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Governance Practices (governance + practice)
Kinds of Governance Practices Selected AbstractsInclusive Governance Practices in Nonprofit Organizations and Implications for PracticeNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 4 2002William A. Brown An inclusive board seeks information from multiple sources, demonstrates an awareness of the community and constituents that benefit from and contribute to the organization's services, and establishes policies and structures to foster stakeholder contributions. This research investigated the prevalence of inclusive governance practices and its relationship to board composition, diversity attitudes, and recruitment practices. Fifty-six executive directors and forty-three board members representing sixty-two nonprofit organizations returned a mailed survey (29 percent response rate). The study profiled two organizations that represented different styles of inclusive governance. The survey, part of a larger study, contained questions about inclusive practices, board composition, attitudes toward diversity, and recruitment practices. Most organizations indicated that they operate with inclusive governance practices. The organizational profiles provide a picture of boards that used different strategies to accomplish the goal of inclusivity. Boards that use more inclusive practices were not necessarily heterogeneous in board member composition. Inclusive boards were more inclined to be sensitive to diversity issues and used recommended board recruitment practices. The existence of a task force or committee on diversity was also significantly associated with a more inclusive board. Nonprofit organizations must consider their philosophy on stakeholder involvement, recognizing that different strategies lead to different levels of stakeholder involvement. [source] When legal counsel is uninformedBOARD LEADERSHIP: POLICY GOVERNANCE IN ACTION, Issue 79 2005Bill Charney Boards often look to attorneys to guide their decisions about governance practice. For example, legal counsel is normally asked for help in revising bylaws, as they usually need to be revised with the adoption of Policy Governance. Legal knowledge, however, is not the same as governance knowledge. Bill Charney and Jim Hyatt's article "Legal Concerns with Policy Governance" (in Issue 78 of Board Leadership) addressed issues periodically seen as problematic by attorneys seeking to minimize legal risks for their clients. In this article, Charney and Hyatt explore misunderstandings that arise when an attorney lacks an understanding of Policy Governance and provide suggestions for effective board responses. [source] Managers as Monitors: An Analysis of the Non-executive Role of Senior Executives in UK CompaniesBRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2000Noel O'Sullivan An important aspect of current governance practice is the use of non-executive directors to monitor the behaviour of company management. This paper examines the extent to which senior executives are utilized as non-executives in large UK companies. The results suggest that executive directors are not an important source of non-executive directors. The average number of non-executive directorships held by each executive is 0.22. Indeed, 85% of executives hold no additional directorships. The holding of non-executive directorships is positively related to the strength of board monitoring in the executive's company, executive tenure and company size. Executives in companies with greater growth opportunities and operating in regulated industries are less likely to hold non-executive directorships. [source] Optimal Board Monitoring in Family-owned Companies: Evidence from AsiaCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2010En-Te Chen ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family-owned companies. Research Findings/Insights: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board independence of 38 per cent, separation of the chairman and CEO positions, and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study shows that the effect of additional monitoring on agency costs and firm performance differs across firms with different ownership structures. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels. [source] The Effect of National Governance Codes on Firm Disclosure Practices: Evidence from Analyst Earnings ForecastsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2008John Nowland ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question: This study examines whether voluntary national governance codes have a significant effect on company disclosure practices. Two direct effects of the codes are expected: 1) an overall improvement in company disclosure practices, which is greater when the codes have a greater emphasis on disclosure; and 2) a leveling out of disclosure practices across companies (i.e., larger improvements in companies that were previously poorer disclosers) due to the codes new comply-or-explain requirements. The codes are also expected to have an indirect effect on disclosure practices through their effect on company governance practices. Research Findings/Results: The results show that the introduction of the codes in eight East Asian countries has been associated with lower analyst forecast error and a leveling out of disclosure practices across companies. The codes are also found to have an indirect effect on company disclosure practices through their effect on board independence. Practical Implications: This study shows that a regulatory approach to improving disclosure practices is not always necessary. Voluntary national governance codes are found to have both a significant direct effect and a significant indirect effect on company disclosure practices. In addition, the results indicate that analysts in Asia do react to changes in disclosure practices, so there is an incentive for small companies and family-owned companies to further improve their disclosure practices. [source] Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2008A Comparison of Institutional, Efficiency Perspectives ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Given the global diffusion and the relevance of codes of good governance, the aim of this article is to investigate if the main reason behind their proliferation in civil law countries is: (i) the determination to improve the efficiency of the national governance system; or (ii) the will to "legitimize" domestic companies in the global financial market without radically improving the governance practices. Research Findings/Insights: We collected corporate governance codes developed worldwide at the end of 2005, and classified them according to the country's legal system (common or civil law). Then, we made a comparative analysis of the scope, coverage, and strictness of recommendations of the codes. We tested differences between common law and civil law countries using t-tests and probit models. Our findings suggest that the issuance of codes in civil law countries be prompted more by legitimation reasons than by the determination to improve the governance practices of national companies. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The study contributes to enriching our knowledge on the process of reinvention characterizing the diffusion of new practices. Our results are consistent with a symbolic perspective on corporate governance, and support the view that diffusing practices are usually modified or "reinvented" by adopters. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results support the idea that the characteristics of the national corporate governance system and law explain the main differences among the coverage of codes. This conclusion indicates the existence of a strong interplay between hard and soft law. [source] Corporate Boards and Company Performance: review of research in light of recent reformsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2007David Finegold Recent US corporate governance reforms introduced extensive regulations and guidelines for public corporations, particularly corporate boards. This article evaluates the extent to which empirical research on corporate boards and firm performance supports these reforms. Building on the meta-analysis conducted by Zahra and Pearce (1989), we review 105 studies published between 1989 and 2005. We find most of the practices mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the regulations issued by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ, had not been subject to prior study. Where board characteristics have been studied, we find limited guidance for policymakers on identifying governance practices that result in more effective firm performance. In an effort to increase the relevance of future research on boards and firm performance, we provide a framework on corporate boards. [source] Corporate Governance in ASEAN Financial Corporations: reality or illusion?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2007Wiparat Chuanrommanee According to Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, Singapore has the best corporate governance practices in Asia. Malaysia has had the biggest improvements in governance overtime. Thailand lags behind both in achieving appropriate governance. This paper considers recent developments in corporate governance through the analysis of the corporate websites of financial corporations in these countries. The study finds that the corporate governance practices of Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean financial corporations are consistent with international best practices. Corporate governance as presented in company documents probably does not actually reflect real corporate governance practices. These practices do not have an impact on company performance. The level of corporate governance reported is also not consistent with the ratings from international financial institutions such as Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia and Standard & Poor's. These findings suggest that corporate governance in ASEAN is more illusion than fact. [source] Corporate Governance in South Africa: a bellwether for the continent?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2006Melinda Vaughn The recent onslaught of corporate scandals has compelled the world to acknowledge the profound impact of corporate governance practices on the global economy. Corporate governance is of particular concern in developing economies, where the infusion of international investor capital and foreign aid is essential to economic stability and growth. This paper focuses attention on corporate governance initiatives in South Africa, given its significance as an emerging market, its potential leadership role on the African continent and the country's notable corporate governance reform since the collapse of apartheid in 1994. The evolution of the country's corporate structure and the forces driving corporate governance reform over the past decade will be examined, followed by a review of the most notable reform initiatives in place today. Finally, an assessment of those initiatives will be presented, along with recommendations concerning how South Africa's initiatives can serve as models of enhanced corporate governance standards for the African continent. [source] Continuity and Change in Corporate Governance: comparing Germany and JapanCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2005Gregory Jackson Germany and Japan are often seen deviating from an economic model of shareholder control and thereby as being similar by virtue of their mutual contrast with the US. Given the common challenges for bank-based and stakeholder-oriented models of corporate governance, Germany,Japan comparison seems particularly timely. This article provides an introductory overview and analysis for the Special Issue by comparing recent developments in corporate law reform, banking and finance, and employment in Germany and Japan. While rejecting arguments for international convergence, we discuss this evidence of simultaneous continuity and change in corporate governance as a potential form of hybridisation of national models or renegotiation of stakeholder coalitions in German and Japanese firms. One consequence is the growing diversity of firm-level corporate governance practices within national systems. [source] Factors Associated with the Development of Board Sub,committeesCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2002Elizabeth Carson This study examines the factors associated with the presence of board sub,committees, specifically audit, remuneration and nomination committees. Factors which are hypothesised in this study to affect sub,committee presence are Big 6 auditors, non,executive directors, non,executive chairmen, number of intercorporate relationships of the board and shareholder type. Company size, number of board members and leverage are employed as control variables as suggested by earlier research. An analysis of board sub,committees in the Australian corporate environment is relevant to other jurisdictions as there are no mandatory requirements on either board composition or board sub,committees. There is, however, a mandatory requirement to disclose corporate governance practices which allows for a study of this type to be reliably conducted. A sample of 361 Australian companies drawn from the largest 500 public companies is employed. Audit committee presence is found to be positively associated with Big 6 auditors and the number of intercorporate relationships of the directors of the board. Remuneration committees are also found to be associated with Big 6 auditors and intercorporate relationships and also higher levels of institutional investment. The presence of nomination committees is not associated with auditors, directors or investors, but is associated with board size and leverage. The study concludes that audit committees are a highly developed and mature governance mechanism, and that remuneration committees can be classed as a developing and maturing structure whilst nomination committees are relatively immature. [source] Principles of Corporate Governance in GreeceCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2001Harilaos Mertzanis This article presents the reasons which led the business community in Greece to reconsider existing corporate governance practices of listed corporations in the Athens Stock Exchange, outlines the general rationale for the creation and adoption of specific recommendations for best corporate practice, presents the recommendations in full detail and finally provides suggestions for the required corporate legal reform. [source] Divestitures, wealth effects and corporate governanceACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2010Sian Owen G32; G34 Abstract We analyse the market reaction to divestiture decisions and determine the impact of corporate governance practices. We find the market reaction is significant and can be determined using internal governance mechanisms. We evaluate the determinants of the decision to sell using a control sample of firms displaying characteristics often associated with divestitures indicating that these firms may face the same incentives to divest but elect not to restructure in this manner. Our results suggest that a combination of strong internal and external governance may force managers to act in a manner that is incompatible with their personal desires. [source] Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United KingdomACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Chrisostomos Florackis G3; G32 Abstract This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999,2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure. [source] Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized Facts about their Determinants and Governance,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Joshua Aizenman Concerns about the implications of foreign investments by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) stem in large part from apprehensions about the objectives and governance quality of these institutions. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the stylized facts of SWFs by providing a statistical analysis of a range of characteristics of SWFs, including the motivation for their establishment as well as their size, governance and effect on reserve management behaviour. Specifically, it estimates what factors foster the establishment of SWFs as well as affect their size. It also investigates the extent to which the governance and transparency of individual SWFs correlate with domestic and global governance practices. Lastly, it analyses how asset accumulation by SWFs may affect central bank holdings of official reserves. [source] The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Audit Fees of Australian Listed FirmsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING, Issue 2 2009Fazlina Mohd Salman The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (SOX) was enacted to improve the corporate governance practices of US firms. Significantly, foreign registrants traded on US stock exchanges are also required to comply with SOX. This study assesses the impact of the SOX legislation on non-US firms by examining audit fees for Australian firms with foreign registrant status in the US from 2001 to 2005, compared with audit fees for other Australian firms. The findings indicate that Australian companies issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) incurred substantial increases in audit fees and Australian firms subject to the full provisions of SOX incurred larger increases in audit fees. These findings provide a broader understanding of the compliance costs for non-US firms subject to SOX and therefore inform both policy-makers and firms. [source] Do Investors Really Value Corporate Governance?JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 2 2007Evidence from the Hong Kong Market To examine the relation between corporate governance and firm value, we develop an instrument to assess the corporate governance practices of listed companies in Hong Kong. Based on the Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD) and the Code of Best Practices (HKEx), we construct a corporate governance index (CGI) for Hong Kong listed companies. Unlike measures used in other studies, the CGI score reflects the presence of good corporate governance practices as well as variation in the quality of corporate governance practices. Empirical evidence shows that a company's market valuation is positively related to its overall CGI score, a composite measure of a firm's corporate governance practices. We also find that the transparency component of the CGI score drives the relation with market valuation. In summary, this study provides supporting evidence for the notion that, in Hong Kong, good corporate governance practices are consistent with value maximization. [source] Does government funding alter nonprofit governance?JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2002Evidence from New York City nonprofit contractors Government contracting has raised a collection of issues with respect to adequate oversight and accountability. This paper explores one avenue through which contracting agencies may achieve these tasks: through the governance practices of the contractor's board. Oversight and monitoring are a board's key responsibilities, and influencing a board's practices is one way a governmental agency can help to insure quality performance. Agencies could thus use both their selection process and their post-contracting power to influence board practice. Using a new, rich data set on the nonprofit contractors of New York City, a series of hypotheses were tested on the relationship between government funding and board practices. Significant differences were found to exist in board practices as a function of government funding levels, differences that mark a shift of energy away from some activities (i.e., traditional board functions, such as fund-raising) towards others (financial monitoring and advocacy). This suggests that government agencies may indeed use their contracting choices with an eye to particular governance practices. This increased emphasis on such activities appears to crowd out other activities, and is not unambiguously to the benefit of nonprofit board governance. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source] Collaborative governance practices and democracyNATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2004David E. Booher First page of article [source] Inclusive Governance Practices in Nonprofit Organizations and Implications for PracticeNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 4 2002William A. Brown An inclusive board seeks information from multiple sources, demonstrates an awareness of the community and constituents that benefit from and contribute to the organization's services, and establishes policies and structures to foster stakeholder contributions. This research investigated the prevalence of inclusive governance practices and its relationship to board composition, diversity attitudes, and recruitment practices. Fifty-six executive directors and forty-three board members representing sixty-two nonprofit organizations returned a mailed survey (29 percent response rate). The study profiled two organizations that represented different styles of inclusive governance. The survey, part of a larger study, contained questions about inclusive practices, board composition, attitudes toward diversity, and recruitment practices. Most organizations indicated that they operate with inclusive governance practices. The organizational profiles provide a picture of boards that used different strategies to accomplish the goal of inclusivity. Boards that use more inclusive practices were not necessarily heterogeneous in board member composition. Inclusive boards were more inclined to be sensitive to diversity issues and used recommended board recruitment practices. The existence of a task force or committee on diversity was also significantly associated with a more inclusive board. Nonprofit organizations must consider their philosophy on stakeholder involvement, recognizing that different strategies lead to different levels of stakeholder involvement. [source] The Need for Effective Communication with Market StakeholdersAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 32 2004Karen Hamilton Good corporate governance practices have become increasingly important in determining the cost of capital in global capital markets. The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) aims to promote an environment of market confidence so that listed companies can obtain reasonably priced capital and maximise the value of their listing. As the market operator, the exchange has the ability to set and monitor disclosure standards and to support dialogue between companies and investors. However, a problem with corporate governance disclosures in Australia is that they have not delivered particularly meaningful information to investors about the performance of individual companies. [source] Corporate Governance Scoring Systems: What Do They Tell Us?AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 32 2004Pernilla Linden The failure of companies such as Enron in the United States, and One. Tel and HIH in Australia, and the collapse of Arthur Andersen have created a worldwide debate on the importance of good corporate governance practices. A number of accounting and consulting firms and rating agencies have responded to the debate by developing corporate governance scoring systems (CGSS). In this paper we seek evidence of whether CGSS convey any information about the financial characteristics and performance of companies. We find no evidence of any significant relationship between the corporate governance score and financial performance. However, we find a direct relationship between a firm's size and its corporate governance score. [source] Internal and External Corporate Governance: An Interface between an Organization and its EnvironmentBRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Igor Filatotchev Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices (e.g. shareholder activism, board independence) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different corporate governance practices. This paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and focuses on two dominant streams that analyse internal and external governance mechanisms. First, we explore governance practices aimed at dealing with a complex set of problems internal to an organization, such as conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, different types of shareholders, and block-holder opportunism. Second, we discuss the importance of formal and informal governance arrangements that organizations use in managing their relationships with external parties, such as alliance partners, overseas subsidiaries and network members. We argue that an integrated approach bringing these two streams together helps to develop a more holistic view on the effectiveness and efficiency of various corporate governance mechanisms, and suggests a number of avenues for future research. This paper also sets the scene for this thematic issue on corporate governance, scopes the field and introduces 11 papers which make significant contributions towards our understanding of corporate governance. [source] Adapting to Europe: Is it Harder for Britain?BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2006Vivien A. Schmidt Britain has had difficulties adapting to European integration. The problems result not so much from the EU-related changes in national policies, which have actually been rather moderate, or from the EU-related changes in governance practices, although these have been significant, affecting national institutional structures, policy-making processes and representative politics. They do not even follow from the serious challenges that the EU-related changes in governance practices pose for traditional ideas about democracy. Rather, they come from the lack of a discourse capable of legitimating such changes. To demonstrate this, the article considers Britain's problems in comparative perspective with those of France, which has had greater changes in policies and practices, greater challenges to national ideas, but a more legitimating discourse, and Germany and Italy, where changes in the practices and challenges to ideas have not been as significant. [source] Perspective on Local Governance Reform in ChinaCHINA AND WORLD ECONOMY, Issue 2 2006Mingxing Liu H57; H71; P32; P35 Abstract This paper is an attempt to present an analysis of China's decentralization and local governance practices, the dilemmas rooted in the current institution. We argue that the misbehavior of local government officials is endogenous to China's central-local structure and that competition among localities has become distorted and constrained by various policy burdens and development mandates imposed from above. The information asymmetry for the enforcement cost of mandates that exists between central and local governments not only leads to difficulties and distortions in local performance evaluations, but also creates opportunities for local bureaucracy expansion and rent-seeking. Enhancing fiscal transfers, or strengthening political restraint, although necessary, would be far from enough to solve the local governance problems. The ultimate solution entails an in-depth deregulation reform on factor mobility and a furthest eradication of policy mandates for the local government. Edited by Xinyu Fan [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||