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Governance Problem (governance + problem)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting60%

Selected Abstracts

Nonprofit versus corporate governance: An economic approach

NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 3 2008
Gerhard Speckbacher
This article proposes a new theoretical concept of nonprofit governance using transaction cost economics and the economic theory of contracts. After a short review of economic approaches to corporate governance, I clarify the specific nature of the governance problem in nonprofit organizations. Based on this analysis, I derive criteria for selecting an organization's relevant stakeholders. If stakeholders provide valuable specific resources without the protection of a comprehensive contract that details exactly how the organization is to use these resources, then such stakeholders seek decision and control rights in order to direct the use of the resources they have provided. I argue that the core problem of governance is how to enhance valuable specific contributions of the relevant stakeholders while keeping the costs of bargaining between stakeholders and the costs of collective decision making low. The theory developed is then applied in a discussion of practically relevant governance mechanisms, and the concept of governance is used to contribute to the discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the nonprofit character of organizations from a governance perspective. [source]

CORRUPTION AND CORPORATE FINANCE PATTERNS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

PACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
Julan Du
Corruption contributes to a more prevalent and higher degree of corporate equity ownership concentration and more reliance on bank financing in raising external finance. It argues that corporate governance under corrupt governments is particularly poor. Firm management, taking advantage of political capital acquired through bribery, is especially powerful in expropriating from outside investors. Ownership concentration and reliance on bank financing are means of mitigating the corporate governance problem under a corrupt government. [source]

The Role of Competition in Determining Corporate Governance Outcomes: Lessons from Australia's Corporate Governance System

THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 5 2005
Alan Dignam
Successive waves of corporate collapse in every decade of Australia's history suggest that there is a significant unresolved corporate governance problem in Australia. Corporate collapse has been followed by reform but with little effect on the overall pattern of collapse and reform every decade. This article suggests that one of the elements which entrenches corporate governance problems in Australia is the competitive environment in which companies operate, which currently is not regulating management. It is argued that this anti-competitive environment has two significant effects. First, key shareholders have retained controlling blocks of shares as the benefits of control and the costs of unconstrained management are high in such distorted markets. Secondly, management skills have stagnated, so that bad management and regular management failure have become features of the corporate governance system. [source]

Perspective on Local Governance Reform in China

CHINA AND WORLD ECONOMY, Issue 2 2006
Mingxing Liu
H57; H71; P32; P35 Abstract This paper is an attempt to present an analysis of China's decentralization and local governance practices, the dilemmas rooted in the current institution. We argue that the misbehavior of local government officials is endogenous to China's central-local structure and that competition among localities has become distorted and constrained by various policy burdens and development mandates imposed from above. The information asymmetry for the enforcement cost of mandates that exists between central and local governments not only leads to difficulties and distortions in local performance evaluations, but also creates opportunities for local bureaucracy expansion and rent-seeking. Enhancing fiscal transfers, or strengthening political restraint, although necessary, would be far from enough to solve the local governance problems. The ultimate solution entails an in-depth deregulation reform on factor mobility and a furthest eradication of policy mandates for the local government. Edited by Xinyu Fan [source]