source] The impact of state governance structures on management and performance of public organizations: A study of higher education institutionsJOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004Jack H. Knott Legislative statutes are passed by political majorities which support structures that insulate the implementing agency from its political opponents over time. Political actors also respond to different constituencies. Depending on the broad or narrow base of these constituencies, actors favor different kinds of governance structures. We apply this theoretical framework to the question of whether the state governance structures of boards of higher education affect the way university managers allocate resources, develop sources of revenue, and promote research and undergraduate education. Over the past two decades state governments have given considerable attention to state governance issues, resulting in many universities operating in a more regulated setting today. This paper develops a classification of higher education structures and shows the effects of differences in these structures on university management and performance using a data set that covers the period from 1987 to 1998. The analysis suggests that, for most of the measures, productivity and resources are higher at universities with a statewide board that is more decentralized and has fewer regulatory powers. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source] Youth Voices as Change Agents: Moving Beyond the Medical Model in School-Based Health Center PracticeJOURNAL OF SCHOOL HEALTH, Issue 7 2005Leslie A. Mandel Freshmen were recruited to participate in a Youth Advisory Board Project that included weekly afterschool meetings. Adult supervision was provided by SBHC staff that included 2 clinical social workers and 1 youth empowerment specialist. Through this effort, students were (1) trained in nonprofit board development and governance structures; (2) urged to identify gaps in services; (3) taught to select, prioritize, and implement action projects; and (4) offered clinical support around personal issues. Students brought a wealth of life experiences, knowledge of teen attitudes, information regarding trends in risk-taking behaviors, and feedback about experiences in the SBHC. In addition, their increased awareness of the SBHC service elements led to identification of obstacles to youth participation in care, feedback regarding positive and negative health care experiences within the SBHC, as well as with external health care providers, and ideas about unrecognized needs leading to gaps in services. This experience demonstrated that young health care consumers, with support, can focus their attention and begin to utilize analytical thinking skills to shape health outcomes and inform service delivery. (J Sch Health. 2005;75(7):239,242) [source] A contingency approach to nonprofit governanceNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 1 2009Patricia Bradshaw A number of contingency factors may be relevant for effective nonprofit organizations and their boards. Although all boards must fulfill certain critical roles and responsibilities, strategic choices can be made about adopting different governance configurations or patterns. These choices can be meaningfully informed by understanding organizational contingencies such as age, size, structure, and strategy,and, even more important, by external contingencies and environmental dimensions such as degree of stability and complexity. This article extends or layers contingency thinking beyond its traditional focus on an alignment between the external environment and the organization's structure to focus as well on the alignment of the organization's governance configuration with its structure and environment. Structural contingency theory in general, and specifically within nonprofits, is reviewed. Two cases are presented of organizations that used an approach based on contingency theory in an action research process to examine and change their governance configurations. The steps they followed may help other nonprofits adapt their governance structures and practices and fulfill their responsibilities for board assessment and reflection. [source] The Completely Decentralized City: The Case for Benefits Based Public FinanceAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2001Fed E. Foldvary An alternative to centralized top-down city governance is a multi-level bottom-up structure based on small neighborhood contractual communities. This paper analyzes the voting rules and public finances of decentralized, contractual urban governance and the likely outcome of such a constitutional structure, substantially reduced transfer seeking or rent seeking. Tax and service substitution, with lower-level funding and services substituting for higher-level public finance, is the general process by which the governance would devolve. Land rent is the most feasible source of such decentralized public finance, and local communities could also engage in local currency and credit services. Some empirical examples demonstrate the implementation of some of these governance structures. [source] "New Governance" and Associative Pluralism: The Case of Drug Policy in Swiss CitiesPOLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 4 2003Sonja Wälti Throughout the 1990s, hierarchical administrative governance structures have been replaced by self-governing networks for various motives, one of which is to improve the authenticity and democratic quality of public decisions. Thus, "new governance" has been praised for its propensity to provide a plurality of civil society organizations with access to the decision process. This article explores these claims based on the case of drug policy in Swiss cities. We show that self-governing networks indeed seem to have increased the involvement of civil society organizations in the policy process. However, we also find evidence that self-governing networks may in the longer run induce state control over civil society organizations, thus ultimately reducing associative pluralism. They do so either by imposing a policy paradigm or by excluding actors who do not comply with the dominant paradigm from the networks. We conclude by arguing that self-organizing networks should not be dismissed, given that former hierarchical bureaucratic approaches to drug-related problems have failed even worse. Rather, their long-term effects should be subject to further examination aimed at developing adequate responses to their shortcomings. [source] To Manage Is to GovernPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 5 2002Martha S. Feldman Governance structures constrain and enable the actions of public managers. Principal,agent theory has played a dominant role in our understanding of governance structures. This theory suggests that politicians create relatively static governance structures in a top,down fashion and hold managers accountable for mandated results. In other words, public managers are influenced by governance structures but do not affect governance structures. However, we argue that public managers do affect governance structures, and, in order to understand how this influence takes place, we need a new way of thinking about governance structures. We propose thinking about governance structures as relationships created through the interactions of people in different and reciprocal roles that are relatively dynamic. Public managers are an important source of the multiple, reciprocal, and dynamic interactions that produce governance (relationship) structures. As such, managers are accountable not only for policy outcomes, but also for the appropriateness of the relationships they create and support. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||